Wednesday, 18 November 2009

Immunological Ethnocentrism

A note I made some time ago, in quote marks, but I do not recall where I read it:

There is an analogy, according to Rosenblatt, between immunological reactions of the body and the ethnocentric reactions of the individual or of a society. Just as the body is better prepared to avoid destruction by foreign substances as a result of a generalised tendency to resist the impingement of foreign substances, so an individual or a society may be better prepared to avoid destruction by aliens as a result of a generalised tendency to distrust, avoid, or reject foreign-seeming individuals. The disadvantage of severe damage or destruction, whether likely to occur or not, is so much greater than whatever advantages contact with things alien confers on one that a psychological or biochemical paranoia is the preferred strategy for survival. Where one failure to anticipate the malevolence of an alien person or substance may be fatal, organisms that must acquire defensive reactions to each specific harmful person or substance are less likely to survive during a given period of time than organisms prepared to be defensive against all alien persons or substances.

Rosenblatt!

Background to the Afghan War

From Michel Chossudovsky, America’s “War on Terrorism” (Quebec, Global Research, 2005):

Chapter VI
The Trans-Afghan Pipeline


Washington’s Silk Road Strategy consists in not only excluding Russia from the westbound oil and gas pipeline routes out of the Caspian Sea basin, but also in securing Anglo-American control over strategic southbound and eastbound routes.

This strategy consists in isolating and eventually “encircling” the former Soviet republics by simultaneously taking control of both westbound and east/southbound corridors. In this regard, Washington’s strategy in support of the oil giants is also to prevent the former republics from entering into pipeline ventures (or military cooperation agreements) with Iran and China.

According to the Washington-based Heritage Foundation, a conservative public policy organization, the American diplomatic dance with the Taliban was partly an attempt to prevent the construction of a pipeline through Iran and to reduce Russian leverage over Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. [1]


Backed by the Clinton administration, Unocal, the California based oil giant, developed a plan in 1995 to build an oil and gas pipeline route from Turkmenistan, through Afghanistan and

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Pakistan, to the Arabian Sea. Unocal is also involved in the westbound Baku-Ceyan pipeline project out of Azerbaijan across Turkey and Georgia, together with BP, which has a majority stake in the consortium.

The CentGas Consortium

By transiting through Afghanistan, Unocal’s CentGas pipeline project was meant to bypass the more direct southbound route across Iran. Unocal’s design was to develop a dual pipeline system that would also transport Kazakhstan’s huge oil reserves in the Tenghiz Northern Caspian region to the Arabian Sea.

Although the Russian oil giant Gazprom was part of the CentGas consortium, its participation was insignificant. [2] The hidden agenda was also to weaken Gazprom, which controls the Northbound gas pipeline routes out of Turkmenistan, and undermine the agreement between Russia and Turkmenistan, which handled the export of Turkmen gas through the network of Russian pipelines.

After Unocal had completed a first round of negotiations with Turkmenistan’s President Niyazov, it opened talks with the Taliban. [3] In turn, the Clinton administration decided to back the installation of a Taliban government in Kabul in 1996, as opposed to the Northern Alliance, which was backed by Moscow:

Impressed by the ruthlessness and willingness of the then-emerging Taliban to cut a pipeline deal, the State Department and Pakistan’s ISI agreed to funnel arms and funding to the Taliban in their war against the ethnically Tajik Northern Alliance. As recently as 1999, US taxpayers paid the entire annual salary of every single Taliban government official. [4]


Meanwhile, the Russians were providing logistical support and military supplies to General Massoud’s Northern Alliance out of military bases in Tajikistan. When Kabul finally fell to the Taliban with the military backing of America’s ally Pakistan, in September 1996, State Department spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found “nothing objectionable” in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose

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Islamic law. Senator Hank Brown, a supporter of the Unocal project, said “the good part of what has happened is that one of the factions at least seems capable of developing a government in Kabul.” Unocal’s Vice-President, Martin Miller, called the Taliban’s success a “positive development”. [5]

When the Taliban took Kabul in 1996, Washington said nothing. Why? Because Taliban leaders were soon on their way to Houston, Texas, to be entertained by executives of the oil company, Unocal…. A US diplomat said, “The Taliban will probably develop like the Saudis did.” He explained that Afghanistan would become an American oil colony, there would be huge profits for the West, no democracy and the legal persecution of women. “We can live with
that”, he said. [6]


Washington’s endorsement of the Taliban regime instead of the Northern Alliance was part of the “Big Game” and the added rivalry between Russian and US conglomerates for control over oil and gas reserves, as well as pipeline routes out of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In early 1997, Taliban officials met at Unocal’s Texas office:

[Unocal’s Barry] Lane says he wasn’t involved in the Texas meetings and doesn’t know whether then-Governor George W. Bush, an ex-oil man, ever had any involvement. Unocal’s Texas spokesperson for Central Asia operations, Teresa Covington, said the consortium delivered three basic messages to the Afghan groups. “We gave them the details on the proposed pipelines. We also talked to them about the projects’ benefits, such as the transit fees that would be paid,” she says. “And we reinforced our position the project could not move forward until they stabilized their country and obtained political recognition from the US and the international community.” Covington says the Taliban were not surprised by that demand …. In December 1997, Unocal arranged a high-level meeting in Washington, DC, for the Taliban with Clinton’s undersecretary of state for South Asia, Karl Inderforth. The Taliban delegation included Acting Minister for Mines and Industry Ahmad Jan, Acting Minister for Culture and Information, Amir Muttaqi, Acting Minister for Planning, Din Muhammad and Abdul Hakeem Mujahid, their permanent UN delegate. [7]


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Two months following these negotiations, in February 1998, Unocal Vice President for International Relations, John Maresca, in a statement to the House Committee on International Relations, called for “the need for multiple pipeline routes for Central Asian oil and gas resources”. Implied in his statement, US foreign policy in the region was to be geared towards destabilizing the north, west and southbound pipeline routes controlled by Russia, as well as competing pipelines through Iran:

[A] chief technical obstacle [or more likely political obstacle] which we in the industry face in transporting oil is the region’s existing pipeline infrastructure. Because the region’s pipelines were constructed during the Moscow-centred Soviet period, they tend to head north and west toward Russia. There are no connections to the south and east …

The key question then, is how the energy resources of Central Asia can be made available to nearby Asian markets … One obvious route south would cross Iran, but this is foreclosed for American companies because of US sanctions legislation. The only other possible route is across Afghanistan, which has of course its own unique challenges. The country has been involved in bitter warfare for almost two decades, and is still divided by civil war. From the outset, we have made it clear that construction of the pipeline we have proposed across Afghanistan could not begin until a recognized government is in place that has the confidence of governments, lenders, and our company.

Unocal foresees a pipeline which would become part of a regional system that would gather oil from existing pipeline infrastructure in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Russia. The 1,040-mile long oil pipeline would extend south through Afghanistan to an export terminal that would be constructed on the Pakistan coast. This 42-inch diameter pipeline would have a shipping capacity of one million barrels of oil per day. The estimated cost of the project, which is similar in scope to the trans-Alaska pipeline, is about $2.5 billion.

Without peaceful settlement of the conflicts in the region, cross-border oil and gas pipelines are not likely to be built. We urge the Administration and the Congress to give strong support to the UN-

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led peace process in Afghanistan. The US Government should use its influence to help find solutions to all of the region’s conflicts. [8]


The Unocal-Bridas Feud

There was something else behind the Unocal pipeline project, which mainstream reports failed to mention. The Taliban had also been negotiating with an Argentinean oil group, Bridas Energy Corporation, and were “playing one company against the other”. [9] Bridas belonged to the wealthy and powerful Bhulgeroni family. Carlos Bhulgeroni is a close friend of former Argentine President Carlos Menem, whose government was instrumental in implementing in 1990 - under advice from the World Bank - a comprehensive deregulation of Argentina’s oil and gas industry. This deregulation contributed to the enrichment of the Bhulgeroni family.

In 1992 - several years prior to Unocal’s involvement - Bridas Energy Corporation had obtained gas exploration rights in Eastern Turkmenistan, and the following year it was awarded the Keimir oil and gas block in Western Turkmenistan. Washington considered this an encroachment. It responded to Bridas’ inroads into Central Asia by sending former Secretary of State Alexander Haig to lobby for “increased US investments” in Turkmenistan. [10] A few months later, Bridas was prevented from exporting oil from the Keimir block.

Unocal and Bridas were clashing in their attempts to gain political control. While Bridas had a head start in its negotiations with Turkmen officials, Unocal had the direct support of the US Government, which was acting both overtly (through diplomatic channels) as well as covertly to undermine Bridas Energy Corp.

In August 1995, at the height of the Afghan civil war, Bridas representatives met up with Taliban officials to discuss the pipeline project. Meanwhile, Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyasov had been invited to New York (October 1995) to sign an agreement with Unocal and its CentGas consortium partner, Delta Oil Corporation of Saudi Arabia. The agreement was signed by President Niyazov of Turkmenistan and John F. Imle, Jr., President of Unocal, and witnessed by Badr M. Al-Aiban, CEO of Delta Oil Corporation.


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Bridas and the Taliban

In February 1996, Bridas Energy Corporation of Argentina and the Taliban provisional government signed a preliminary agreement. Washington responded through its embassy in Islamabad, urging Pakistan’s Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to dump Bridas and grant exclusive rights to Unocal. [11] Meanwhile, the Clinton administration had funnelled, through Pakistan’s ISI, military aid to advancing Taliban forces. This support was a crucial factor in the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in September 1996. Following the installation of a hard-line Islamic government, Unocal confirmed that “it will give aid to Afghan warlords once they agree to form a council to supervise the project”. [12]

Back in Texas, Bridas Energy Corporation filed a $15 billion lawsuit against Unocal, accusing it of dirty tricks and interference in:

… secretly contacting the Turkmen deputy prime minister for oil and gas [in 1996] about its own pipeline plan. According to a Bridas source, the Turkmen government then made an overnight decision to cut off the export of oil from Bridas’ Keimir field on the Caspian Sea. The company also alleges that the deputy prime minister demanded that Bridas, with its cash flow strangled, renegotiate its concession. “We found written evidence that Unocal was behind the
curtains,” the Bridas source said. [13]


BP-Amoco Enter the Pipeline Saga

Facing pending financial difficulties, 60 per cent of Bridas shares were sold in August 1997 to the American Oil Company (Amoco), leading to the formation of the Pan American Energy Corporation. The bidders in the Bridas merger were Amoco and Union Texas Petroleum of the United States, France’s Total, Royal Dutch Shell, Spain’s Endesa and a consortium including Spain’s Repsol and US Mobil.

For Amoco, which later merged with BP in 1998, Bridas was a prize acquisition, which was facilitated by Chase Manhattan and Morgan Stanley. Former National Security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was a consultant to Amoco. Arthur Andersen - the

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accounting firm implicated in the 2002 Enron scandal - was put in charge of “post-merger integration”. [14]

BP-Amoco is the main player in the Westbound pipeline routes out of the Caspian Sea basin including the controversial Baku-Ceyan pipeline project through Georgia and Turkey. By acquiring Bridas, the BP-led consortium gained a direct stake in the east and southbound pipeline negotiations.

Unocal is both a “rival” as well as a consortium “partner” of BP. In other words, BP controls the westbound pipeline consortium in which Unocal has a significant stake. With Bridas in the hands of BPAmoco, however, it is unlikely that a future trans-Afghan pipeline will proceed without the consent and/or participation of BP:

Recognizing the significance of the merger, a Pakistani oil company executive hinted, “If these [Central Asian] countries want a big US company involved, Amoco is far bigger than Unocal.” [15]


Following the takeover of Bridas by Amoco, Bridas’ successor company, Pan American Energy Corporation, continued to actively negotiate with the Taliban. But the dynamics of these negotiations had been fundamentally modified. Pan American Energy was negotiating on behalf of its Chicago-based parent company Amoco. Moreover, the Clinton administration had abandoned its dirty tricks and was now backing Amoco’s subsidiary.

Meanwhile, in August 1998, Amoco and BP announced their decision to unite their global operations leading to the formation (together with Atlantic Ritchfield) of the world’s largest oil company.

The Bridas-Unocal rivalry had evolved towards “a fall-out” between two major US corporations (Unocal and BP-Amoco), which were also “partners” in the westbound pipeline projects. Both Unocal and BP-Amoco have extensive links to seats of political power, not only in the White House and Congress, but also with the military and intelligence establishment in charge of covert operations in Central Asia. Both companies contributed generously to the Bush presidential campaign.

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The merger between BP and Amoco (leading to the integration of British and American oil interests) had no doubt also contributed to the development of closer political ties between the British and US Governments. Responding to the merger of American and British interests in oil, banking and the military-industrial complex, Britain’s new Labour government, under Prime Minister Tony Blair, has become America’s unconditional ally.

The US Embassy Bombings

In the course of 1998, talks between Taliban and Unocal officials had stalled. The honeymoon was over. Then came the East African US Embassy bombings, allegedly by Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, and the launching of cruise missiles against targets in Afghanistan.

The official suspension of negotiations with the Taliban was announced by Unocal in August 1998 in the immediate wake of the punitive actions against Afghanistan and Sudan, ordered by President Clinton. Whether the 1997 takeover of Bridas by Amoco and the subsequent merger of BP-Amoco (also in August 1998) had a bearing on Unocal’s decision remains unclear. Nonetheless, “the Big Game” had evolved: Unocal was now competing against the world’s largest oil company, BP-Amoco.

The Texas Court Case: BP-Amoco (Bridas) versus Unocal

Two months later in this evolving saga, in October 1998, a Texas court dismissed the (formerly Argentinean-owned) Bridas’ US$15 billion lawsuit against Unocal “for preventing them developing gas fields in Turkmenistan”. [16] It turned out that the court ruling was in fact against Bridas’ parent company, BP-Amoco, which had, a year earlier, acquired a controlling stake in Bridas.

In all likelihood, there was a mutual understanding between Unocal and BP-Amoco, which are consortium partners in the Caspian Sea basin. Moreover, while Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former National Security Adviser (in a Democratic administration), was acting as a consultant for Amoco, Henry Kissinger, a former Secretary of State (in a Republican administration), was advising Unocal Corporation.

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The acquisition of Bridas by BP-Amoco suggests that BP will, in all likelihood, be a major player in future pipeline negotiations, most probably in an agreement with Unocal.

Unocal Withdraws But Only Temporarily

While Unocal had formally withdrawn from the CentGas consortium in the wake of the cruise missile attacks on Afghanistan and the Sudan, BP-Amoco’s subsidiary, Pan American Energy, (the successor company to Bridas), continued to actively negotiate with Afghan, Russian, Turkmen and Kazakh officials regarding the trans-Afghan pipeline project.

Meanwhile, a turnaround had occurred in US foreign policy under the Clinton administration towards Bridas: No more dirty tricks against a company which is now owned by one of America’s largest oil conglomerates! Visibly, in the last two years of the Clinton administration, Unocal’s rival in the pipeline negotiations, BPAmoco, had the upper hand.

Despite Unocal’s temporary withdrawal, the CentGas consortium was not disbanded. Unocal’s partner, Delta Oil Corporation of Saudi Arabia, in CentGas continued to negotiate with the Taliban.

George W. Bush Enters the White House

The evolving pipeline saga gained a new momentum upon George W. Bush’s accession to the White House in January 2001.

At the very outset of the Bush administration, Unocal (which had withdrawn in 1998 from pipeline negotiations under the Clinton administration) reintegrated the CentGas Consortium and resumed its talks with the Taliban (in January 2001), with the firm backing, this time, of senior officials of the Bush administration, including Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage. Dick Armitage had previously been a lobbyist for Unocal in the Burma/Myanmar Forum, which is a Washington-based group funded by Unocal. [17]

These negotiations with the Taliban occurred only a few months before the September 11 attacks:

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Laila Helms [daughter of Senator Jesse Helms], who was hired as the public relations agent for the Taliban government, brought Rahmatullah Hashimi, an advisor to Mullah Omar, to Washington as recently as March 2001. Helms was uniquely positioned for the job through her association with her uncle Richard Helms, former chief of the CIA and former Ambassador to Iran. One of the negotiating meetings was held just one month before September 11, on August 2, when Christina Rocca, in charge of Asian Affairs at the State Department, met Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Salem Zaef, in Islamabad.

Rocca has had extensive connections with Afghanistan, including supervising the delivery of Stinger missiles to the Mujahideen in the 1980s. At the CIA, she had been in charge of contacts with Islamist fundamentalist guerrilla groups. [18]


Unocal ‘Appoints’ Interim Government in Kabul

In the wake of the bombing of Afghanistan, the Bush administration designated Hamid Karzai as head of the interim government in Kabul. While highlighting Karzai’s patriotic struggle against the Taliban, what the media failed to mention is that Karzai had collaborated with the Taliban government. He had also been on Unocal’s payroll.

In fact, since the mid-1990s, Hamid Karzai, who later became President, had acted as a consultant and lobbyist for Unocal in negotiations with the Taliban. His appointment - visibly on behalf of the US oil giants - had been casually rubber-stamped by the “international community” at the November 2001 Bonn conference, held under UN auspices.

According to the Saudi newspaper Al-Watan:

Karzai has been a Central Intelligence Agency covert operator since the 1980s. He collaborated with the CIA in funneling US aid to the Taliban as of 1994 “when the Americans had - secretly and through the Pakistanis [specifically the ISI] - supported the Taliban’s assumption of power.” [19]


“Coincidentally, President Bush’s Special Envoy to Kabul, Zalmay Khalizad, had also worked for Unocal. He had drawn up the risk

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analysis for the pipeline in 1997, lobbied for the Taliban and took part in negotiations with them.” [20] Khalizad had occupied the position of Special Advisor to the State Department during the Reagan administration, “lobbying successfully for accelerated US military aid to the Mujahideen”.

He later became Undersecretary of Defense in the Bush Senior Cabinet. [21] When George W. was inaugurated in January 2001, Khalizad was appointed to the National Security Council. While Clinton’s foreign policy had provided support to US oil interests in Central Asia, under the Republicans oil company officials were brought into the inner sphere of political decision-making.

The ‘Reconstruction’ of Afghanistan

Washington had set the stage. According to a World Bank representative in Kabul, “reconstruction in Afghanistan [was] going to open up a whole range of opportunities.” [22]

Two days after the bombing of Afghanistan commenced, on October 9, the US Ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlain, met with Pakistani officials regarding the trans-Afghan pipeline. The pipeline, according to the report, was slated to “open up new avenues of multi-dimensional regional cooperation, particularly in light of recent geopolitical developments [bombing of Afghanistan] in the region”. [23]

With Afghanistan under US military occupation, the role of Hamid Karzai as the country’s President is to “broker” the pipeline deal on behalf of the Anglo-American oil giants with the firm backing of the Bush administration.

In the immediate wake of the October 2001 bombing raids, the media reported that “two small companies”, Chase Energy and Caspian Energy Consulting (acting on behalf of major oil interests), had contacts with the governments of Turkmenistan and Pakistan to revive the pipeline deal. While the identity of the oil companies behind these “small firms” was not mentioned, it just so happens that the President of Caspian Sea Consulting, S. Rob Sobhani, had been a consultant to BP-Amoco in Central Asia. Sobhani also sits on the Council of Foreign Relations’ “Caspian Sea

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Discourse”, together with representatives of major oil companies, the George Soros Open Society Institute, the CIA and the Heritage Foundation (a Republican party think tank).

According to S. Rob Sobhani:

It is absolutely essential that the US make the pipeline the centerpiece of rebuilding Afghanistan …. The State Department thinks it’s a great idea, too. Routing the gas through Iran would be avoided, and the Central Asian republics wouldn’t have to ship through Russian pipelines. [24]


According to Joseph Noemi, CEO of Chase Energy, September 11, and the “War on Terrorism” are a blessing in disguise for Afghanistan:

If the United States’ presence continues in the region, [September 11] is probably the best thing that could have happened here for the Central Asian republics … This region, in terms of oil economics, is the frontier for this century and Afghanistan is part and parcel of this. [25]


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Notes

1. Knight Ridder News, 31 October 2001.
2. Jim Crogan, “The Oil War”, LA Weekly, 30 November 2001.
3. Ibid.
4. Ted Rall, “It’s About Oil”, San Francisco Chronicle, 2 November 2001, p. A25.
5. Ishtiaq Ahmad, “How America Courted Taliban”, Pakistan Observer, 20 October 2001.
6. John Pilger, “This War is a Fraud”, Daily Mirror, 29 October 2001.
7. Jim Crogan, “Pipeline Payoff to Afghanistan War”, California CrimeTimes, November 2001, http://www.californiacrimetimes.com/. See also Jim Crogan, “The Oil War: Unocal’s once-grand plan for Afghan pipelines”, LA Weekly, 30 November-6 December 2001.
8. US Congress, Hearing on US Interests in the Central Asian Republics, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on International Relations, Washington, DC,
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa48119.000/hfa48119_0f.htm.
9. See Karen Talbot, “US Energy Giant Unocal Appoints Interim Government in Kabul”, Global Outlook, No. 1, Spring 2002, p. 70.
10. “Timeline of Competition Between Unocal and Bridas”, World Press Review, December 2001, www.worldpress.org.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Alexander Gas and Oil Connections, http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/company/cnc75005.htm, 12 August 1997
14. Larry Chin, “Unocal and the Afghanistan Pipeline”, Online Journal, 6 March 2002, Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/CHI203A.html, 6 March 2002.
15. Ibid.
16. Timeline, op. cit.
17. Larry Chin, op. cit.
18. See Karen Talbot,“US Energy Giant Unocal Appoints Interim Government in Kabul”, Global Outlook, No. 1, Spring 2002. p. 70.
19. Karen Talbot, op. cit. and BBC Monitoring Service, 15 December 2001.
20. Karen Talbot, op. cit.
21. Patrick Martin, “Unocal Advisor Named Representative to Afghanistan”, World Socialist Web Site, 3 January 2002.
22. Statement of William Byrd, World Bank Acting Country Manager for Afghanistan, 27 November 2001.
23. Quoted in Larry Chin, “The Bush administration’s Afghan Carpet”, Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/CHI203B.html, 13 March 2002.
24. Daniel Fisher, “Kabuled Together”, Forbes Online, 4 February 2002, http://www.forbes.com.
25. Knight Ridder News, 30 October 2001.

New round-up: Afghanistan

From yesterday’s news:

At his annual Mansion House foreign affairs address Gordon Brown says that a ‘clear timetable’ for the handover of security to Afghan forces could be agreed as early as January 2010. ‘The international community will meet to agree plans for the support we will provide to Afghanistan during this next phase.’

In a speech to the NATO parliamentary assembly David Miliband says the military commitment in Afghanistan is ‘not a war without end’ but that NATO’s priority was not to risk leaving a ‘vacuum’ for a resurgent Taliban.

Transparency International reports that Iraq and Afghanistan are among the most corrupt states on the planet. ‘When essential institutions are weak or non-existent, corruption spirals out of control.” And who made ’em weak to non-existent in Afghanistan and Iraq?

Now some quotes from Aram Roston’s article in The Nation last week, ‘How the US Funds the Taliban’:

On October 29, 2001, while the Taliban’s rule over Afghanistan was under assault, the regime’s ambassador in Islamabad gave a chaotic press conference in front of several dozen reporters sitting on the grass. On the Taliban diplomat’s right sat his interpreter, Ahmad Rateb Popal, a man with an imposing presence. Like the ambassador, Popal wore a black turban, and he had a huge bushy beard. He had a black patch over his right eye socket, a prosthetic left arm and a deformed right hand, the result of injuries from an explosives mishap during an old operation against the Soviets in Kabul.

But Popal was more than just a former mujahedeen. In 1988, a year before the Soviets fled Afghanistan, Popal had been charged in the United States with conspiring to import more than a kilo of heroin. Court records show he was released from prison in 1997.

Flash forward to 2009, and Afghanistan is ruled by Popal’s cousin President Hamid Karzai. Popal has cut his huge beard down to a neatly trimmed one and has become an immensely wealthy businessman, along with his brother Rashid Popal, who in a separate case pleaded guilty to a heroin charge in 1996 in Brooklyn. The Popal brothers control the huge Watan Group in Afghanistan, a consortium engaged in telecommunications, logistics and, most important, security. Watan Risk Management, the Popals’ private military arm, is one of the few dozen private security companies in Afghanistan. One of Watan's enterprises, key to the war effort, is protecting convoys of Afghan trucks heading from Kabul to Kandahar, carrying American supplies.

Welcome to the wartime contracting bazaar in Afghanistan. It is a virtual carnival of improbable characters and shady connections, with former CIA officials and ex-military officers joining hands with former Taliban and mujahedeen to collect US government funds in the name of the war effort.


Whereas in Iraq the private security industry has been dominated by US and global firms like Blackwater, operating as de facto arms of the US government, in Afghanistan there are lots of local players as well. As a result, the industry in Kabul is far more dog-eat-dog. “Every warlord has his security company,” is the way one executive explained it to me.

In theory, private security companies in Kabul are heavily regulated, although the reality is different. Thirty-nine companies had licenses until September, when another dozen were granted licenses. Many licensed companies are politically connected: just as NCL is owned by the son of the defense minister and Watan Risk Management is run by President Karzai’s cousins, the Asia Security Group is controlled by Hashmat Karzai, another relative of the president. The company has blocked off an entire street in the expensive Sherpur District. Another security firm is controlled by the parliamentary speaker’s son, sources say. And so on.


“Most escorting is done by the Taliban,” an Afghan private security official told me. He’s a Pashto and former mujahedeen commander who has his finger on the pulse of the military situation and the security industry. And he works with one of the trucking companies carrying US supplies. “Now the government is so weak,” he added, “everyone is paying the Taliban.”


Taliban, Mr Miliband? Taliban Schmaliban!

The last eight years begin to look like a speeded-up version of so many old-model colonisation-decolonisations. Invade and destroy the old regime; secure the resources; divide and rule the population; identify and cultivate the most corruptible local elites; install them in power; officially pull out, … but in reality control of the economy remains in our hands. I say ‘our hands’ but mean the bloody hooks of the bankers and contractors. As in Egypt, so in Afghanistan, we, the real we, merely provided the initial tax base and soldiery (this is Combat Barbie’s ‘service.’).

The system of transferring nominal authority without threatening the bankers’ actual control was developed and perfected by Sir Andrew Cohen at the Foreign office in the late 1940s. See Ronald Robinson, ‘Imperial Theory and the Question of Imperialism after Empire,’ and the same author’s contribution to Morris-Jones and Fischer (Eds), Decolonization and After: The British and French Experience (Cass, 1980), ‘Andrew Cohen and the Transfer of Political Power in Tropical Africa, 1940-1951.’ In the first of these Robinson asks whether decolonisation and the recognition of nationalist claims was not simply the ‘continuation of imperialism by other and more efficient means?’ Aye, and still is.

Tuesday, 17 November 2009

How Political Correctness is Corrupting Medicine

Brit nationalist blogger John of Gwent has written about the situation in Britain of ethnic minorities needing more organs for transplant than they provide to the organ bank, yet another subsidy we provide for the parasite groups. Unsurprisingly, the situation in America is the same, and yet still there is the complaint that Blacks suffer discrimination in the organ donor process, an issue reported on in Sally Satel, P.C. M.D. : How Political Correctness is Corrupting Medicine (New York, Basic Books, 2000), chapter 6, ‘Race and Medicine’:

According to new conventional wisdom … [a] mismatch in race between doctor and patient - especially when the doctor is white and the patient is not - may be enough to trigger subtle, or not so subtle, biases that result in second-rate medical treatment and poorer health. “It is increasingly evident that African-Americans and other minority patients have strong grounds for doubting both the goodwill and the color-blindness of White medical practitioners,”

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writes Kenneth DeVille of the Department of Medical Humanities at the East Carolina University School of Medicine. No less authoritative a voice than the American Medical Association’s official newspaper has claimed that “growing body of research reports that racial disparities in health status can be explained, at least in part, by racism and discrimination within the health care system itself.” This is why, according to the Reverend Al Sharpton, health will be the “new civil rights battlefront,” a prediction echoed by other black leaders, including the Reverend Jesse Jackson, NAACP chairman Julian Bond and the Congressional Black Caucus.

In a 1998 radio address delivered during Black History Month, President Clinton spoke of race and health, “Nowhere are the divisions of race and ethnicity more sharply drawn than in the health of our people.” It is indeed true that black Americans are less healthy than whites and Asians on a number of measures, such as life expectancy, infant mortality and death from cancer. This often remains true even when insurance coverage is taken into account. Beyond these facts, the president could only speculate when he said that perhaps one of the reasons for racial disparities is “discrimination in the delivery of health services.”

Given the history of systematic racial discrimination and segregation in the health care system, lingering bias seems, at first, plausible. Black patients were treated in separate and inferior hospital wards - a policy that persisted at many hospitals in the Deep South until the late 1960s. Once routinely barred from joining hospital staffs and medical societies, black physicians started their own institutions to treat other blacks who were denied adequate care by the white-controlled medical facilities. As late as the mid-1960s several medical schools had restrictions against admitting black students.

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[…] Decades later however, accusations of medical bias still linger… In the fall of 1999 the US. Commission on Civil Rights informed Congress and the White House that “racism continues to infect the health care system.” Earlier that year an official of the Association of American Medical Colleges commented on physicians’ unwitting biases. “Most doctors think they are fair,” he told the Boston Globe. “That they carry bias is very hard for them to think about.”

For her part, Leslie Pickering Francis, a medical ethicist at the University of Utah, prefers to believe that “racism [is] the presumptive cause of health care problems minorities face” until there is evidence to the contrary. This view is increasingly common - not too surprising considering the habit nowadays of presuming that discrimination inevitably lies beneath the surface of any race-related difference in social outcome. But evidence suggests that many race-related differences in health are not what they seem to observers like Professor Francis, Reverend Sharpton and the Commission on Civil Rights.

The charge of physician bias against minority patients is often made reflexively, overlooking the myriad complicated reasons for differences in care. In this chapter I present evidence that supports other interpretations of “health disparities” as they are often called. As we will see, the race-related differences that do exist in both access to health care and in health status are better understood - and remedied - from the vantage points of clinical need and health care financing - not race politics.

Do Physicians Treat Minority Patients Differently?

A study in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1999 described differences in the treatment of lung cancer between black and white patients who were beneficiaries of Medicare insurance. In a careful analysis, Peter B. Bach and his colleagues cat Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York City looked at the records of more than ten thousand patients who received diagnoses of operable lung cancer. Seventy-seven percent of the white patients underwent surgery compared with 64 percent of the black patients. Five years after diagnosis, only one-quarter of black patients were still alive compared to one-third of whites.

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What accounts for the different rates of surgery? Did doctors not suggest the treatment as often to their black patients, or did these patients more often refuse the recommendation for surgery? Were the black patients more likely to have poor lung function, such as more carbon dioxide build-up, or other problems that would have prohibited surgery or contributed to earlier demise? Details like these are crucial in explaining why surgery was used less for black patients and why death rates differed, but those were not the questions that Bach and his colleagues set out to answer. Indeed, the authors themselves said they could not offer an explanation for different rates of surgery based on the kinds of data they collected.

Other physicians, however, were ready with hypotheses. “Possibly, physicians are treating cancer patients not just based upon their illness and recommended treatment, but on the basis of their race,” suggested Dr. Hugh Stallworth of the American Cancer Society. A more emphatic reaction greeted a report in the Annals of Emergency Medicine that 74 percent of white patients with fractures of the extremities received pain medication in the emergency room compared with 57 percent of black patients. “I think it’s racism, flat out,” said Dr, Lewis Goldfrank, director of emergency services at Bellevue Hospital in New York City.

Responses like these would probably not surprise John Landsverk of Children’s Hospital in San Diego. As he observes: “The usual implication of such disparities (in treatment rates) is that the health care system is biased against persons of the ethnic minority group and that the bias is likely to be found even in professional clinicians’ perceptions of clinical problems and (referrals for) clinical procedures.”

In light of this, Landsverk is especially enthusiastic about one study led by a group of doctors from the University of Pittsburgh that found no race-related differences in the treatment of children with behavioral problems. Their report appeared in the journal Medical Care one month after

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Bach’s study that attracted little public attention. It should have: it was “an important nonfinding,” as Landsverk notes in an accompanying editorial in the same journal. Not only did the Pittsburgh study include a very large sample - almost fifteen thousand children treated in clinics across the country and Canada - but most important, the researchers interviewed the parent and doctor of every patient. The results: the race and ethnicity of the child had no relationship to clinician patterns of drug prescribing, referral or diagnosis of behavioral problems. The clinicians also reported spending slightly more time with minority children than with their white counterparts.

The handful of studies just discussed gives a taste of the challenges inherent in interpreting health disparities data. First, the vast majority of treatment disparity studies are what scientists call “retrospective.” That is, the raw data already exist in hospital records, and researchers use them (in retrospect) to explore a specific question. (For example, are there more visits to emergency rooms on nights with a full moon?) The disadvantage of this approach is that key questions cannot be asked directly of the very people being studied: for example, in the case of the lung cancer study, did subjects want or refuse a specific treatment? Did their physicians offer it, and if not, why? Second, as Landsverk’s reaction to the University of Pittsburgh study suggests, the absence of alleged racial bias does not make news. Consider the following example of a study that made a media splash the first time around.

A Misdiagnosed Case of Physician Bias

Cardiac catheterization is a procedure used to discern whether there is blockage in the coronary arteries - the vessels that feed blood to the heart itself - and thus whether the patient is at risk for a heart attack. The delicate process involves introducing a catheter into an artery in the leg and threading it upward toward the heart. When it reaches the point near the apex of the heart where the coronary arteries branch off, dye is squirted in, and the arterial patterns show up on a real-time X-ray. This is generally the first step in determining whether the vessels can be opened wider

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using a tiny balloon (balloon angioplasty) or whether some or all of the vessels must be replaced in a bypass operation.

Struck by the observation that black patients undergo catheterization less often than whites, Dr, Kevin A. Schulman and others at Georgetown University Medical Center wanted to examine how doctors make their decisions to refer patients for the procedure. The researchers recruited 720 general internists at medical conventions and asked them to participate in a study of clinical decision-making. The internists were not told that a primary purpose of the study was to explore how the race and sex of the patient might affect those decision, or that the researchers expected to find that African Americans (and women) would be referred for cardiac catheterization less frequently than white men.

The doctors watched a video of actors wearing hospital gowns and answering questions posed to them by an interviewer who elicited their complaints about chest pain and other relevant medical and personal history. The viewing doctors were informed of the actor-patients’ insurance types and their occupations. All the questions asked of the actors and their responses, down to the gestures they used in describing their symptoms, were scripted to minimize inconsistencies. As a group, the doctors, most of whom were white, viewed 144 different videotapes, one for every possible combination of race (black or white), sex (male or female), and age (fifty-five and seventy years old), and including different clinical variables, like the nature of the chest pain and EKG and stress test results. Individual doctors were shown one randomly selected video.

Next, the physicians were asked whether the patients’ complaints appeared to reflect heart disease or another kind of distress, such as indigestion, and to rate the likelihood that the pain was indeed heart-related. As it turned out, all eight actor-patients received similar ratings from the doctors, leading the authors to assume the doctors would refer the catheterization at similar rates as well. Yet this did not happen; according to Schulman, “women and blacks [in the study] were less likely to be referred for cardiac catheterization than men and whites.” Doctors did not refer white men about 9 percent of the time, while the black actor-patients

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and women of both races did not get referred 15 percent of the time. If representative of actual clinical outcomes, Schulman told the media, this would mean that blacks are “40 percent less likely to be referred for cardiac catheterization compared to whites.” He misspoke, however; what it really would mean is that white patients have a forty percent lower chance of not being referred. Quite a difference, as we will see.

These findings were presented in an article titled “The Effect of Race and Sex on Physicians’ Recommendations for Cardiac Catheterization,” published in the New England Journal of Medicine in February 1999. Schulman and his associates speculate:

Our findings that the race and sex of the patient influence the recommendations of physicians independently of other factors may suggest bias on the part of the physicians. However, our study could not assess the form of bias. Bias may represent overt prejudice on the part of the physicians, or, more likely, could be the result of subconscious perceptions rather than deliberate actions or thoughts. Subconscious bias occurs when a patient’s membership in a target group automatically activates a cultural stereotype in the physician’s memory regardless of the level of prejudice the physician has.


The study was a media sensation. On ABC’s World News This Morning, Juju Chang told viewers, “How your doctor treats your heart may depend on the color of your skin … The bias shows up in the diagnosis and the doctors don’t even realize it.” Peter Jennings predicted that the study would make “political waves” because it showed that “prejudice among doctors causes a gap in the quality of health care between blacks and whites.”

On Nightline, Ted Koppel set up the story like this: “Last night we told you how the town of Jasper, Texas, is coming to terms with being the place where a black man was dragged to his death behind a truck by an avowed racist. Tonight we’re going to focus on [doctors] … who would be shocked to learn that what they do routinely fits quite easily into the category of racist behavior.” Newspaper headlines echoed the theme:

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“Cardiac Testing: Study Finds Women, Blacks are Being Shortchanged,” the Chicago Tribune said. “Health Care: It’s Better if You’re White,” announced The Economist. And all the articles repreated Schulman’s claim that blacks were forty percent less likely to be referred.

Some of the most intense - indeed, self-flagellating - reactions came from the medical profession itself. An editorial in the Lancet, Britain’s foremost medical journal saw the findings as being “as close to a definition of institutional racism as doctors and health-care providers may dare to get.” Aubrey Lewis, a Long Island cardiologist warned on Nightline that “if this [physician bias] continues on, you’re looking at literally a decimation of the African American population.”

No-one seemed to notice another article, published earlier that same February, in the Annals of Internal Medicine by the Harvard researcher Lucian L. Leape and his colleagues. In their evaluation of thirteen New York city hospitals. Leape’s group found that African American patients are as likely to undergo cardiac bypass or balloon angioplasty as whites and Hispanics, and in some hospitals more likely to receive a recommendation for these procedures.

A Second, Sober Look at Schulman’s Study

A careful look at the work of Schulman and his colleagues reveals a number of intriguing things. One is the doctors’ impressions of the subjects: one might be surprised to find that they found the white actor-patients to be the least agreeable. When asked, for example, to rate their impressions of the subjects’ personal characteristics, the doctors rated the white men as more “hostile” and gave them the lowest ratings on scales that ranged from “ignorant” (lowest score) to “knowledgeable” highest score” and from “poor communicator” to “good communicator.” Similarly, doctors judged white men to be more “dependent” than their black counterparts, more “sad,” more “negative” in disposition, more “worried” and more “likely to over-report symptoms.”

Finally, the white males were judged “most likely to sue.” With such a litigious profile, one might have expected white men to be over-referred by physicians in order to avoid malpractice lawsuits.

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The second revelation came six months after the Schulman study appeared, when the New England Journal of Medicine itself published a powerful rebuttal. Lisa M. Schwartz, Steven Woloshin and H. Gilbert Welch, all physicians at the White River Junction Veterans Administration Hospital in Vermont, reanalyzed Schulman’s data and showed that the actual referral rates for three of the four groups were in fact the same. White men, white women and black men were all referred by nine in ten doctors. Only black women, for reasons that remain unclear, had a lower referral rate: about eight in ten. Put another way, the black women were eighty-eight percent as likely as white women and men of both races to be referred for catheterization in the actor-patient study.

The doctors from White River Junction also expressed dismay at what might be called the statistical sleight-of-hand that Schulman and his colleagues used to support their hypothesis of physician referral bias in favour of white men. It was only because Schulman and colleagues combined the referral rates for black men (91 percent) and black women (79 percent) to yield an 85 percent black referral rate that they could conclude that the racial differences were so marked. This maneuver led to the “mistaken impression that blacks had a forty percent lower probability of referral than whites, whereas, in fact, the probability of referral for blacks was 7 percent lower,” wrote the White River Junction doctors. “These exaggerations serve only to fuel anger and undermine the trust between physicians and their patients.” Schwartz and her colleagues were not alone in expressing concern; the NEJM editors published a note in the same issue regretting that they had not required the authors to use more straightforward statistical measures. “We take responsibility for the media’s overinterpretation of [this] article … The evidence of racism and sexism in [the Schulman] study was overstated,” the editors wrote.

Nevertheless, even after seeing how his findings had been interpreted by the press and used to goad racial resentments, Schulman wouldn’t budge. “Our study … will encourage the medical profession to seek ways to eliminate unconscious bias that may influence physicians’ clinical decision,” he maintained. Schulman also met with the Congressional Black Caucus at its invitation and briefed the members on bias in the health care

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system. Also sticking with Schulman’s interpretation was Paul Douglass, a cardiologist at Morehouse school of medicine. “You can argue with statistics all day,” he told USA Today. “We have to face the reality of our situation: there is a gender and racial bias.” Compared with the tidal wave of coverage triggered by the Schulman study, the article by Schwartz and her colleagues generated a mere trickle of media interest, as noted by the columnist John Leo and the media magazine Brill’s Content.

Alternative Explanations for Differences in Treatment

Less eye-catching than accusations of bias are the everyday aspects of clinical care that account for many of the recorded disparities. For example, one reason procedure rates differ is that medical problems do not necessarily occur with the same frequency across races. [..] Consider these facts: uterine fibroid tumors, and thus hysterectomies, are more common in black women than in whites, while osteoporosis-related fractures, and thus hip-replacement are rarer. Limb amputation is more common among black patients, typically because thicker atherosclerosis of the blood vessels in the leg makes it harder to perform limb-saving surgery.

African Americans suffer stroke at many times the rate of whites yet undergo a procedure to unclog arteries in the neck (endarterectomy) only one-fourth as often. Racism? Unlikely. Some studies have documented a greater aversion to surgery and other invasive procedures among African American patients, but the more substantial reason, in the case of endarterectomy, is clinical. It turns out that whites tend to have their obstructions in the large, superficial carotid arteries of the neck region, which are readily accessible to surgery. Blacks, by comparison, tend to have their blockages in the branches of the carotids. These smaller vessels run deeper and further up into the head where the surgeon cannot reach them.

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Thus, even without financial obstacles, an African American patient at high risk for stroke is far less likely than a white counterpart to undergo endarterectomy. Yet indoctrinologists like David R. Williams, a sociologist at the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research, are quick to turn this disparity into evidence of bias. After all, they argue, if money is not an issue, then the difference in treatment must represent bias on the part of the doctors. American Medical News, the newspaper of the American Medical Association, gives voice to this view: “National studies, such as the one that examined care at Dept. of Veterans Affairs medical facilities - where all of the patients have comparable insurance coverage - suggest ‘racial disparities in the quality of medical care do not merely reflect the behavior of a few bad apples,’ Dr. Williams said. ‘The evidence is too overwhelming and the pattern is too pervasive.’ ”

Williams seems not to consider a different interpretation: the patients’ clinical needs rather than the doctors’ personal biases are dictating the care. Think about it. If not for concern about the patient (many of whom are treated in private hospitals and have medical insurance), why wouldn’t physicians perform a reimbursable procedure?

Another consideration in performing procedures is the clinical condition of the patient. Does he have other medical problems that alter the risk-to-benefit ratio of a procedure and make the outcome less favorable? The treatment of heart disease, for example, often needs to be modified in the presence of uncontrolled high blood pressure and diabetes - conditions more typical of black patients with heart disease than of their white counterparts.

Then there is the site of care itself. Some hospitals simply do not offer certain cardiac procedures, such as bypass grafts or balloon angioplasty. Examining a sample taken from New York City hospitals, Dr. Lucian L. Leape of the Harvard School of Public Health and his colleagues found that about one-fifth of all patients needing these procedures do not get them, largely because those hospitals do not offer them. Leape found that failure to recommend these procedures - and hence to transfer a patient to a hospital where it could be performed - is equal across all groups of black, white and Hispanic patients. Conversely, when medical care is readily available for special patient populations (for example the veterans’

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affairs medical centers or the military service), racial differences in treatment and outcome can melt away. For example, veterans with colorectal and prostate cancer show no race-related differences in treatment availability, treatment methods or survival rates.

Fairness and Kidney Transplantation

Patients’ attititudes toward illness and care also play a role in determining the treatment they receive. The nature of their belief in their personal susceptibility to disease, the seriousness with which they perceive disease, their confidence that the treatment will work - and even that the medical system is benign - are all relevant. Differences in health benefits account for some of the reluctance in the African American community to donate (and sometimes receive) kidneys, according to Dr. Clive O. Callender, head of transplant surgery at Howard University Medical Center in Washington, DC.

Callender tells me that, compared to whites, African American patients are less trustful that they will be well cared for, whether as a living relative undergoing surgery to donate a kidney or as a patient undergoing transplant surgery to receive one. Some fear that signing a donor card will lead to premature declaration of death. Others express concern that a deceased donor will either be disfigured or unable to get into heaven without all his body parts. A potential recipient ay also object on religious grounds to having the tissue of a dead person in his body. Moreover, blacks are not as likely as whites to believe that people who get transplants gain additional healthy years of life.

To enhance recruitment of African American donors and dispel the myths surrounding donation, Clive Callender directs the national Minority Organ Tissue Transplantation and Education Program (MOTTEP), which operates in over a dozen cities. Understanding patients’ objections to donation and demystifying the process is critical because severe (or “end-stage”) renal disease is about four times as common in blacks than in whites and , as we will see, there are considerable benefits to receiving a kidney from a living donor of the same race.

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To create incentives for organ donation and expand the black organ donor pool, Wayne B. Arnason, a minister writing in the Hastings Center Report, has proposed an experimental protocol that would try to pair a black donor kidney with a black recipient, some African Americans have expressed a desire that their organs be earmarked for black recipients. Arnason’s proposal addresses the fears of some black patients that they are being discriminated against in the kidney transplantation process, fears stoked by observers like David Barton Smith, a sociologist at the University of Michigan, who asserts in his 1999 book Health Care Divided: Race and Healing a Nation: “The assumptions that served as justification for the Tuskegee Study remain in evidence among those providing health services to [the black] population . . . Blacks have lower rates of kidney transplants . . . even where no differences in insurance or ability to pay exist.”

This matter has attracted the attention of a wide spectrum of advocates, from the Reverend Louis Farrakhan (who has said that whites condone black-on-black killing as a source of transplantable organs) to law professors who propose suing the federal government for violating civil rights laws in the allocation of organs. The US Commission on Civil Rights has also weighed in: “Black patients remain less likely than other minorities and whites to receive a kidney transplant,” it reported in 1999, calling this “an aspect of health care inequality that thus far seems to have eluded the [HHS’s] Office of Civil Rights.”

To assess the fairness of the charges levied by the Commission on Civil Rights and others we must first walk through the steps involved in donating and receiving a kidney. The road starts at renal dialysis. Every two or three days patients with end-stage kidney disease undergo a process called renal dialysis while they wait far a kidney to become available. During the three-to-four-hour dialysis process, patients are hooked up to a machine that acts as an external kidney, removing the fluid and metabolic by-products that are normally cleared by the kidney and excreted as urine. For unclear reasons, black patients, on average, tolerate dialysis better than white patients - who are more likely than black patients to die while on the waiting list - and blacks can be

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maintained longer in a healthy state before transplantation. Just the opposite is true, however, once the operation has taken place: black patients, on average, do not tolerate the transplant organ as well as whites, and they must return to dialysis support sooner and more frequently.

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[…] Another key aspect of the transplantation process is the patient’s interest in receiving a kidney. United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) data suggest that African American patients decline the procedure more often than do whites. Reports have documented that black transplant candidates were more often undecided, more apt to decline the transplant operation at the last minute, more often unavailable owing to illness and more likely to be unlocatable when a kidney became available.

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[…] [T]he remedy for recruiting more organ donors is better education of both medical personnel and the public.

[…] Combining these principles - with better education for the public through a program like Clive Callender’s MOTTEP seems most promising. Simply getting more people to have a family discussion about donation is important because families are more likely to agree to the donation process if they know the deceased had previously expressed a desire to give his organs. The MOTTEP program also involves explaining the biology of matching and the nature of the surgical procedure, and working with churches to dispel religion-based myths. Callender’s results are encouraging: by the late 1990s 45 percent of kidneys transplanted at Howard University (a predominantly African American institution) were from black donors; a decade earlier the figure had been under 20 percent.

Fairness Continued

Now let us turn to the clinical aspects of transplantation. A crucial dimension is tissue compatibility. Without a good “match” the donor kidney will provoke the recipient’s immune system to attack or “reject” it. The better the match on biological variables, the better the outcome, Accord-

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-ing to a report issued by the UNOS Histocompatibility Committee, black patients in need of a transplant wait longer owing to factors such as blood type, sensitization and some antigens. Similarly, Rand researchers found that “once a patient is on the waiting list, biological factors may predominate” in explaining his lower chances of receiving a kidney.

A technique called antigen matching is used to test for different combinations of six major antigens, or proteins, found on the surface of tissues. A perfect six-out-of-six match is the ideal condition for compatibility between donor and recipient. A complete match is far less common in African American transplant candidates than in whites because they have more possible antigen combinations than whites do, and some of those antigens are very rare in the general population. Scientists are still debating the precise physiology of organ rejection, and particularly the extent to which the organ is jeopardized by less-than-perfect antigen matching. What they do know is that black transplant recipients are more likely to reject their new kidneys. Possible reasons include poor control of hypertension or a more vigorous immune response. Even well-matched transplants can be lost to rejection, suggesting that the standard antigen-matching system may be too simplistic.

[…] To circumvent some of the biological constraints, physicians encourage donation of a kidney from a living relative so that the chance of a match will be enhanced. Living donation is also promoted even if the donor is not related and not of the same race because there is so much

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added benefit from getting a fresh kidney - one that goes straight from the operating room of a healthy donor to the operating room of the recipient without spending too much time on ice. In fact, along with tissue compatibility and the clinical condition of the recipient, the amount of time spent in “cold storage” is one of the most important factors in the successful functioning of a transplanted organ.

Getting a live kidney has little to do with the medical establishment and a great deal to do with the health and attitude of one’s family and others of one’s own race. Unfortunately, the black donation rate from living individuals is very low relative to need. In 1998, for example, 438 living kidneys were donated by African Americans, but 14,923 African Americans needed a kidney (a ratio of 3 donated per 100 needed), while 2,559 whites gave live kidneys and 20,616 were in need (a ratio of 12 per 100). In addition to personal reluctance and wariness of the system, the low rate of black live donations relative to need is due in part to the fact that so many potential donors are not eligible to give a kidney because they suffer from hypertension or diabetes, conditions that diminish the health of their kidneys. UNOS data show that in 1998 almost one-third of all transplant candidates received a living kidney: 73 percent of those kidneys were given by white individuals to their relatives or friends, and 13 percent by African Americans to theirs.

Most patients on dialysis, especially black individuals, receive an organ from a deceased donor; a so-called cadaveric donor. Once on the waiting list, how do black patients fare in the allocation of kidneys from cadavers? In 1998 African Americans represented 36 percent of the waiting list for kidneys; as a group, they donated 11 percent of all cadaveric kidneys (proportionate to their representation in the general population) and received 27 percent of all donated kidneys.

Thus, more than half of all cadaver kidneys received by black transplant recipients came from donors of other races (predominantly white). As Maritza Rozon-Solomon and Dr. Lewis Burrows of the Department of Surgery at Mount Sinai School of Medicine observe: “African-Americans have historically donated significantly fewer cadaver kidneys than they have received. They have benefitted from Caucasian organ donation.”

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Donation is a gift of life that transcends racial score-keeping, but it is still important to look closely at the numbers when bias in the allocation of kidneys is alleged.

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Monday, 16 November 2009

Pakistanis in Britain: The Second Generation

Alison Shaw’s study of the Oxford Pakistani community was published a while ago, 1988, and the third generation of British Pakistanis is now grown up and quite the handful. Still, her information on the attitudes of her subjects toward us is worth reading -- and some of those attitudes, I think, cannot easily be dismissed as unjustified. Also important is the explicit contrast Shaw draws between the Pakistanis and the English in the levels of support they can expect from family and their wider communities.

From Alison Shaw, A Pakistani Community in Britain (Blackwell Ltd., Oxford, 1988):

Tariq had been seeing Rubina regularly for about one year without his parents’ knowledge before deciding to ask his father’s permission to marry. Despite their initial disappointment at their son’s intentions because they were already arranging a good match with a relative’s daughter, Tariq’s parents agreed to speak to Rubina’s parents. They rejected the proposal and so Tariq and Rubina decided to elope and get married elsewhere. When Rubina returned home to tell her parents of her marriage, her enraged father took her back to Pakistan, where, several months later, she was married to a relative.

When incidents like this occur, it is common for western observers to view them as evidence of the clash between cultures which they expect the second generation will inevitably experience as a result of being brought up and educated in Britain. The assumption is that because the second generation have been at school in Britain and imbued with western values, they will reject a culture which is seen to deprive them of many fundamental liberties, such as choice of career and marriage partner.
Have there in fact been any such changes in attitude among the second generation educated in Britain? Are they less likely to comply with their families and biradari over participation in family and community events and over arranged marriages?

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[…] the attitudes to marriage and respect for the biradari of those born here are not easily distinguished from the attitudes of newly arrived Pakistanis. Indeed, a rebellious attitude may be found among fiancés from Pakistan. For instance, Jamil, brought over to marry his cousin, soon deserted his new family for the delights of London, whereas Pervez, who was born here, readily agreed with his parents’ plans and married his cousin and now works in the family shop. This range of experience and backgrounds is an important feature of the present generation of young adults in the Pakistani community. It means, for instance, that when there is conflict over education, work or marriage, it is likely that conservative pressures will be exerted over the second generation not just by parents but by their peers as well.

[Additionally] the young adults of the community always include a substantial proportion who have only recently come from Pakistan. The preference for marriage within the biradari, ideally with cousins, means that marriages are still being arranged between Britain and Pakistan and girls and boys from Pakistan are still joining prospective husbands or wives in Britain. It is therefore likely that the young adults of the Pakistani community will always include at least some who have not been born or have not been to school in England.

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[…] These young men are westernized in that they are fluent in English, interested in western music and Sport, and comfortable in English company, where they move with a sophistication that their parents lack. What does this imply about their attitudes to their family and biradari?

It is striking that young men such as these retain very strong social and financial links with their families; even those who live and work away from Oxford come home whenever they can and hope to get work locally when the opportunity arises. These young men tend to spend their leisure time with each other and their peers within the community rather than with English friends and also participate in family and community social events. Rather than regarding themselves as financially and therefore socially independent of their families, they contribute their earnings to the joint family budget. For instance, Khalid’s salary has enabled the family to take out a mortgage on a third house near the house in which the whole family at present lives. The plan is that when Khalid marries he will move with his wife, parents and unmarried siblings into the new house, leaving his married brother and sister-in-law and their growing family in the first one. Mohammed Ali has used his salary to help his sister and her husband to buy a house; Zahoor gives his parents the balance of his earnings after meeting his own living expenses and Akram hands his earnings to his mother. In other words, although these young men have successfully broken out of the circle of semi-skilled and manual labour, their attitudes to the family and views of work are essentially the same as those of their fathers before them. They consider it their duty to earn money for the benefit of the family, even if this means spending time living away from home, as their fathers did when they first came to England. Significantly, these young men said that they had chosen their particular careers because these are ones which gave them skills that would be useful in Pakistan were they to return there. As will be discussed below, these young men also accept that their parents will arrange or have already arranged their marriages.

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[…] Many young Pakistani schoolgirls themselves (like many white British girls too) see a career on the one hand and marriage and family life on the other as mutually exclusive, and consider that a career has little value in comparison with the advantages they have at home. Indeed some girls are confident that within their culture they have many opportunities that their English peers are denied and that they choose their lifestyle as freely as most other girls do. Several girls have commented to me that they find condescending and offensive the attitudes of teachers who assume that the girls must be experiencing conflict between school and home. Most girls leave school because they see their role within the community, in the years before and after marriage, as a more attractive proposition than the opportunity of qualifications and a career that school offers.

Moreover, it is important to note that, contrary to the popular belief that Pakistani girls are forced into early marriages, most girls who leave school at 16 do not get married straightaway. Many girls who leave school take on responsible positions within the family and community before marriage. Kaniz, Raila and Fiaz spent the first few years after leaving school and before they got married at home, where they took on a large proportion of the household tasks, looked after younger siblings, worked in family shops where, as fluent English speakers, they had an important role, or returned for lengthy visits to relatives in Pakistan. Girls who work in family shops may continue to do so after marriage. Shakila, who left school at 16, worked in her father’s shop, where she served at the till and dealt with large grocery orders, and since her marriage at 17 she has been working in the shop that belongs to her father-in-law, who is her mother’s brother. Her unmarried. cousin, who also left school at 16, also helps in the shop. Similarly, Farida, who left school and got married at 16, works in the shop that is owned by her father and his brother, now her father-in-law. Her presence in the shop has enabled her husband and mother-in-law to run the family’s second shop, bought at the time of the marriage. In the evenings after school and at weekends Farida’s younger cousin also works in the shop. She is excited at the prospect of having a larger part in the running of the shop and says she can hardly wait to leave school. She shares with many of her white teenage friends a dislike of school and impatience to start a family; unlike them, however, not only can she depend on a large network of biradari members to help with childcare, but she also can expect a relatively responsible role in the family business and participation in the full extent of lena-dena relationships, and hence a say in biradari affairs. In this respect she has more to look forward to and is better provided for than many of her white contemporaries.

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[...] Most young men have much the same attitude to women and sexuality as their fathers; there has been no obvious change due to school, feminism, or the supposedly liberalizing influence of the west.

[…] Men and woman should avoid all contact with the opposite sex, apart from their spouses and immediate kin. For women, in most people’s view, this involves confining activities to the home. Men and women should also dress modestly. Men should cover the area just below the navel to the knees, whereas women should cover their hair and their bodies to the ankles and the wrists and conceal the shape of the breasts. Young women themselves hold these views of purdah, emphasizing that it is to protect men. Shabnam, who was eight when she came to Britain and is now in her twenties, said, ‘Especially before marriage, but also after it, women should not reveal their legs, should tie their hair, should cover their heads and chests with a scarf and should not wear make-up. This stops men from succumbing to temptation.’

It is believed that despite these preventative measures men do succumb to temptation and it is held that both men and women will then be punished by God. In practice, however, the woman is considered more blameworthy, for she is regarded as the temptress. A young married

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woman gave this account of the punishments for failing to follow these rules:

The Prophet Mohammed was out walking one day when he saw a woman in torture, hanging by her hair, but still alive. A little further on, he saw a woman being hung by her breasts and then he saw a woman being put into a huge fire, screaming. Horrified, he asked Allah, ‘Why are these women being tortured like this? Please let them go free!’ But Allah replied, ‘The first woman used to tantalize men with her hair, the second used to reveal her breasts to strange men and the third slept with a man who was not her husband. That is why I cannot set them free.’


At the same time it is considered that women must be protected because they are the dependants of men. As one mosque committee member, whose views were shared by many younger men, said:

If you have something valuable, you keep it safe. If you have a diamond you lock it in a case. You don’t leave it for anyone to take. A woman is like a diamond. She is precious. You should keep her inside the four walls of your house. She should look after the house and children, and you look after her. Inside the house, she is in charge. My place is outside.


The corollary of this is that a woman who is ‘outside’, among men, unprotected, is ‘free for anyone to take.’ Western women in particular appear to break all the rules of purdah. They are regarded as sexually promiscuous, moving freely from one man to another, behaving and dressing in order to provoke men. A woman out alone is in effect asking for sexual relations with a man. Rape, young and older men have insisted, is always the woman’s fault, because it is the natural result of a woman dressing provocatively and being out alone. In this view, western women are simultaneously exciting and despised for having no sense of shame and being ‘used by more than one man; like prostitutes’. As the mosque committee president quoted above said, ‘Women are exploited in English society. They are like toys for men to play with. They are cheap. Women are out on the streets, in shops, on the television. They work like slaves for a pittance in factories, in shops and as cleaners. There’s no respect for them.’

The same man’s wife showed what she thought of English women by pulling her shalwar tight across her buttocks, loosening her hair and swaying her hips, in imitation of how an English woman attracts a man.

These views constitute a general stereotype of English women, but are not confined to them, for the same is thought of women within the Asian

[p.172]

community who are known, or suspected to be, sexually promiscuous. Asian girls who go to college, or work, or cut their hair short, or wear western dress are assumed to be very ‘modern’ and to have several boyfriends, like English girls. The rumours that circulate about them are based on the same prejudices with which English women are viewed; indeed, such girls have been slandered as desi goris (literally, ‘home-made white women’). One man regarded the Asian women he had slept with as ‘no better’ than English women.

What these attitudes amount to is that the same double standard held by many first-generation men is now held by many men of the second generation. A man’s own wife, sisters and daughters are regarded as, and expected to be, pure and chaste, while all other women are regarded as potential sexual partners. Many married men who do not expect their wives to go out in mixed company go themselves to attend mixed gatherings where they socialize with women. Pre- and extra-marital sexual affairs are generally kept hidden from all other family members. Moreover, many second-generation men, like the first generation before them, believe that because most English women do not share Islamic moral values, there is no contradiction between upholding the Muslim community’s moral values on one hand and taking advantage of women who do not share these moral codes on the other. Izhar, for instance, is an unmarried twenty-two year old who has recently applied for his father’s brother’s daughter to

[p.173]

come to England as his fiancee. Unknown to his family, he has had a number of English girlfriends:

The point is, English girls don’t mind; there’s no restriction for them. In fact, they chase you and laugh at you if you don’t go with them. It was like that at school: the girls chasing men. I know I shouldn’t have, it’s against our religion, but how could I refuse? It’s natural for a man to feel like that; you can’t really avoid it. I blame the western system. I was in a mixed school and it was too free - all the boys thought about was the girls, and all the girls thought about was the boys.


Izhar is not unusual in his attitudes and behaviour. Almost all of the unmarried men among the young adults surveyed above have had clandestine relationships with English girls, yet do not feel that this contradicts their acceptance of an arranged marriage or the Islamic moral code. It is tacitly accepted by most men and women that men will have girlfriends because ‘men are like that’ and because English girls are easily available, yet parents avoid discussing the subject of pre-marital sex, unless to condemn it, and the sons keep their relationships hidden from relatives and people who know them in the community. However, one mother, unusual for her bluntness, admitted that she had encouraged her son to find a girlfriend:

When he first started at university, he kept on asking us to arrange his marriage as soon as possible. I was worried, because I thought it would be better for him to wait about five years, until he was qualified and had got a job. After all, he is only twenty, and when you marry, it’s for life. We talked about it, and it seemed that he was worried about sex. All his friends had girlfriends or were married or getting married. So I told him he should enjoy himself first, before he gets married. A boy should have some experience, and there are plenty of English girls around.


Incidents like those involving Rubina and Jamila are therefore only public versions of what goes on, and is even expected to go on, in private. The difference, however, is that when a sexual relationship with an Asian girl becomes public knowledge everyone else, including the men who have English girlfriends, becomes morally indignant, for they have to be seen to be upholding the community’s values. Jamila’s brothers and their friends, who included boys like Izhar, were furious when they heard of Jamila’s elopement; they retaliated by assaulting her boyfriend’s brothers. One of the assailants said, ‘Jamila is like my sister; she could have been my sister - it’s my duty to take revenge on him for his insulting us like this.’ When I suggested that the speaker was just as guilty because the English girl he went out with was also someone's sister or daughter, he said:

[p.174]

That’s different. The difference is, English people don’t care. The girls don’t mind; you tell them you can’t marry them, you’re just passing your time, and they don’t bother. They’re just passing their time too. If their brothers or fathers got angry, we would understand, but they don’t bother. Mostly, they are not even living in the same place. How can you respect men like that? They just say it’s the girl’s choice, it’s her life, and that’s what the girls say too.

[p.175]

Saturday, 14 November 2009

Genocide is as Genocide does...

Related (and brilliant!): http://curmudgeonjoy.blogspot.com/2009/10/how-to-commit-genocide.html

From part four of Alex Kurtagic’s review essay of Channel 4’s Race and Intelligence: Science’s Last Taboo:

Having heard from Jones and Nisbett, Omaar positions the ball before the goal, “It seems to me race is not a useful scientific category at all. A view shared by neuroscientist Steven Rose.” Steven Rose’s visage then fills the screen. He asserts:

The social definitions of race — black, white, for example — don’t match the biological definitions. I mean, if you look at gene frequencies, for example, there are differences, on average, between North Welsh and Southern Welsh people, but you wouldn’t call the North Welsh a different race from the Southern Welsh people. There are differences between different groups of people in Africa, and yet what racist language does is group all Black Africans as if they are one group. That makes no sense in biological terms, in genetic terms at all.


While it is right and proper to point out that there is a mismatch between social and biological definitions of race, the ensuing analogy is preposterous. Saying that it would be wrong to mislabel two subcategories as categories does not discredit categorization: It discredits the person misapplying the labels.

Rose’s claim that “racist language” lumps all kinds of different groups into one is an exact inversion of the truth: The language of race seeks to differentiate groups. Leftist ideologues like Rose are the ones doing the lumping, by saying, for example, that there is no race but the human race, when humans are, in fact, racially diverse.


***

Funny how it goes sometimes. Immediately after reading these words I picked up a book, What is Genocide? by Martin Shaw, and read the following on the competing definitions of genocide:

The answer to the misuse of classification is not, therefore, to abandon classification. We simply cannot do this: classification is an inescapable part of human cognition and social life. Social scientists’ classifications like those of genocidists - are particular versions of this general human activity. Classification’s danger is always, as Nigel Eltringham suggested, that ‘we “misplace concreteness” and set out to “prove” that our abstract concepts ... really do correspond to reality, rather than being contingent approximations.’ Genocidists go a big step further in trying to enforce their social classifications, making reality correspond at the cost of lives. [p.12]

Drummer Hodge vs. ‘Combat Barbie’ Hodge

Katrina Hodge / Lance Corporal Hodge / Combat Barbie / Miss England hopes to ‘serve in Afghanistan.’ To serve whom?

Thomas Hardy wrote some fine war poems including ‘Drummer Hodge’ about a Boer war casualty. Hodge was a sometimes derogatory name for a rural labourer and Hardy had written about their situation sympathetically. We are meant to understand that the disenfranchised soldier, fighting to secure the Transvaal gold mines for other men, had been the disenfranchised English labourer of peacetime, and to causally link the two states. Hardy is right, men with productive land of their own in a country controlled by their own people are not often found fighting imperial wars as soldiers for hire. Needless to say, nor would their women folk seek reason or glory in an imperial misadventure like the present Afghan war.

Drummer Hodge
by Thomas Hardy


They throw in Drummer Hodge, to rest
Uncoffined – just as found:
His landmark is a kopje-crest
That breaks the veldt around;
And foreign constellations west
Each night above his mound.

Young Hodge the Drummer never knew –
Fresh from his Wessex home –
The meaning of the broad Karoo,
The Bush, the dusty loam,
And why uprose to nightly view
Strange stars amid the gloam.

Yet portion of that unknown plain
Will Hodge forever be;
His homely Northern breast and brain
Grow to some Southern tree,
And strange-eyed constellation reign
His stars eternally.

Alabaster's Archive upload



Yahoo! Geocities is no more and one of the more regrettable losses is ‘Alabaster’s Archive,’ a resource devoted to Jewish, particularly religious, supremacism, especially as it informs Israeli society and Jewish attitudes to Palestinians. In Alabaster’s own words,

[the] goal is to present a serious full-text research resource of scholarly materials devoted to Jewish and Israeli religion, history, extremism, fundamentalism, and global socio-political power.


And I think he did a great job, so much so I downloaded the site a year or two back and saved it to my hard drive. I have now uploaded the 80 or so web pages in a zip file (3.4MB) to megaupload. Download it at this link:

http://www.megaupload.com/?d=C4UE2690

When it breaks please just ask and I’ll re-up or email it ya…

Pakistanis in Britain: Leadership and Political Mobilisation

More from Alison Shaw, A Pakistani Community in Britain (Blackwell Ltd., Oxford, 1988). Previous posts here and here.

My emphases in bold:

I once had to interpret in court for Mohammed Anees who had been charged with shoplifting. He had been in England for over fifteen years but his knowledge of English was poor. Under cross-examination he had to answer one main question. Was there some sort of commotion going on in the street outside the shop, and if so what? Anees replied that he thought something might have been happening in the street outside the shop but he could not remember what. At this point the court adjourned, and Anees, his solicitor and I withdrew to a private room. The solicitor then explained, with unmasked irritation, that Anees had just contradicted his written statement given to the court the day before. This statement said that some youths fighting in the street outside the shop had distracted Anees’ attention just as he was going to pay for his goods. The solicitor then asked Anees why he had just contradicted in court the previous day’s statement. It emerged that Anees had relied upon a Pakistani community representative from a local welfare association to give the original statement, the details of which Anees did not know. In view of Anees’ contradictory evidence, the solicitor’s advice now was that Anees should change his plea to guilty. Anees accepted this. The court reconvened and Anees was fined.

Afterwards, I felt that I had somehow let Anees down, that had I known more about the case beforehand I might have helped him steer his way through the proceedings. However, Anees said, in a somewhat condescending tone, that I was worrying unnecessarily because things did not happen that way. He had already done all that he could by approaching a community representative who was a ‘big man’ (bara admi), capable of getting him let off. He seemed to have assumed that this patron would ensure charges were dropped by providing a story, of which the details did not really matter, and, more importantly, by negotiating with the solicitor and other members of the court. This had obviously not happened. Even

[p.135]

though Anees had been let down by his patron, who, by not furnishing Anees with the details of the story, had allowed him to contradict himself and thus worsen his case, Anees bore his patron no grudge. Anees felt that he had been unlucky this time, but this did not cause him to question the procedure he had followed. For him, the case had already been decided by the ability of his patron to negotiate with the solicitor. He felt that this had been unsuccessful because of his choice of a patron, not because of the procedure he had adopted. If his patron had had sufficient influence and if the court had liked him, he would have been let off anyway and it would not have mattered that he had contradicted himself. He protested his innocence in the eyes of God and seemed quite unconcerned about how the English court viewed him, as if he did not believe in justice on earth.

This incident, contradictory and confusing to the lawyer and the court, only makes sense when Anees is seen to be drawing on his own tradition and experience of law and justice.

Patronage in Pakistan

To understand Anees’ case, and many like it, we need to consider the significance of authority and leadership in Pakistan; the following picture is drawn from incidents and conversations with villagers there. Villagers frequently spoke of police corruption. In particular, they described how the rich bribe the police when someone has to be charged for a crime, and induce them or compel them to charge an innocent party who cannot afford to bribe. One bank-clerk reported that police had arrested a colleague of his while he was travelling on a train and had imprisoned him for a crime someone else had committed. For such people, survival lies in strengthening their biradaris, extending the network of people bound to each other by mutual obligations and doing favours for people with authority to ensure the return of a favour when necessary; the biradari network is trusted rather than the system of police or the law. An individual will not go to court until he has found someone, such as a barrister, ideally from within his own biradari, who has some obligation to him and would be sure to win the case or get it withdrawn.

[p.136]

[…] Influential biradari contacts may also mean that people can escape punishment for a crime that biradari members may themselves have set up.

Thus, many villagers regard the wealthy owners of land, villages, or factories, government officials or army officers as being in a position to dispense patronage; as a result they are treated with deference and respect. One landlord, who had recently returned to Faisalabad district after spending twenty years in Glasgow where his sons still run businesses, had bought a large farm, with a large pakka house (built of kiln-baked bricks and mortar), a tube-well and tractors with money earned in Britain. He had also purchased an ice factory in town and given his brother the task of running it. He now employed landless labourers from a nearby kacha settlement (built of mud bricks) who treated him with respect and subservience; on one occasion an employee knelt at his feet to ask a favour. As the landlord himself proudly pointed out, they now also call him chaudhri, a title or respectful form of address which literally means ‘head man’.

[…] The result is an attitude towards institutions that differs from traditional British expectations of their function and operation. In Pakistan, one cannot appeal to the justice of the system, to the rules and principles embedded in the bureaucracy, to deal with a problem. Each official is seen first as a member of someone’s biradari and only second as an official.

[p.137]

Business will be attended to if an official is a biradari member; if he is not, he may have to be bribed, or some other biradari member may have to exert his influence.

Britain: local politics and patronage

In Pakistan, for those without influence or biradari members in positions of authority, legal and government institutions are to be avoided. For those with influential contacts, things are different. As one young man boasted to me: ‘If a policeman tells me to come to prison but I refuse, what can he do? His superiors are my father’s friends. He can do nothing.’ Consequently it is not surprising to find that first generation migrants from poor village backgrounds assume that their first recourse, in dealing with British authorities, must be to enlist the aid of a patron.

It might be thought that such attitudes would disappear after a few years in England, but there are two main reasons why they have persisted. The first is that in the early years of settlement a patron’s aid was required to cope with life in England. The second reason, discussed below, has to do with defending the Islamic values believed to be essential for the maintenance of the community once settled in England.

When Pakistani men first came to Britain, the majority of them had a very poor knowledge of English and had great difficulty in finding accommodation and employment, in handling the D.H.S.S. and so on. The British economy needed labour in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but the government, while encouraging immigration, made no concessions to accommodating and meeting the needs of the immigrants once they were here. Migrants therefore turned to biradari members and fellow villagers for help. In this situation, it was relatively easy for a fellow migrant who appeared to be educated, to have good English, and to be able to cope with British institutions and make contacts in departments of the local council or the Pakistan Embassy, to achieve a position of influence among his fellow Pakistanis. Migrants themselves tended to put into a position of influence and authority someone who appeared to be educated and able to offer them the help they needed. Such a person, having attained this status, generally confined his welfare activities to members of his own biradari and this led to biradaris competing with each other for such positions and for the resources which they provided.

Welfare associations arose from the genuine need for welfare in the 1960s. Although the associations are in theory open to all and have elections to each post, the presidents can be seen to operate as patrons do in Pakistan. The first Pakistan welfare association in Oxford, founded in 1961, provided a free and popular welfare service, which included

[p.138]

negotiating with the Home Office and the Pakistan Embassy and filling in tax forms. […]

The threat to Islamic values

As the majority of families can now manage reasonably well in dealing with British institutions, it might be supposed that the need for patrons would diminish and that attitudes to authority would change. However, a new need is perceived, the need for protection from the threat of western values. By appealing to fears of the erosion of Islamic culture certain individuals have come to acquire in the eyes of many Pakistanis the same status as patrons in Pakistan. This ideological element is a second aspect of the persistence in Britain of traditional attitudes to authority.

The force of the ideological influence of these new patrons lies in the complex views Pakistanis hold of English society. In Pakistan, Britain is admired for its wealth, education and health services. Comparing Britain with Pakistan, people would often comment on the apparent absence of nepotism and bribery in political and administrative circles, and spoke with admiration of the health and social services. ‘England’ one man said ‘is the most civilized country in the world.’ In Pakistan, people spoke with pride of the role of the British administration in organizing the building of the canals, irrigation and settlement of the canal colonies. The president of the Pakistan Welfare Association who arranged for improvements to be made

[p.139]

to his village in Pakistan had been impressed by the fact that British cities have community centres and British cemeteries have walls around them. Goods made in England are much sought after in Pakistan, and in general anything man-made is highly valued. Locally produced cotton is considered inferior to silky man-made colour-fast fabrics. In Pakistan, English is compulsory in higher education and considerable status is attached to schools where English is the medium of instruction and which are to some extent modelled on English private schools. Pakistanis praise the British education system and first generation migrants hope that the second generation will obtain professional qualifications in Britain; qualifications obtained abroad, especially from Britain, are respected and coveted in Pakistan.

There are also racial connotations in the ways in which English people, or what might be regarded as ‘Englishness’, are admired. In Pakistan, fairness of skin is coveted; it is desired in a bride and associated with the high castes who traditionally keep their women in purdah. Magazines abound with pictures of pink, round-faced babies in advertisements for dried milk, and with pale-faced women in advertisements for cream to lighten skin colour. Relatives of families in Oxford would ask about the skin colour of their relatives in England, for they expected it to lighten in Britain, and mine to darken in Pakistan. Pakistanis refer to themselves as kale log (black people) inferior on the grounds of skin colour to the gore log (white people). Within the kale category though, there are gradations of colour: dark skins are associated with low caste status and inferior racial origins. One man described people of kami status as black and of a different ‘race’, (using the English word). On the same grounds, east Oxford Pakistanis consider Bangladeshis inferior to them, while people of Afro-Caribbean origins rank lowest. The word habshi, usually translated as negro, is used as an insult.

Among Pakistanis in Britain, however, English people are regarded with considerable ambivalence. While the aspects of English society and western civilization mentioned above are admired and whiteness itself is still coveted, at the same time the British administrative and political system is one which hunts down immigrants, has betrayed their rights as British subjects by successive changes in immigration and nationality laws, and treats them as inferior. While only some of the first generation speak openly of racial discrimination, many of the second generation born here speak bitterly of it. Thus the term gora is an ambivalent one, and the phrase gore log can be used insultingly, to separate Pakistanis and outsiders. But what is usually perceived to lie at the heart of this ambivalence towards English people is the fact that their social and sexual mores contrast starkly with the Islamic values of purdah and sexual segregation.

Many Pakistanis hold a low opinion of western social and sexual mores and particularly of the position of women in western society. English

[p.140]

women are seen to break all the rules governing sexual morality. The western system, it is thought, permits free sexual relations and allows, even encourages, women to dress revealingly and to provoke men. One Pakistani man who had recently arrived in England, commented on seeing a number of female University students sunbathing that the male undergraduates who were passing by could not be real men or else they would have thrown themselves on the women. Pakistani women often cite Britain’s high divorce rate and the increasing proportion of illegitimate births as evidence of the low moral standards of the west. Furthermore, their views are often coloured by the fact that some Pakistani women had to cope with husbands who have, or had, English girlfriends and even wives. Not surprisingly, many Pakistani women are suspicious of English women who visit them and it has sometimes taken many years for me to be accepted in their homes. Knowing me has not changed their beliefs. For my close women friends, who have always been curious about my views on the position of women and on Islam, which I have not concealed from them, it is a matter of great concern that I will ‘burn in hell’ for the sin of not believing in God and for other sins such as preventing pregnancy.

Manipulation of ideology

Because of these feelings about western society, Pakistanis’ support will be easily mobilized if the need for it is expressed within the framework of Islamic values. When there was a proposal to close the only all-girls secondary school in Oxford, attended by many, though not all, of the Pakistani Muslim girls in east Oxford, a Community Relations Council survey was carried out which showed that while some parents sent their daughters to that school because it was single sex, there were also those who sent their daughters to a mixed secondary school because they thought the education there was better. For them, the religious question at that stage was not as important as the quality of the education that their daughters were receiving. However, once the issue had been presented in terms of a threat to Islamic values, many of these parents sided with those campaigning to maintain the all-girls’ school.

[p.141]

[…] Similarly, the emotive issue of protecting the community’s young women and girls from western influences figured prominently in establishing the role of the president of the All Pakistan Women’s Association in the community. At an Eid celebration which she organized, she spoke to the assembled women of their duty to ensure that their daughters keep their hair tied up and covered with a scarf, wear the shalwar, or at least trousers, rather than skirts, and do not wear make-up. At another gathering, she referred to someone’s daughter as a desi gori (a ‘home-made English girl’), and warned mothers to take care that their daughters do not become desi goris too. This phrase is used as a term of abuse for a girl who wears jeans, make-up, cuts her hair short and may work or go to college.

[p.143]

[…]

Community leaders as patrons

Taking a public stance as defender of the community’s values does not of itself make a person into a patron as they exist in Pakistan. This comes about because some people, once elevated into prominence by their position as the community’s protector, are keen to impress on their fellows that they are indeed such patrons. The individuals who champion the cause of Islamic virtue belong to a group sometimes referred to as ‘community leaders’ or ‘community representatives’. As other commentators have noted, this is a heterogeneous category. Writers agree that most leaders are in many ways on the periphery of the community. Some leaders have been described as ‘integrationist’ in that they are self-appointed, atypical, committed to western values and are regarded with suspicion by the ‘mass of rural uneducated Pakistanis’, even though they may have official status in the eyes of the British authorities. On the other hand, there are also the ‘accommodationists’ drawn from the educated but poor middle classes who are ‘culturally aligned with the uneducated peasantry’. Of the ‘Asian immigrant brokers’ who organize the welfare societies in Manchester, ‘the majority tended to be less religious and to have certain exceptional attributes (of regional or denominational affiliation) which set them apart from the Punjabi Sunni majority. In other respects, however, they were very much of the “centre” ’. Writers have also noted that there is frequently considerable competition between leaders for positions as representatives of their community on, for instance, community relations councils. In Oxford, this has involved, for example, accusations and counter accusations of elections being rigged.

Once elected or appointed, successful candidates generally do very little work for their councils and rarely attend meetings; much of their role is, as has also been noted for Manchester, ‘validatory and symbolic’. Given this situation, observers find it difficult to understand why such positions are so sought after. The fact that some of these leaders act after the fashion of the Pakistani patron has not been so widely discussed. However, this explains

[p.144]

many aspects of the way in which Pakistani community leaders in prominent positions behave. For instance, one community representative would drop the names of Pakistan Embassy officials or local white councillors in order to impress fellow Pakistanis with his apparent power and influence. Another such leader claimed to be from one of Pakistan’s twelve largest business families, with influential contacts in Pakistan’s government. In conversations with fellow Pakistanis from rural backgrounds, he would talk of recent visits to the Pakistan Embassy in London and of personal telephone calls from the Pakistan Ambassador and even from the President of Pakistan himself. This name-dropping, and the ambition to hold office in the welfare associations, is, as one Pakistani put it, ‘for status, so that when he (a community representative) walks into a meeting, everyone will treat him with respect, even the elders who are his seniors’. Some Pakistanis are impressed by such individuals, and, assuming that they do have influence, give them their allegiance, invite them to dinner and give presents and money at Eid.

[...] The willingness of local council authorities to accept the role such community leaders adopt, assuming that ‘community representative’ means for most Pakistanis what it means for most whites, tends to encourage the patronage system. Council staff or councillors may be aware that existing provision within the statutory agencies frequently fails to meet the community’s needs. They know, for example, that there is a lack of interpreters, and so are prepared to accept at face value people who present themselves as representatives working for the benefit of the community; what they may fail to see is that such links are also being cultivated so that the representatives can extend their patronage within the community.

[p.145]

There are sometimes attempts to forge links with local council officials in much the same way as they are established within the community through lena-dena (taking-giving). A few weeks before one Christmas, one patron was apparently in such financial difficulty that the people he patronized brought him sums of £20 or £30 once a week, or gave money when he visited them. The money was spent on china, cut glass and other goods which were sent as Christmas gifts to local City councillors, the Lord Mayor, barristers, head teachers, and other locally influential figures.

Representation on the local community relations council, the Oxfordshire Council for Community Relations (OCCR), is another way of attempting to build up links with the statutory agencies and local councillors and provides access to committees of other bodies where ethnic minority representation is required, such as on the police liaison committee or on the City Council’s housing committee. These patrons may then use their positions to demonstrate within the community their apparent power and authority, making it appear that others are beholden to them for appointments. Moreover, through such positions patrons may promote themselves or their relatives as applicants for posts in community relations. This aspect of their role in relation to the Asian community is generally hidden from the English, Afro-Caribbean and other representatives on the OCCR executive or other committees.

[…] All I am emphasizing here is that Pakistani perceptions of how the local system operates derive more from Pakistan than from knowledge of British politics and institutions, and their resort to patronage has its roots in a Pakistan where bureaucracies can never be relied upon.

Friday, 13 November 2009

‘The Same old Hun?’: Anti-German Propaganda II

A third post of extracts from Ian McLaine, Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1979), continuing the story of British WWII anti-German propaganda from a prior post.

See also ‘Morale and Morale Busting’ about WWII preparations for the coming multicult.

Keywords/themes: Holocausts posited for propaganda gain, fair-play, a Christian crusade against paganism, congenitally barbaric Germans, ‘primitive’ Japanese slated for total social and cultural destruction, ‘astonishment and awe,’ remarkable plasticity of public feeling toward the enemy dictated by day-to-day events, lies about civilian bombing, WWI style atrocity propaganda, don’t mention the Jews -- British public feeling is that ‘one thing Hitler had done is to put those damned Jews in their place’ etc...

There was in the Ministry’s anti-German propaganda a certain element of defensiveness, perhaps aggravated by the veto on statements about domestic reform, but stemming chiefly from the belief that the frenetic ‘dynamism’ of Nazi ideology was not unattractive to the British people. Two and a half years after the outbreak of war Home Intelligence observed:

The public has no clearly worked out conception of the purpose of the war. The Russians have a clear-cut purpose: they have a way of living that they think worth fighting for and which enables them to fight well. The Germans are believed to have

[p.149]

a purpose. We have only vague conceptions, fluctuating between ideas of holding what we have got and ideas of right and wrong.


The tone of the report echoed the stale, even bored, mood of the public in the first half of 1942, a period which witnessed considerable parliamentary and public dissatisfaction with the government’s conduct of the war. Britain seemed to be having a minimal impact on the course of events and, having in 1940 achieved the supreme feat of thwarting Hitler’s invasion plan, the public could now only set before themselves the distant prospect of victory. The Ministry appears to have believed that the British people, observing from the sidelines the fierce struggle of two nations fighting for opposed but compelling ideologies, yearned for a set of ideas that might invest their sacrifices with a greater significance than the preservation of national sovereignty.

An ideology of sorts was proclaimed by the Ministry of Information. Although used principally to discredit specific aspects of Nazism, it was supposed to represent something worth fighting for. Diffuse, vague and lacking the immediacy of Nazism and communism, it nonetheless reflected the sincere ideas of men forced by circumstances to articulate their convictions. These may be conveniently examined in terms of what the propagandists had to say about the past, the role of Christianity and the future.

The Ministry contrived to stretch a Whiggish interpretation of history back to the pre-Christian era. As part of that civilisation whose ‘ideal of a good life men have created through 2,000 years’, Britain had contributed the latest ideal:

... human history has been marked by certain definite phases of advancement, each one of which produced its own special contribution to the improvement of Man (e.g. Greece: the freedom of human intelligence. Rome: the sanctity of contracts. Middle Ages: chivalry. France: intellectual sincerity. Britain: fair play).


While the concept of ‘fair play’ may be deeply embedded in the British consciousness and was possibly a factor in the people’s dislike of German behaviour, it was hardly a stirring call to action. Nicolson preferred to speak of Britain’s past record in achieving social justice while at the same time preserving the rights of man. The conjunction of the ideas of Britain as a pioneer of freedom and justice, against both domestic and foreign tyrants, and of balanced, gradual social improvement was central to the propaganda, for the Ministry

[p.150]

could simultaneously combat the supposed attractiveness of Nazi social promises and represent the country as the defender of Western civilisation. RIOs were therefore asked to preach the following social philosophy:

Evolutionary revolution as distinct from revolutionary revolution is the characteristic British method of ensuring political, social and economic progress. The difference between our method and that of the Germans should be emphasised. One results in forward progression: the other in a reversion to systems long abandoned by the democracies.


[…] Germany’s claim to be the sole bulwark of Christian Europe against Bolshevism was reason enough for the Ministry to insist that a true reading of the situation pitted Christian Britain against pagan Germany. But the constant theme of Britain as a Christian nation, and a nation of Christians, also derived from the received opinion which stated that belief in Christianity informed the country’s secular virtues. There seem to have been few qualms about pressing religion into the service of propaganda. Pausing only to observe that the churches should ‘not be suspected of being used as channels of propaganda’, the senior officials set up the Religions Division, whose purpose at home was to impart ‘a real conviction of the Christian contribution to our civilisation and of the essential anti-Christian character of Nazism’.

‘God is on our side’ has ever been the cry of nations at war and the Religions Division, although aware of the dangers in resurrecting it, comforted themselves with the knowledge ‘that the Nazi regime has openly derided Christianity and announced that it is setting up a new religion. The Christian issue has therefore become much

[p.151]

more important than in previous wars, when both sides invoked the same creed’. Organised in Protestant, Roman Catholic and, later, Orthodox and Jewish sections, the division worked chiefly through contacts in the churches. It encouraged public meetings, distributed printed material such as a weekly series called The Spiritual Issues of the War, stimulated the religious press and put out direct propaganda to the wider public on religious matters. John Betjeman, who was then the press attache in Dublin, was not a member of the Ministry but corresponded with the Religions Division on the extremely delicate matter of British propaganda in Eire - addressing officers of the Division as ‘Brother’ and occasionally concluding his letters with ‘Yours in Calvin’s name’. The Sword of the Spirit, founded by Cardinal Hinsley as a body to proclaim the Church’s hostility to Nazism, received a great deal of assistance from the Ministry of Information, a fact which the Religions Division was anxious to conceal.

The word ‘crusade’ sprang easily to the lips of the propagandists, since it was very tempting to cast Britain in the role of a Christian warrior opposing the forces of darkness. In September 1939 Lord Macmillan addressed a meeting of church leaders at Lambeth Palace and asked them to issue a joint manifesto declaring their attitude to the war, taking care to emphasise that the Ministry wished to appear in no way connected with the statement. A joint declaration was issued but it was not published until 21 December 1940 and, although exploited for propaganda purposes, could hardly have pleased the Ministry. Signed by the Archbishops of Canterbury, York and Westminster and the Moderator of the Free Churches, the statement made no mention of the enemy and, instead, dwelt on the religious and ethical foundations of a future peace, going so far as to recommend the abolition of material inequality and a fair distribution of the earth's resources. Clearly the leaders of the churches were not going to be drawn into a ‘crusade’ inspired by a government department.

But Duff Cooper had no reservations about characterising the conflict as a ‘religious war’. Nor did the members of the Religions Division, although in a slightly more qualified fashion:

... to speak of a Christian crusade is dangerously misleading. But our civilisation is based ultimately on Christian principles ... You cannot spread Christianity by the sword, but you can defend a society in which Christian principles are allowed scope and in which there is freedom of thought and worship.


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Thus the Ministry turned its affirmation of Britain’s Christianity into an attack on Nazi Germany. And almost anything could be and was interpreted as an affront to the spirit of Christianity. The persecution of German clerics such as Pastor Niemoller and Bishop Galen and of churches throughout occupied Europe, the practice of euthanasia - these more obvious crimes were supplemented with accusations of paganism, sexual immorality, Fuhrer-worship and the perversion of children’s education. British Catholics were sternly warned:

No true Catholic can watch with a clear conscience the holocaust of his co-religionists in Nazi-occupied Europe. There can be no compromise or indifference in the realms of the spirit. Those who are not actively against Nazism must ask themselves whether by their passivity they are not actually for Nazism.


The imperative tone of such pronouncements was as strong as that found in the department’s general statements about Germany. But, staffed by clerics and working largely through the churches, the Religions Division adroitly sidestepped the potential embarrassment to the Ministry of a situation in which religion was seen to be a creature of propaganda.

Full use was made of symbols designed to fashion an image of the Briton as a tolerant, peaceable, home-loving family man - as opposed to the Germans who, because they found ‘it difficult to credit the individual as such with dignity and worth ... tried to acquire them by huddling into rigid hierarchies and disciplined formations, by reverencing rank and drill’. Furthermore, they ‘are dead - dead to joy, dead to decency, dead to thought, dead to reason, virtue and to freedom, dead to themselves, to that humanity which makes men men’.

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Vansittart’s broadcasts late in 1940 and the publication of his Black Record, in which he tried to show that the Germans since earliest times had been violent and aggressive, enjoyed considerable public attention and provoked much controversy. Not that his views were novel. At a meeting of the British Psychological Society in March 1940, Dr H. G. Barnes referred to Jung’s description of the periodic madness of the German people as ‘furor teutonicus’:

It must be assumed to be a latent potentiality of the German unconscious which has remained concealed like an underground mine since barbarian times. When the civilised Christian superstructure was undermined by defeat in war, physical deprivation, and a deep and galling sense of inferiority, ‘Wotan’ swept the nation away like a whirlwind. The individual man is hunted back into a herd collectivity by a daemonic spirit which Hitler himself identifies with Antichrist, and which has devoured Hitler’s own individuality.

At a later meeting of the same society, Professor T. H. Pear put an opposing view. He condemned Black Record for its distortion of ‘history, ethnology, sociology and social psychology in a manner which Dr Goebbels has made familiar’, and added: ‘No responsible social psychologist ... would claim that the Germans have a special innate tendency to cruelty, possessed by members of no other nation.’ Although Vansittart’s beliefs accorded with the Ministry’s indiscriminate anti-German propaganda, there took place a debate as to whether quite the correct emphasis was being given to it. At a

[p.155]

Planning Committee meeting in January 1941 the question was posed whether the line ‘Germans will always be Germans’ should be continued and Sir Kenneth Clark was asked to prepare a memorandum on the subject. His paper, entitled ‘It’s the Same Old Hun’, asked:

... firstly, if the Germans are really incorrigible, what can be the outcome of the war? Are we hoping to exterminate 80 million people or to keep them in continual subjection? The question is often in the mind of the average thoughtful man, and creates a feeling of hopelessness. Secondly, the comparison of this war to the last must have a depressing and disillusioning effect on anyone old enough to remember the post-war period. It would seem in our interest to stress the very great difference between the Germany of 1914-18 and to-day, by pointing out how in the last war all the best elements of German culture and science were still in Germany and were supporting the German cause, whereas now they are outside Germany and supporting US.


His argument is difficult to follow. To say that Germany was much worse than it had been in the Great War, and to demonstrate the thesis by reference to the fine men who had fled the country, was unlikely to reassure those people who despaired of ever seeing a peaceable Germany. However, in explaining his paper, Clark said, ‘The emphasis should ... be on the deterioration of the German character since 1918’ adding, ‘The problem of what to do after the war with the Germans if they were really unteachable should be passed over in silence.’

Evidently the ‘average thoughtful man’ would continue to be troubled. But there appear to have been few of his kind. According to Home Intelligence, large numbers of people felt ‘that no peace can be considered which does not ensure that Germany will never again be able to declare war on England ... Many ... want to exterminate, or at least ostracise, the whole German race’. Reports of this kind reached a peak during the period of intensive bombing. With its passing there were remarkably few expressions of bitterness and ruthlessness towards the German people - grim satisfaction and even exultation at the bombing of enemy cities, but little reported desire for a Carthaginian peace. Some people, indeed, were said to be concerned lest the ‘effect of Vansittartism might ... eventually hamper an equitable and reasonable settlement when the war is over’. But the Ministry continued to lay stress on the moral delinquency of the Germans:

[p.156]

Had it been any other nation that unleashed the present horrors upon the earth, one might well despair of twentieth-century civilisation, and feel that mankind is doomed to perish in a holocaust of ritual hatreds, brutalities and attempts at self-extermination. But the fact that for a second time in one generation it is Germany, and Germany alone, who has done these things - that, surely indicates beyond doubt where the evil lies ... In 1914 the cry was this: ‘Remember Belgium!’ Now, all who revere justice and honour have still blacker crimes to remember.


[…] The Roosevelt-Churchill declaration of August 1941 - the Atlantic Charter - and the magnanimous implications for Germany of Article 6 raised afresh the problem of the depiction of the German character. Evidently feeling some measure of responsibility for the material they produced, the members of the Publications Division asked on 28 August whether in view of the Atlantic Charter it was right to continue propaganda along Vansittart lines. On the following day the Deputy Director General issued a prompt and definitive statement:

We cannot combine a promise of peace and prosperity to all States, including the vanquished, with a quenchless feud against Germany. Nor can we regard ‘Hitlerite Germany’ as equivalent to Germany under all conditions. Nor can we equate the ‘destruction of Nazi tyranny’ with the destruction of Germany.

It follows that it is not our public aim to ostracise Germany in perpetuity. If it is not, it cannot be good propaganda to enlarge upon the theme that the Germans are a race which has no future in civilisation. What good can that do? It does not help to divide or weaken Germany: on the contrary. It does not encourage support in the USA whose people discern nothing but an age-

[p.157]

long feud which they can neither mend nor end. Its only legitimate use would be to dissipate sentimental Germanizing in this country. I do not think the public stands in any need of such a correction to-day.

This can be taken as Ministry policy.


This was the very matter touched upon by Sir Kenneth Clark early in the year. But in the intervening period the rhetoric of hate had become, if anything, even more shrill. Legitimate targets for criticism - Nazi education, the evils of occupation, racial persecution, the idiocy of Nazi ideology - did come under attack but were so uniformly drenched in emotional language as to leave the impression that everything German was and always would be abhorrent. That the future dangers of such a policy were appreciated in the Ministry is clear from the Deputy Director General’s statement. Why, then, was the policy not changed? In the absence of minutes and memoranda relating to the debate (if, indeed, it reached the proportions of a debate) the explanation can only be guessed at. Possibly the sheer momentum of the propaganda brushed aside any alternative. There is no evidence to show that such themes as were employed from the Anger Campaign had had any effect. Neither had there been objections to them. The end of the war seemed a long way off late in 1941. And it was no doubt easier for the Ministry to condemn the Germans wholesale than to embark at such a time upon what to many might have appeared as an over-refined nicety of distinction between the people and their Nazi leaders.

In this context it is instructive to examine what was said about the Japanese. For reasons which were closely related to the public’s attitude to the war in the Far East, the production of anti-Japanese propaganda was a peripheral activity. The Pacific war was remote to a people preoccupied with the European conflict and after the fall of Singapore it was regarded as very much an American sphere of responsibility.

The Japanese, described in terms appropriate to a newly discovered zoological species, were objects of amused contempt:

Smoking chimneys, policemen and traffic lights, taxis hurrying little men in black coats and bowler hats to offices that might well be in New York, bear witness to Japan’s modern technique and disguise her primitive heart.


Although undoubtedly brutal, their courageous devotion to bankrupt and hollow ideas made ‘these mediocre people assume the stature of

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tragedy’. Their defeat would present the allies with a political and social tabula rasa: once the Japanese could be taught to exercise ‘self control’, their institutions would undergo a drastic remoulding along democratic lines and the old, inferior customs and habits of thought would be destroyed. Japan, in other words, knew no better. Whereas Germany did:

Japan was ahead of Germany in the follow-my-fuhrer danse macabre, but was also tremendously influenced by Germany. Amazing though the parallel between them is - in pseudoreligions, tribalism, aggression, brutality, false-swearing, density about other mentalities, contempt of women, contempt of freedom, contempt of the human spirit and negation of God - it is not complete. Germany is a heretic, relapsed from universal standards that Japan has never known.


German barbarity for its very wilfulness was therefore all the more reprehensible and, by implication, could not be easily - if ever extirpated. To say that the Germans had once conformed to a universal standard of civilised behaviour cannot, of course, be reconciled with the Vansittart line that they had never been truly part of European Christendom, but logic is ever the least regarded component of propaganda.

Because of the government’s insistence that British policy was directed solely at knocking out enemy war production and internal communications, the Ministry was rather more circumspect in its propaganda about bombing than in other issues involving Germany. A delicate path had to be picked out between the propagandists’ desire to show that German civilians were suffering heavily and the obligation to proclaim the essentially strategic nature of Bomber Command’s operations. But after February 1942, when the decision was taken to direct the main weight of the RAF’s attack against German civilians, the Ministry did more than exercise discretion. It lied. Noble Frankland has written of the Air Ministry’s publicity: ‘The damage to the residential and central areas, which were in reality the main aim of the area attacks, was ascribed to what could unfortunately not be avoided if the factories and so on were to be hit.’ The Ministry of Information was party to the deception.
Although not wishing in 1940-41 to adopt a ‘vindictive note’, it was nonetheless thought wise to hint at the fact that Germany was sustaining civilian casualties:

[p.159]

Since May 10th [1940], the RAF have carried out widespread raids on Germany ... For a number of reasons it does not pay us to adopt indiscriminate bombing for its own sake or as a measure of retaliation. The crippling of the enemy’s industry and war machine is likely to lead to far more conclusive results in a shorter space of time. Some of the targets which we have attacked are, in fact, situated in thickly populated towns and districts ... and, consequently, the enemy civilian population has by no means gone unscathed.


In April 1941 RIOs were instructed to ‘stress the point that we cannot afford to divert our striking power from the main military and other kindred objectives to actions of a secondary nature’. Indignant at the implication that Britain desisted from bombing German civilians for strategic reasons only, the London RIO asked, ‘Must Government always shirk the moral issue? Have we not the courage to say that to take reprisals is wrong in itself, unethical, unchristian and unworthy of the British people ?’ There was a distinctly uncomfortable reaction to this protest but, at the same time, a strong reluctance to antagonise the public by saying that enemy civilians were being spared on moral grounds. ‘Sir Wyndham may be right’, observed one official. ‘Fortunately it is not for us to say. Perhaps we are not all Christians?’ The matter was hastily referred to higher authority for decision, although sufficient qualms existed for the BBC ‘to be asked to avoid describing bombs as “beautiful”. There is no indication in the records to show whether the matter was considered by the War Cabinet but as the policy underwent no change it may be assumed that the Ministry’s avoidance of moral entanglements earned the government’s approval.

News of heavy attacks was greeted by the public with enthusiasm, despite the knowledge of severe losses sustained by Bomber Command, and by 1942 the earlier veiled hints of civilian casualties had become heavy nudges. Of the extremely heavy raids on Cologne of 30 May 1942, the Ministry commented in a pamphlet: ‘Ninety minutes bombing created devastation over an area eight times the size of the City of London ... Steadily the storm will increase in violence.’ No one could mistake the fact that an attack on this scale had no purpose other than to destroy large areas of civilian housing. That there were, in fact, no illusions is clear from the Home Intelligence report following news of the Cologne raid:

... nothing has given such a lift to public confidence for many months as the raid on Cologne. The public’s astonishment and awe appear to have been almost as marked as their elation and satisfaction ...

Some regret has been expressed, ‘particularly by older people, that women and children should have to suffer from our bombing: but no one has been heard to suggest that we should limit our attacks on this account’, and ‘even the most soft hearted’ feel that it is ‘the only way, however distasteful, to drive home to the German people what their airmen have been doing in other countries’.


A debate which took place late in 1943 between Sir Arthur Harris, Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command, and the Air Ministry had profound implications for propaganda policy. In a letter of 25 October, Harris objected strongly to publicity which encouraged the view that Bomber Command’s operations were ‘in the nature of an experiment or side-show’ and which misrepresented the situation by stating that the intention was not ‘the obliteration of German cities and their inhabitants as such’. Harris demanded that the ‘aim of the Combined Bomber Offensive ... should be unambiguously stated [as] the destruction of German cities, the killing of German workers and the disruption of civilised community life throughout Germany’.

Sir Archibald Sinclair, Secretary of State for Air, circled warily around the problem by declaring that no attempt had been made to conceal the immense devastation caused by area bombing but that the emphasis had been laid ‘on the fact that our prime objective is German war industry and transport’. These were not the primary objectives, as Sinclair knew, but he drew back from admitting the truth, not wishing to ‘provoke the leaders of religious and humanitarian opinion to protest’. The Air Ministry looked hard at Bomber Command’s general directive: ‘The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened’. In reply to Harris the Air Ministry told him that the directive ‘neither requires nor enjoins direct attack on German civilians as such’, although it was recognised that attacks on military and industrial targets entailed the virtual destruction of German cities and heavy civilian casualties.

At first sight, this seems to have been an extraordinary situation. For eight months Bomber Command had been carrying out a policy

[p.161]

which was the result of a gross misinterpretation of the original directive. Harris, although placing rather more emphasis than his superiors on ‘undermining the morale of the German people’, could hardly be blamed for finding the Air Ministry’s reply ‘ambiguous’. Observing in a rather chilling way that it was not his policy to attack children, invalids and old people since they were a handicap to the German war effort, he stated:

This, however, does not imply, as the Air Ministry seems to assume that it does, that no German civilians are proper objects for bombing. The German economic system, which I am instructed by my directive to destroy, includes workers, houses and public utilities, and it is therefore meaningless to claim that the wiping out of German cities is ‘not an end in itself but the inevitable accompaniment of all-out attack on the enemy’s means and capacity to wage war’.


In an almost Byzantine fashion, the Air Ministry conceded that Bomber Command had in fact been pursuing the right operational policy:

Thus, while in the case of cities making a substantial contribution to the German war effort, the practical effects of your Command’s policy cannot be distinguished from those which would accrue from a policy of attacking cities as such, the Council cannot agree that it is impossible to draw a clear distinction between these two policies. This distinction is in fact one of great importance in the presentation to the public of the aim and achievements of the bomber offensive.


What appears to have been a serious policy disagreement, with fatal consequences for thousands of Germans, was, after all, a mere difference of view on what should be said publicly about the RAF’s air raids. And Harris left the Air Ministry in no doubt that he felt free to bomb ‘any civilian who produces more than enough to maintain himself’.

The Ministry of Information was thus spared an extremely inconvenient change of direction. Having condemned the Germans’ use of terror bombing for three years, the propagandists could not easily have manufactured reasons for Britain’s use of the same tactic persuasive enough to overcome the inevitable moral objections from important sections of the community. For everyone concerned it was much more convenient to continue the lie.

[p.162]

In any event, it was unnecessary to tell the truth. The reports of Home Intelligence strongly indicated widespread public knowledge of the nature of British bombing policy. In the first place, little interest was shown in attacks on specific industrial targets, unless they were of a spectacular nature such as the destruction of the German dams in May 1943. In the period July-August 1942, for example, the public were said to be disappointed at the apparent failure of the RAF to carry out the destruction of German cities one by one:

... ‘in the light of the statements made on our policy to bomb Germany with ever increasing ferocity’ these raids are neither regular enough nor sufficiently drastic. It is asked why the 1,000 bomber raids are not materialising ...

There is a renewal of hope that with the longer nights, ‘the RAF will blow a bloody big hole where Berlin is’.


Repeated calls for thousand-bomber raids were, in fact, calls for the destruction of whole cities since few people could have been in any doubt that attacks on such a scale were aimed principally at housing and civilians. The press maintained the official fiction that Bomber Command had no such intention, although what were people to make of statements such as that which appeared in the Daily Telegraph in October 1943: ‘Hamburg has had the equivalent of at least 60 ‘Coventrys’, Cologne 17, Dusseldorf 12, and Essen 10’. The evocation of Coventry, of course, could only bring to the minds of most people a devastating attack on the thickly populated centre of a town.

Secondly, the public were reported to link their exultation at news of heavy raids with the supposed effects upon German morale, not upon industry and the general war effort as such. Similarly, demands for the bombing of Italy, and Rome in particular, seem not to have arisen because of concern about enemy war production but because the Italians were believed not to have suffered enough:

The news of the bombing of Italy is said to have been received with enthusiasm - ‘the really bright spot of the week’. It has given particular pleasure as ‘there has been a feeling for some time that the Italians are getting off too lightly - possibly for political or religious reasons’.


[p.163]

Occasional expressions of sympathy for the German population and doubts about the impact of bombing upon enemy morale appear to have been founded on the knowledge that civilians were the principal targets of British air attacks. One report mentioned ‘some feeling against the bombing of Berlin, on the grounds that there are targets of military importance which do not involve so much bombing of civilians’; another spoke of ‘ “A tinge of pity” for the women and children and horror at their suffering, but acceptance that “civilians must suffer” ’, and a persistent minority continued to wonder how decisive an effect the raids were having on German morale ‘in view of the effects of the German air offensive on this country’. Significantly, another minority were said to favour the restriction of bombing to military targets, because “they don't believe the mass raids destroy morale” ’.

The evidence from Home Intelligence is fragmentary but there seems to have been little that was not known in broad outline of the nature and intention of Bomber Command’s raids. It is equally clear that the public enthusiastically endorsed them. This throws a different light on the policy of deception practised by the Ministry of Information. It should, perhaps, first be asked just how much was known in the department. Bracken, as one of Churchill’s circle of close acquaintances which included Lord Cherwell, the chief architect of terror bombing, must have been aware of the policy and its development after February 1942. And in view of the arrangement made in July 1941 between Radcliffe and the Air Ministry, under which the Ministry received a secret daily summary of air operations and intelligence, the senior officials were in possession of detailed information regarding area bombing and its effects. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the Ministry attempted to mislead the public. Statements of the following kind continued to be made until the end of the war:

British bombing of German war production centres has, during the past two years, become steadily heavier and more concentrated. Inevitably, damage to civilian life and property has increased in proportion. But incidental damage of this type, heavy though it may in fact be, is a very different thing from the deliberate terror-bombing of civilians ...


During the autumn and winter of 1943-44, Berlin received a series of paralysing raids - raids designed not to terrify the civilian population, but simply and systematically to eliminate Berlin as the focal point of the German war effort.

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Many thousands of Germans will owe their lives after the war to the fact that, given ample opportunity and provocation, BRITAIN CONTINUED TO SET HER FACE AGAINST TERROR BOMBING.


The high moral tone, shunned earlier in the war in favour of the argument from expediency, apparently satisfied the Ministry and the public, between whom there was a tacit conspiracy to pretend that Britain declined to use the methods of total war.

As the Anger Campaign paper proposed, the Ministry of Information did exploit stories of atrocities committed by the Germans. But for most of the war they were incorporated in the general propaganda about unscrupulous enemy methods rather than selected for special treatment: thus Germans were said to ‘blast and bomb their way across the homes and bodies of human beings, machine-gunning even the sick in hospital and children in the playground’. Much of this material had a perfunctory feeling, as if the Ministry were going through the motions and taking over where their predecessors had left off in 1918. ‘But the Nazis now prove’, read a pamphlet of 1941, ‘by their deeds that no infamy is too foul for them to commit - that bullying, massacre· and slavery are things in which they frankly rejoice.’ Was there no one in the Ministry who feared that this sort of material would eventually devalue the language of outrage? Apparently not, for the propagandists did not cease stressing the theme that there was nothing of which the Germans were not capable. Of a disturbingly large number of Germans this was true. But the language of hate was too exhausted to describe the enormity of what had been done in occupied Europe when it became known.

In July 1941 the Planning Committee considered whether atrocity stories should be lifted out of the context of general propaganda and given more emphatic treatment as part of a campaign to combat apathy. Sheer horror stories, it was suggested, repel the normal mind:

In self-defence people prefer to think that the victims were specially marked men - and probably a pretty bad lot anyway. A certain amount of horror is needed but it must be used very sparingly and must deal always with treatment of indisputably innocent people. Not with violent political opponents. And not with Jews.


It was not until late in 1942 that news of the true fate of European Jewry began to trickle out of the occupied territories,

[p.166]

but certainly it had been known for a long time that the Nazis were systematically persecuting Jews of many nationalities. According to Andrew Sharf, ‘Few facts of Nazi anti-Semitism were left unstated by the British Press’. Why, then, was the Ministry reluctant to employ in its propaganda the facts that were known, even after the publication by the Inter-Allied Information Committee in December 1942 of a detailed account of Nazi extermination procedures? For example, the propagandists placed much greater emphasis on the persecution of Christian churches in Europe, whose members did not suffer as the Jews suffered.

Again, there is little to go on owing to the complete absence of minutes and memoranda relating to this issue. It cannot be doubted, however, that the Jews were regarded in the Ministry as ‘indisputably innocent’ victims of Nazism. Nor can it be doubted that there were any reservations about exploiting a crime of this magnitude as a means of demonstrating what had been said of the Germans since mid-940. The Ministry almost certainly hesitated because of the widely reported prejudice in the British community against Jews. First reported in June 1940 - when Jews were supposed to be fleeing from Britain to the United States - and reaching its first peak at the time of the East End Blitz, anti-Semitism became such a regular subject that it was placed in Home Intelligence’s ‘Constant Topics and Complaints’ at the end of each weekly report together with such matters as poor transport and shortage of crockery. Jews were said to control the black market, to display ostentatious wealth, to avoid war work and military service, even to force their way to the heads of queues and to exhibit truculent behaviour. A report of May 1942 stated:

‘The growth of anti-Semitism is reported from widely separated areas’, according to the North Midland report. Infringements of the rationing orders, dealings in black markets and ‘deliberate cunning evasions of measures instituted by the Government to meet war-time conditions’ are said to have aroused strong public feeling.

Allegations are made of ‘enormous’ numbers of young Jews boasting of evading the call-up; the expression of ‘open indignation’ is feared unless measures are adopted ‘to bring home to this race that they are inviting a similar revulsion to that which they have experienced in other countries’. This view is confirmed in another Region, whence the comment is reported that ‘one thing Hitler had done is to put those damned Jews in their place’.


[p.167]

After falling off in the months between early August and December 1942, when there were only three reports, anti-Semitism appears actually to have been revived by the authoritative disclosures of the Nazis’ systematic massacre of European Jews. Although there was ‘extreme horror’ and ‘widespread indignation, anger and disgust’ at the news, there took place a recrudescence of feeling against Jews in Britain and Home Intelligence came to the conclusion ‘that “as a result of the publicity, people are more conscious of the Jews they do not like here” ’. The Bethnal Green tube disaster of 3 March 1943, when 173 persons died in a crush on the stairs leading to a shelter, was widely blamed on panicking Jews - an accusation confirmed in many people’s minds by Herbert Morrison’s decision not to release the findings of the subsequent inquiry.

It is difficult to estimate how accurately these reports reflected the degree and extent of British anti-Semitism during the war; but their frequency was such as to suggest that the propagandists drew back from giving the plight of European Jews more prominence than that of other groups and nationalities under Nazi domination. A Jewish Section was set up in July 1941 as part of the Religions Division. It was not allowed to touch ‘political problems’ - chiefly because of the Zionist controversy - and was therefore confined to disseminating propaganda to the Jewish community and explaining Jewish religious life to Christian citizens. It did not function as a centre for the compilation and distribution of material revealing the situation in Europe.

In February 1942, Robert Fraser, head of the Productions Division, issued a warning against the use of unverified atrocity stories:

It must be remembered that the twenty years between the two wars were occupied by a well conducted campaign against atrocity propaganda, and that some people are contra-suggestible to atrocity propaganda. I do not know whether there was a ‘corpse factory’ or not. But most people believe there was not.


On the whole it appears the majority of people were ready to believe reports of German brutality, especially if they concerned victims geographically close such as the Dutch and the French, but there was a sufficiently large minority sceptical both of stories and of photographs to act as a restraining influence on the Ministry. Another constraint was the evidence reaching the Ministry of the public’s hard attitude towards the enemy. ‘Hatred of Germany - “enemy No. 1” - is expressed’, read a report of February 1943, ‘as well as

[p.168]

a hope that the Russians get to Germany before we do, “as they’re more ruthless”.’ A survey conducted by the British Institute of Public Opinion in April 1943 showed that 41 per cent of the sample thought the German people, as distinct from the Nazi government alone, were the chief enemy. In September 1939 the percentage stood at 6, although it had risen to a peak of 50 per cent at the height of the blitz. The public often displayed impatience at any suggestion of a less than implacable attitude on the part of political and military leaders. In November 1942, for example, a photograph appeared in the press showing Montgomery entertaining one of the defeated Afrika Korps generals, von Thoma. It aroused ‘extreme annoyance’ and distaste, for the spectacle of the British ‘treating him as if he were the captain of an opposing cricket team’ was said to be universal. Such reports were undoubtedly instrumental in persuading the Ministry that atrocity propaganda was unnecessary.

In September 1944 A Catalogue of Crime, a pamphlet of some 5,000 words, documented extensive and authoritatively verified evidence of the Nazi extermination of Jews and other peoples, its unusually dispassionate and concise form of presentation making the facts all the more horrific. The introductory section reviewed German history since the time of Bismarck and endeavoured to show the gradual process by which Germany had irrevocably advanced towards these latest outrages. In conclusion it was stated:

The German people have accepted from the nineteenth- and twentieth-century leaders of German thought and action, and have fully supported, the principles and practice of glorification of war; pursuit of world domination; and total ruthlessness in method.


Why, at this late stage, were the German people still identified inextricably with Nazism? Having for so long insisted on the wickedness of the enemy, perhaps the Ministry could not help but regard the discoveries of the allied armies in Europe as final proof of the allegation. If there had been any question of reversing the policy, the prospect of drawing a distinction between Nazism and the German people was simply too daunting to be undertaken. Bracken was certainly in no mood to do so:

Most of the victims appear to be foreign slaves, and if the German people did not endorse the conduct of the people whom they put in power, then the German people must remember that they have to accept the consequences of the government ... In this war,

[p.169]

the Germans have shown themselves to be very good in organised fighting, and let me warn the House that they will be equally good in organised whining!

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Monday, 9 November 2009

The ‘Vote Conservative -- they Oppose the Multicult’ meme

Sarah, Maid of Albion put up a very good blog at her site and at Green Arrow’s urging people not to fall into the trap of voting for the establishment party/ies again now that they are talking the right game on immigration.

Of course, we have been here before, the last time that our politicians were forced to address the subject of immigration during the months leading up to an election, thirty years ago, in 1979.

Usually, all political parties comply with a secret pact whereby none of them mention the subject of immigration before an election, because they all have the same failed policy, and they do not want it discussed. However, this time, the growing popularity of the BNP, means that they have no option other than to address the subject and start lying through their expensively capped, tax payer funded teeth.

Voters over 50 will have seen this before, in the lead up to the 1979 election, the then opposition leader Margaret Thatcher gave a famous TV interview to the “World in Action” program during which she alluded to the fears in many communities that they could become "rather swamped by people of a different culture".

Thatcher was widely condemned, even then controlled media, for using the word “swamped” but she used it deliberately, and as cynically as Johnson used his words at the Royal Society.

Like Johnson, Thatcher had no intention of changing immigration policy, but she fooled enough people into into believing she would that they voted for her, rather than the National Front, and she won with a majority of 43 and the rest is history.

The BNP is not the National Front, but the issues and the Lib/Lab/Con troika are the same as they were in 1979, just much worse. Do not let history repeat itself, do not be fooled again.


This is an especially important message going into the next election because now that it’s become clear that Labour will not win the MSM are strongly pushing the idea that mass-immigration has been a peculiarly Labourite obsession, and that the Tories, had they been in power, would have acted differently. Nothing could be further from the truth. Race-replacement migration has been every bit as much a Tory program as a Labour one and will remain so. Right-liberals have no more grounds on which to say ‘this far but no further’ than left-liberals, and so never do say ‘no further’ -- much less, ‘let’s back up a little.’

Recently I came across this quote in a Times opinion piece discussing Birmingham City Council’s plan to rehouse immigrants suffering from overcrowding, in accomodation that otherwise would have gone to Brits who had been waiting on housing lists, often for long periods of time:

What are likely to be the feelings of 50,000 white would-be tenants in Birmingham, who have waited years for a decent house, when they see newcomers, no matter what their colour, taking over whole streets of properties?


It was published on November 8th, no, not yesterday - November 8th, 1954. Nothing changes! Churchill was PM then, and in the 55 years since the Tories have been in power for 31 and we’ve had six more Conservative Prime Ministers. Will the boobs be fooled again? Will they vote Tory in part to halt our dispossession? Millions will, but I predict that for the first time more than a million won’t be fooled, and shall vote for a party that means it -- not only on immigration but on other issues close to all social-conservatives’ hearts.

Reasons for Treasons II

I have posted before about successive governments’ clear determination to import dangerous and troublesome populations and individuals:

It has been apparent for years that the more hostile and problematic immigrant groups gain official and NGO support in their efforts to immigrate and remain here while the most affinitive have obstacles put in their way. The perverse bias persists despite near unanimous public opposition and politicians’ oft-stated ‘outrage’ at the situation. [...]

It is axiomatic that governments usually act in such a way as to increase their powers, and this is the most parsimonious explanation for the systematic discrimination in favour of the hostile, criminal and least assimilable. The more havoc the [radically dissimilar immigrant groups] create, the more public support is gained for legislative and social controls that would otherwise be opposed on civil liberties grounds. Immigration by the [similar] is discouraged because it dilutes the toxic effect of immigration generally, and because the [lives they will live here] would present such an obvious contrast to the government's favoured immigrant cohorts.


A story broken yesterday in the Sunday Times shows how the de-facto policy was enforced at ministerial and administrative level during the Blair years:

From The Sunday Times November 8, 2009:
Home Office covered up immigration risk


Labour's “open door” immigration policy knowingly risked allowing dangerous people to settle in Britain unchecked, according to documents seen by The Sunday Times.

The Whitehall correspondence, which was illegally withheld by the Home Office for four years, shows how ministers were told by the country’s most senior immigration official that his staff were to be “encouraged to take risks” when granting visas, work permits and extended residency to hundreds of thousands of new migrants.

The cover-up of this policy of risk-taking was so concerted that Richard Thomas, the then information commissioner, sent a team of investigators into the Home Office to trawl all the relevant papers. Earlier this year he rebuked the department for breaking the law and ordered it to release the material under the freedom of information (FoI) law.

The documents help to explain the huge rise in the flow of migrants into Britain as the Home Office rushed to clear a backlog of 45,000 cases.

Officials agreed to fast-track 337,000 applications with minimal checks. This led to a rapid rise in immigration. In 1999, 170,000 visas were granted; by 2002, this had risen to 300,000.

As officials were being ordered to take risks, several potentially dangerous people entered the UK. In late 2001, more than 20 Taliban, who had fled from Afghanistan after their defeat by American and British forces, were allowed to stay in the UK.

The documents cast new light on the row over past immigration policy, highlighted by the recent rise of the British National party.

Last week Alan Johnson became the first Labour home secretary to admit the government had made mistakes in its handling of immigration. He said ministers had ignored problems about failed asylum seekers and foreign national prisoners. They had also failed to grasp public unease about the growing pressure on jobs and public services.

Johnson’s remarks signalled the government’s belated recognition that its immigration policy has alienated its white working-class vote, tempting a significant minority to back the BNP. The documents indicate that, far from being a mistake, there was a deliberate policy — apparently endorsed at the highest level in the Home Office — to promote concerted risk-taking by immigration staff whose job was to decide whether non-European Union migrants applying to work, study or marry in Britain were genuine.

A key figure in the scandal was Sir Bill Jeffrey, who was the director-general of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Britain’s most senior immigration official. He is now at the centre of controversy as the senior civil servant in charge of the Ministry of Defence.

The other key figure was Beverley Hughes, then minister of state for citizenship and immigration. She was later forced to resign after it emerged she had misled MPs about whether she had been warned that Romanian and Bulgarian crime gangs might want to exploit the UK’s decision to open its borders to those seeking work from eastern Europe.

In March 2003, shortly after the 2001 entry permits to the Taliban had come to light — to an outcry in the press — Jeffrey spelled out the policy in a note to Hughes.

“We are still in a situation where some risks have to be taken, and staff should feel that if they are encouraged to take risks they will be supported when something does go wrong,” he wrote.

The minister’s office replied by e-mail three days later:

“Beverley Hughes has seen and noted your submission of 7 March . . . Beverley feels the basic point is that while staff have to take some risks, this was a decision that flew in the face of common sense.”

The e-mail was copied to David Blunkett, then home secretary, and Sir John Gieve, his most senior mandarin. The words “to be withheld” were later scribbled across the top, an apparent instruction not to comply with an FoI request for its release.

The same words appear on a note, prepared by Jeffrey, sent to Hughes a few day later. In it, in response to Hughes’s insistent complaints about the need to clear the 45,000 backlog, he outlined the new “risk-taking” policy. This involved fast-tracking all 337,000 applications, with little or no regard as to whether they were merited.

The policy, codenamed Brace, meant that officials had to make quick decisions based on the paperwork in an applicant’s file, regardless of whether it was complete. No further follow-up checks were to be made.

Jeffrey said staff were given guidance that “Brace is about pragmatic (ie not pursing every angle that could conceivably justify refusal) grants rather than pragmatic refusals”.

In other words, the official policy was in principle to grant applications rather than to refuse them.


This telling exchange — and equally significant evidence of a concerted cover-up — is buried deep in a batch of documents that ministers tried desperately to prevent being made public.

Their illegal activity followed an application by a Whitehall whistleblower, Steve Moxon, to force them to release the material under the Freedom of Information Act.

An immigration case worker whose ultimate bosses had been Jeffrey and Hughes, Moxon was sacked after telling The Sunday Times about the fast-tracking process in 2004. He has spent five years trying to obtain the truth about the policy, which Hughes always claimed publicly was implemented by junior officials without her knowledge.

Not only do the papers expose her claim as untrue; they go further in showing that Hughes and Jeffrey were happy to encourage the culture of deliberate risk-taking.

When an FoI application was made to see their exchanges, ministers argued that the material was exempt from disclosure because policy advice given by officials to their political masters should remain confidential.

In official correspondence with the information commissioner, the Home Office said that “a Home Office minister” had ruled that the documents should not be released.

But in March this year, Thomas ruled: “The public interest in favour of maintaining the exemption does not outweigh the public interest in disclosure.

“The commissioner requires the (Home Office) to disclose the information which has been withheld . . . In failing to release information, the commissioner finds that the (Home Office) breached sections 1 and 10 (of the Freedom of Information Act.”

The government reluctantly conceded, placing the documents on an obscure part of the department’s website, apparently in the hope that nobody would notice.

Yesterday, the Tories said they would be demanding an urgent explanation of the documents from the government.

Chris Grayling, the shadow home secretary, said: “This is shaping up to become one of the major political scandals of recent times. Ministers quite clearly broke the law and deliberately misled the public to cover up a policy which most reasonable people would say was utterly irresponsible.”


Whiff of a smoking gun

Why did new Labour secretly open Britain’s borders, while pretending to control the numbers under its so-called “managed migration” policy?

Two weeks ago Andrew Neather, a former speechwriter for Tony Blair, wrote an article saying Labour had allowed immigration to rocket in order to turn Britain “truly multicultural” and “to rub the right’s noses in diversity”.

The heart of his claim was that uncontrolled mass immigration had been a deliberate, covert policy to change the country’s demographics.

But Labour’s core vote, the white working class, were drawn to the BNP at the resulting pressure on jobs, homes and schools.

Alan Johnson, the home secretary, has said Labour was “maladroit” on the issue: the immigration door was left wide open because of “cock-up” not a “conspiracy”. But Neather’s account may be only half the story.

Chris Mullin, a former minister, recalled in his memoirs that ministers had “barely touched the rackets that surrounded arranged marriages . . . terrified of the huge cry of ‘racism’ that would go up

. . . There is the added difficulty that at least 20 Labour seats, including Jack (Straw’s), depend on Asian votes”.

With up to 80% of ethnic minorities voting Labour, it is obvious that the more immigrants who get the right to vote, the greater is Labour’s electoral share. Perhaps Mullin has stumbled on a smoking gun.


In the third of Dan Dare’s terrific series on the evolution of anti-discrimination law in Britain he writes of one particularly egregious attack on our freedoms:

In its zeal to eradicate the evil of racial hatred the Conservatives had managed to outdo even the anti-racist zealots in the Labour Party. That it should have fallen to a Conservative government, trading on its law-‘n’-order credentials, to enact repressive measures of such an Orwellian character would have been literally incredible to Winston Churchill.


I am sure history is about to repeat itself. Following deliberate increases in ethnic diversity and the fostering of social problems therefrom, the future Cameron government will quite easily find excuses, themselves probably manufactured by the state, to extend the limits on free -speech and -association.

Media rejoice as pro-war beauty becomes Miss England



___________________________Christie and Hodge______________________


When Rachel Christie somewhat bizarrely won the Miss England beauty contest earlier this year our ‘anti-racist’ mainstream media were cockahoop - because she wasn’t White. The ITN News reporter said that Christie’s non-Whiteness made her ‘a thoroughly modern beauty queen’; Christie herself said that she hoped to be a role-model to Black youngsters:

‘I want to show them you can do anything you want, whatever your colour. I don't like hearing: "I can't do this or that because I'm black." They should stop behaving in a way that stereotypes them. If you come across as smart, if you dress nicely and speak well, it shouldn't make a difference if you're black or white.’


It made a difference to the media, every piece of news coverage mentioned her race as a positive factor. I quoted some headlines at the time:

I won Miss England to prove being black is NEVER an excuse for failure
First Black Miss England crowned
Victory for Linford Christie’s niece as she becomes first black Miss England
100m star Christie’s niece crowned first black Miss England
Linford Christie's niece is first black Miss England


But now that Christie has conformed to stereotype and been forced to hand back her crown after punching another girl repeatedly in the face in a nightclub brawl, the media are strangely silent about race. Maybe her uncle Linford Christie, the drug cheat sprinter, is right about the media’s racism but wrong about which groups it privileges?

Fortunately for the media, though, every cloud has a silver lining, and while Christie’s resignation means no more anti-White propaganda can be squeezed from this story, her replacement offers propaganda scope for one of their other wars:

Miss England: 'I Want To Serve In Afghanistan'

The soldier recently crowned Miss England has expressed her wish to one day serve on the frontline alongside comrades in Afghanistan.

Lance Corporal Katrina Hodge, dubbed "Combat Barbie" by Army colleagues, had been due to join the British effort before she was drafted in to compete for the Miss World crown.

The 22-year-old soldier, who has already served in Iraq, said she hopes to be deployed when her reign as Miss England ends in July next year.

The 2009 runner up was fast-tracked in as a replacement for the year's original winner Rachel Christie.

The 21-year-old relinquished the beauty title following her arrest over an alleged brawl in a Manchester nightclub.


How convenient. I wonder if the second runner-up was a professional global warming activist?

Saturday, 7 November 2009

‘The Same Old Hun?’: Anti-German Propaganda

More from Ian McLaine, Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1979):

In war it is almost axiomatic that the peoples of the combatant nations must be taught to hate each other. This applied to Britain no less than it did to Germany in the Second World War. Writing before the war, Hans Speier stated, ‘In modern war, in which mass opinions count, the enemy has to be wholly identified ... with the principle of evil, so that one can mobilize the power of right for one’s own cause.’ As if with the Ministry of Information’s propaganda in mind, Joseph Geoghegan observed during the war that the enemy was denied any shred of justification:

He so blatantly represents the negation of all good, he so deliberately runs counter to every law of God or man, he carries with him such a foul string of barbarities that it becomes only right and proper to smite him hip and thigh.


While the Ministry saw it as a prime duty on the home front ‘by the dissemination of truth to attack the enemy in the minds of the public’, it became clear as the war progressed that statements made about the enemy represented a deliberate attempt to manipulate public opinion and attitude. ‘All propaganda is lies’, wrote Orwell in 1942, ‘even when one is telling the truth.’ The validity of this paradox is borne out by an examination of the Ministry’s use of the ‘truth’, for the propagandists did select facts to serve ends and they did offer as truth statements which at best could be described as convenient assumptions. On one issue - the nature of the RAF’s bombing strategy in Germany - they were not above stretching the truth to the threshold of lying.

A contemporary psychologist, E. H. Henderson, suggested that

[p.137]

the aim of the propagandist is to inculcate certain attitudes by means which prevent critical thinking. That the Ministry of Information attempted to accomplish this should cause no surprise. What is worthy of comment, however, is the fact that the Ministry simultaneously attached great importance to releasing simple, unadorned news and tried to persuade other departments to limit their requests for censorship strictly to matters of security. The ambivalence in departmental attitudes cannot be attributed to poor co-ordination between one division and another, since on the same day a senior officer might berate the Admiralty for withholding unpleasant news and then suggest at a meeting that the public should be induced to regard the Germans with hatred as a means of sustaining morale. […]

To judge by the resources, man hours and thought expended on telling the public what attitudes they ought to adopt towards the· enemy, the Ministry considered the matter to be one of cardinal importance. […]

[p.138]

The critical question as to whether the German people were to be characterised as incorrigibly aggressive was left for the consideration of the Ministry. Yet this matter, so closely related to a post-war settlement, should have merited the Cabinet’s closest attention. Unlike its operations in censorship and the issue of news, the Ministry was virtually unconstrained by higher authority in pronouncements on the enemy.

In July 1938 Stephen King-Hall insisted:

We must go into the war with a conviction in the minds of the people that it was forced on us and that we did all that was honourably possible to avoid it ... The danger would appear to be that in a crisis which may arise very suddenly we shall have public opinion in a muddle in this country ... we may find ourselves in the dangerous position of the Cabinet having issued threats and being committed to action for which public opinion is unprepared and might not support.


In the event, it was the public that clamoured for a firm declaration of war when Chamberlain appeared to waver after the Germans attacked Poland. Having prepared a considerable amount of material, the Ministry adopted a historical, almost scholarly, emphasis in explaining the causes of the war. In a pamphlet of some 6,000 words, D. A. Routh, the historian, reached deep into German history to expose the roots of her latest act of aggression and, while not sparing the nation from charges of wickedness, concluded:

... the tragedy of Germany is the tragedy of a great people who, through lack of political experience and for reasons lying far back in their history, have twice failed to prevent their national power from falling into the hands of violent and ambitious rulers ... The overthrow of National-Socialism is the one hope for the future of the German people.


In Assurance of Victory it was argued that Britain had striven to ameliorate the harsher provisions of the Versailles Treaty and to integrate Germany in a peaceful Europe but, misled by Hitler, the Germans had insisted on supporting a treacherous foreign policy. There was now no recourse but to prevent Germany from trampling

[p.140]

on the rights of other nations, a policy ‘which British Governments have consistently pursued in the face of the attempts of any Power to dominate Europe by force’. […]

Once the British were at war there was little sign of reluctance to pursue a struggle ‘quietly accepted as inevitable’ and as a consequence the Ministry’s long-winded statements about its cause became superfluous. A source of greater concern - and one that would continue well into 1941 - were reports of public confusion about Britain’s military aims. It was one thing to know who had started the war but quite another to know what victory was meant to achieve or, indeed, whether the government would stop short of the complete defeat of the enemy. […]

[p.141]

When the war moved closer to home and it was realised the fight was on in earnest the tone of the propaganda underwent an abrupt change, a process greatly hastened by Churchill’s accession to the premiership on 10 May.

As British troops. were being evacuated from Norway, the Policy Committee agreed that the separation of the German people from Nazism should in future be avoided. And after Dunkirk:

The Director General asked whether it was thought that the Ministry should now begin to stir up people’s more primitive instincts. After discussion it was considered that we should now pay more attention to stirring up people’s anger ... It might be merely sufficient to impress the people that they were in fact angry.


[p.142]

Two weeks later a paper setting out proposals for an ‘Anger Campaign’ was circulated at the Policy Committee. It is one of the more remarkable documents of wartime government, not merely because it illustrates the mood which gripped the propagandists themselves but also because it demonstrates the extent to which they were capable of misunderstanding the British public.

The public, ‘patient, long-suffering, slow to anger, slower still to hate’, were believed to be ‘harbouring little sense of real personal animus against the average German man or woman [and] accepting with amazing phlegm bitter reverses without overmuch recrimination’. This placidity must be replaced with ‘personal anger ... against the German people and Germany’. This raises two difficult questions. First, what justification was there for thinking that the people felt no anger towards the Germans? And second, was anger necessary ‘as a factor in increasing the war effort and preparing the British public for every emergency’? Such evidence as was available to the Ministry suggested that there was nothing approaching the almost hysterically bellicose mood of the British in the early months of the First World War, which is not to say that in the middle of 1940 the public regarded the Germans with equanimity. What did the Home Intelligence reports indicate? Hitler’s discomfiting ability to realise his military predictions aroused apprehension but it was Italy rather than Germany which earned the anger of the British after Mussolini’s declaration of war on 11 June. Not until September 1940 were there any reports of bitterness against the Germans, and even then they were said to have been aroused not by Nazi ideology or German victories in Europe but by direct air attacks on Britain. ‘It is so strange’, observed Harold Nicolson, ‘that in this moment of anxiety there is no hatred of Hitler or the Germans.’

Granted, then, that the Ministry had good reason to suppose that the people did not hate the enemy, what justification was there for the deduction that this represented a danger? It is too easy to be wise after the event. We know that the British people displayed resilience and determination, though in no greater measure than German civilians later in the war, but we must avoid the anachronism of imputing that knowledge to the propagandists in June 1940, when invasion seemed a distinct probability. Nevertheless, stolidity and phlegm might just as easily have indicated a sober realisation of the trials that lay ahead and a determination to withstand them; whereas anger of the semi-hysterical sort the Ministry wished to inculcate might, if spontaneously present, have revealed a certain brittleness and instability far more worrying than outward placidity.

[p.143]

It was the opinion of contemporary psychiatrists and social psychologists (whom, for the most part, the Ministry studiously avoided consulting) that hate is a poor basis for morale. The emotion, asserted one authority, prevents discrimination between good and bad individuals among the enemy, blinds one to historical realities and may, if continued into peacetime, affect post-war settlements and lay the foundation for another war. If the reasoning then current in the Ministry is followed, where does it lead? The public were not angry. They were, therefore, either not aware of the danger of the situation or were unwilling to construct for themselves good reasons for standing up to the Nazis. In consequence they were incapable of resisting whatever lay ahead.

So in order to ‘change the attitude of the most stolid and unvengeable people in the world’ it was proposed to mount a massive and, at first, clandestine campaign. Photographs, cartoons, posters, film, radio, leaflets, speeches, exhibitions, window displays - all were to be put at the service of ‘the modern art of propaganda - all pervasive, subtle and persistent’. The Ministry should be seen to enter the campaign only after non-official propaganda had succeeded and the people were beginning to feel stirrings of anger. The methods of Goebbels had not been overlooked, for, as the paper averred with a hint of admiration, ‘it is exactly upon these intensive lines that propaganda has succeeded in creating the militant Germany of to-day from a battered, helpless nation’. The officials of the Ministry were urged to regard themselves as ‘a small group of expert propagandists ... in a position to tap and colour and guide every source of public expression’. The ‘total attack’ was to have as its principal weapon the co-operation of the twenty or thirty most influential journalists of the national press who, in consultation with the Ministry, would write a ‘stream of carefully worded features’ based on certain themes. In suggesting one such theme, ‘The German Character’, the paper stressed the importance of tailoring the style and content to the class of the reader. For the broad mass the emotional appeal was felt to be most suitable:

EUROPE’S GANGSTERS RAMPANT
THE RECURRING MADNESS OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE
HUNS, GOTHS AND VANDALS
GERMAN LUST FOR WORLD DOMINATION
1870 - 1914 - 1939
‘THEY DO NOT CHANGE’
BLOWS ARE ALL THEY UNDERSTAND
FREDERICK - BISMARCK - WILHELM - HITLER
THEY SHALL NOT PASS
WHY THE KAISER CALLED THEM ‘HUNS’
THE ROUT OF THE GERMANS IN 1918
THE GERMAN IS NOT INVINCIBLE
THESE BULLIES CAN BE BEATEN
THE LESSON OF THE AIR FORCE
INFERIORITY COMPLEX -- THE ROOT OF GERMAN AGGRESSION


The ‘sophisticated and educated classes’ were to be given ‘more restrained and factual’ evidence:

The fundamental ‘rottenness’ of the German character - historical analysis.
German writers on the Germany bully complex - Nietzsche, Treitschke, etc.
Detailed instances where Germans have crumpled up.
German weaknesses.
Germany’s ‘case’ torn to shreds - refutation of Versailles Treaty attacks, etc.
Events since the war have utterly confuted the weak-kneed apologists for Hitler. His ‘lebensraum’ is the whole world. His ‘culture’ the death of every other race.


The middle classes - ‘still not mentally at war’ - had to be convinced that the Germans intended to rob them of their incomes and culture; the professional classes ‘told of refugee professional men, of how they have been hounded and put to menial tasks - like washing dishes and cleaning lavatories’; and shopkeepers, businessmen and industrial workers disabused of the idea that ‘things might go much the same way under Hitler’. While being careful to emphasise that stories of German brutality should not be allowed to arouse fear rather than hatred, the Ministry insisted that atrocity stories are believed and are effective. Thus another Nurse Cavell story was to be found and news of German ruthlessness treated so as to illustrate triumphant courage ‘such as the woman in Bruges in 1914 who slaughtered two Germans who had killed her son’.

The smaller touches were not omitted. Nazi leaders, it was recommended, should never be mentioned without an appropriate label: ‘Hitler - the Arch Gangster’, ‘Jew Baiter Streicher’ and ‘Lie Minister Goebbels’. The BBC must be persuaded to cease referring to ‘Herr’ Hitler and ‘Signor’ Mussolini. A rather more drastic suggestion was

[p.145]

that ‘a few death sentences on traitors would have a great effect in heightening the public temper against the enemy’.

Hitler posed a very difficult problem. Later in the war it would be possible to make a joke of him but in 1940 it was not easy to counter the impression of his political and military omniscience, and all that could be done was to suggest somewhat feebly that the opposite was the case:

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that Hitler’s success is engendering a legend of infallibility which is immensely powerful ... THIS LEGEND MUST BE DEFEATED. It must be made clear that the little countries Hitler has invaded were lying defenceless at Hitler’s door for generations. Even in France he is only making headway by sheer weight of metal. Hitler is personally fallible, despicable, cowardly ... He is important only as the embodiment of the German lust for power in the most evil guise it has ever taken.


This latter assertion contains the essence not only of the Anger Campaign but of the tenor of domestic propaganda for the rest of the war, namely that there can be no distinction between a German and a Nazi. Nazism is but the latest and most virulent manifestation of the inherent wickedness of the German race. Stephen King-Hall’s propaganda theme of 1938 - ‘we reluctantly destroy German bodies in order to save the souls of the rest’ - had been hastily jettisoned. The new orthodoxy, suggested the propagandists, should be embodied by a famous writer such as J. B. Priestley in a short wall text to be issued in millions:

The Secret Beast

In the middle of a great civilised continent, far from the sea which brings a breath of the outer world to freshen men’s minds, a secret people dwell.

Ever and again they become crazed with a spell of hero worship. A leader arises among them who tells them that they are greater than the other peoples of the world. Knowing nothing of the world’s vastness and of the seas which link land to land, they believe - and march out to slaughter and destroy.

The secret people of the Germanys are worse than fools in their folly. When their madness comes upon them, out leaps a primitive, barbarian beast-like instinct. They kill without pity, rejoicing in blood, as animals kill. They know no law, as animals know no law.

[p.146]

They are Europe’s secret beasts, roused to senseless fury. It is all Europe’s mission to cower them and cage them today, as all Europe has had to do before.

The Hun is at the gate. He will rage and destroy. He will slaughter the women and the children. But in the end, he will run from the men as he has always run in the past.

Out then and kill ... the extermination of the wild animal let loose on Europe is the plain business of Europe’s citizens.


By these and other means a fundamental change of public attitude was to be wrought. The wish was very much father to the thought. No evidence was forthcoming during the brief life of the Ministry to support the belief that public opinion and emotion were so malleable, and just how seriously the proposed campaign was regarded in the department it is difficult to tell. The men responsible for approving it were well educated, intelligent and worldly and it is barely conceivable that they could contemplate treating the British public as a body of credulous simpletons. Moreover, in proposing a reversion to the crudest type of First World War propaganda, were they not aware of the scepticism which the falsity and unscrupulousness of that propaganda had engendered between the wars? The explanation must be tentatively sought in the states of mind of the propagandists themselves. They knew what the public could only strongly suspect - that the threat to Britain was imminent and grave - and the Anger Campaign seems to have been devised to stir up their own ‘primitive instincts’ as profoundly as those of the people at large. The Ministry saw about them a dangerous complacency whose cure it was their urgent duty to prescribe. While other men produced the munitions and manned the beaches the propagandists probably felt the need to do something which could be interpreted, if only by themselves, as of equal importance to the nation’s defence. It was at this time, too, that the Ministry were advocating the imposition of compulsory censorship, but this departure from the liberal attitude with which censorship was normally exercised was soon abandoned. Not so the new propaganda. For, although the Anger Campaign was not implemented on the heroic scale originally contemplated, its principal themes were embodied in the Ministry’s public attitude towards the enemy for the rest of the war.

[p.147]

Wednesday, 4 November 2009

Big Lies

The news is not a neutral phenomenon; it is rather the manufactured production of ideology. ~ The Glasgow University Media Group

***

There are many ‘Big Lies,’ not least the one that a certain German fellow originated the practice and advocated its use. One big lie is that the establishment parties are deadly foes, another is that government more generally reacts to public opinion than shapes it.

From a 1939 Ministry of Information memo to the Home Office on civilian morale:

It must be realised that large masses of people distrust the radio and a press which they know to be censored. Hence support for the energetic prosecution of war, from those sections of the Labour Movement known to be most opposed to the Government on other matters will have a quite disproportionate effect in raising civilian morale ... It is not too much to say that ... their propaganda value will be actually increased if the speakers attack the Government on other points ...

The people must feel that they are being told the truth. Distrust breeds fear much more than knowledge of reverses. The all important thing for publicity to achieve is the conviction that the worst is known. This can be achieved by the adoption, publication and prosecution of a policy. The people should be told that this is a civilians’ war, or a People’s War, and therefore they are to be taken into the Government’s confidence as never before ... But what is truth? We must adopt a pragmatic definition. It is what is believed to be the truth. A lie that is put across becomes the truth and may, therefore, be justified. The difficulty is to keep up lying ... It is simpler to tell the truth and, if a sufficient emergency arises, to tell one big, thumping lie that will then be believed.


‘The Preservation of Civilian Morale’ September 13th 1939, HO 199/434. Italics in original.

Tuesday, 3 November 2009

Pakistanis in Britain: Early Years

More from Alison Shaw, A Pakistani Community in Britain (Blackwell Ltd., Oxford, 1988), again touching on the economic, and ultimately evolutionary, advantage of extended-family and ethnic networking common to south Asians, rare among us, and also covering some of the issues relating to intermarriage covered in a prior post. Emphases in bold are mine.

Pakistanis in Britain - Early years

What was the effect of the British environment on the aspirations, values and activities of the ‘bachelor status’ Pakistani men who first came to Britain in the late 1950s and early 1960s? The range of possible ‘western influences’ is very wide, but many of the relatives in Pakistan of the migrants who came to Britain and some of the migrants themselves feared that life in Britain would exert a potentially corrupting influence over the newcomers. They had, and many still have, ambivalent attitudes to Britain. On the one hand, it was regarded as a rich country where a man can earn huge sums of money after only a few month’s work; but on the other hand, it is a land whose people are lax in their moral standards, particularly their sexual morals. Various myths prevailed which were generally associated with the fact that English people eat pork, the meat of a beast with no sexual shame, and drink alcohol to enjoy its intoxicating effects, both activities being forbidden in Islam. One myth was that every Englishman would carry a bottle of whisky upon his person and encourage any newcomer to have some; another was that every English woman, being sexually promiscuous, would try to seduce any Indian or Pakistani man who might be out wandering on the streets. No doubt these preconceptions were reinforced by the fact that most Pakistani men first arrived in Britain without their wives during the 1960s, the decade of the mini-skirt and the contraceptive pill. To what extent were there grounds, in the early years of settlement, for fears that the men would succumb to these particular western influences?

[p.33]

By living in multi-occupation lodging houses, often sharing a room with many other Indians and Pakistanis, the men were able to circumvent the discrimination which they encountered in seeking accommodation with white landlords and which forced prospective tenants back into houses owned or occupied by Pakistanis. But migrants also continued, and in some cases chose, to live in such conditions because despite its discomforts, living with other Pakistanis in multi-occupation lodging houses had the advantage of offering a man a cheaper way of living than would generally have been possible were he to rent his own room. A man who worked as many as 75 hours a week as a labourer, by taking all possible overtime, would have little time, energy or opportunity to do anything other than work; often the houses in which the men lived were no more than dormitories. Men working on night shifts would share beds with men on day shifts and further reduce their rent. In the early 1960s, a man could in this way earn between £12 and £18 a week, spend £2 per week on lodging and food and save the rest. By keeping expenses to a minimum, some men were able to save as much as £500 in one year. Apparently Indians in London were even able to save from their unemployment benefit and national assistance benefits when they were out of work. Indeed, saving itself became a source of status among migrants. A man who saved large sums of money for the benefit of kin at home gained considerable status among the relatives and friends with whom he was living in Britain; on the other hand, if a worker saved less than £25 a year, he would be ashamed to admit this to others. There was therefore also a moral pressure from relatives and fellow villagers which tended to ensure that migrants continued to live frugally, save and remit money home. To do otherwise would involve a loss of face.

[p.36]

Saeed was one of the few Pakistanis who continued to be employed at the COD (Central Ordnance Depot) after the transfer of the Didcot depot to Bicester had taken place, for most of the Pakistanis were employed there on a short-term basis for a relatively low wage of between £6 and £7 a week. These men then found employment with the Post Office, the hospitals and the bus company where they would earn between £10 and £13 per week. During the 1960s, the quota for black and Asian bus drivers and conductors was gradually increased following the pressure exerted by local voluntary organizations to end racial discrimination by local employers. Later, following the passing of the 1965 Race Relations Act, the quota was abandoned altogether. A number of men also obtained work in foundries outside Oxford, at the paper mill in Sandford, and at the Mother’s Pride bakery in Osney which became a major source of employment at this time. Subsequently the bakery closed in February 1982 and the paper mill closed in January 1983. While some men moved to other cities in response to reports of work opportunities elsewhere, two kinship groups of Mirpuris, one from Sheffield, the other from Bradford, came to Oxford specifically to work at the Osney bakery; one group settled in east Oxford; the other settled in the ‘Mirpuri’ area in Osney.

The most significant change in employment opportunities, however, took place at the British Leyland (or BL, now known as the Austin Rover Group) car factory in Cowley. From after the war until 1965, there had

[p.39]

been an unofficial colour bar on the employment of black and Asian workers at BL. Several Pakistani men described an incident at BL which led to the end of discrimination on the grounds of colour. The incident involved a West Indian who had obtained work at BL in 1964, and was the first black to do so. White workers apparently refused to work alongside the West Indian until an English convener (Bobby Fryer) told the white workers to hand in their notice if they objected to working with a black. The white workers gradually returned to work. Finally, a deputation from the Oxford Committee for Racial Integration successfully ended this form of discrimination at British Leyland.

From 1965 onwards, West Indians and Pakistanis were employed at British Leyland, at first for menial tasks as assemblers, painters, cleaners and storemen. Most of the Pakistanis who were working at the COD in Bicester moved to British Leyland at this time, not necessarily because they preferred the type of work available, but because British Leyland offered wages twice as high as those paid by the COD. By moving to British Leyland, Saeed for example, who had been a store supervisor at the COD, accepted a job as a semi-skilled labourer for financial reasons. […]

As opportunities of work increased, the Pakistani settlement gradually dispersed from west and central Oxford towards the east and south of the city.

[p.40]

[…] Not everyone moved from west Oxford. A number of Mirpuri ex-servicemen, for example, who bought houses in Osney in the first phase of migration, continued to live there (the area is now predominantly Mirpuri), while their former non- Mirpuri tenants bought their own houses in east Oxford. The first Pakistani grocery which opened in 1962 remained on Walton Crescent in Jericho until the mid-1970s (though changing hands seven times), before being moved to the Cowley Road. The second Pakistani grocery, which opened on Walton Street in 1964, is still there. Nevertheless, the new nucleus of the settlement gradually consolidated in east Oxford.

One reason for the residential shift was that the increase in the numbers of Pakistanis who came to Oxford in the early 1960s created a shortage of available rented accommodation in Jericho and west Oxford. Landlords would give priority to their own relatives or fellow villagers in the allocation of rooms. [recall that this sort of thing was labelled 'discrimination' when practiced by White landlords (p.34), the author offers no such value judgement here... fellist] At the same time certain parts of the old city centre, such as the old Victorian properties in Paradise Square in St Ebbes which contained one particularly notorious multi-occupation Pakistani lodging house, were being demolished by the City Council’s programme of slum clearance. Rather than move into a council house in accordance with slum clearance proposals, the Pakistani owners preferred to sell and buy a house elsewhere. The settlement dispersed in the direction of east and south Oxford mainly because cheap houses were available in these areas of the city. East and south Oxford have been officially described as ‘stress’ areas, which are overcrowded and lacking in modern amenities. During the 1960s terraced houses, lacking bathroom facilities and with outside toilets, could be bought for between £3,000 and £4,000 in east Oxford. Many

[p.41]

Pakistanis subsequently made use of City Council improvement grants which were available from 1954 as part of the Council’s urban renewal scheme to assist the improvement of owner-occupied properties in these areas.

From tenancy to house ownership

The shift in the location of settlement coincided with a move from tenancy in multi-occupation lodging houses to owner occupation. Typically, men who moved to east Oxford during the 1960s bought houses there which they paid for outright. The money was raised in several ways. Sometimes, by pooling their savings, relatives embarked upon joint enterprises in property ownership (or shopkeeping) at an earlier stage than was usually possible for an individual. Such houses were often collectively owned though usually registered in the senior relative’s name. Subsequently, as men decided to buy their own houses many of these joint arrangements ceased, the house being sold and shares apportioned out; sometimes this involved disputes over shares in the property.

Men also obtained interest-free loans from fellow migrants or former landlords and with money saved in rotating credit associations called kametis. The principle of a kameti is that every week or month all the contributors to it would pay a given sum, say £5, to the organizer and each week (or month) one person in turn would receive the total, which, if there were 20 contributors, would amount to £100. These methods of raising money enabled men to pay for their houses with cash rather than by taking out mortgages.

There are a number of reasons why Pakistani men did not take out mortgages on houses at this time. Firstly, the ownership of a house is a source of status: it was a way of demonstrating one’s freedom from dependence on a landlord or patron and was also a means of demonstrating one’s superiority to those Pakistanis who were still dependent on landlords, unable to buy their own houses. Little or no status is attached to paying rent or living on ‘borrowed money’, and very few Pakistanis are council house tenants; in fact, a substantial number of men in the present community own four or five properties in Oxford. A second reason for purchasing their houses with cash was that most men were unfamiliar with the procedure for acquiring mortgages. Many of those who did take out mortgages in the late 1960s said they would have done so earlier had they known how to, and complained that some of those who had bought their own houses with mortgages had withheld this information from fellow migrants who were tenants, in order to continue to make money from rent and to exploit their position as creditors. It might be argued that some

[p.42]

Pakistani men did not take out mortgages on religious grounds, because according to Islamic law the giving or receiving of interest is prohibited. Usury is forbidden and the correct form of loan is that given or received without interest. In theory, if interest is accrued on money kept in building societies or investment accounts, it should be given in alms to the poor and needy. However, those who have taken out mortgages were not inhibited by such considerations and justified their actions by saying that they had been compelled to pay interest for financial reasons. Perhaps the major reason for buying a house outright, rather than with a mortgage, was the perceived financial advantage, for a house paid for outright is regarded as a major investment which is easily capitalized. This was important because it meant that when a house was sold the owner would have a lump sum which he could take back to Pakistan or invest quickly in another property or in a business. This is still the major reason for the emphasis on owner occupation and completing full payments on a house as soon as possible.

‘Western influences’

During the 1960s there was therefore an increase in the range of economic opportunities, a shift in the location of the settlement and more men became house owners. Gradually, too, some migrants became less dependent on kin for welfare and assistance, more competent in spoken and written English and more familiar with procedures for obtaining mortgages, employment and welfare. Financial independence and competence in English brought a man status in the eyes of other migrants, especially in so far as they enhanced his ability to save money for remitting to Pakistan; they did not necessarily mean that a man’s allegiance to his original purpose and cultural values was weakened.

For some men, however, adapting to life in a western society involved changes which were not so well thought of. Some men succumbed to the ‘corrupting influences’ of the British environment as their relatives feared they would. While few men in the community today, especially those who hold positions of authority in the mosque or the welfare associations, would admit that they themselves had English girlfriends or visited prostitutes or went drinking during their bachelor years in Britain, accounts of migrants’ activities at that time and the rumour and gossip prevalent in the community today suggest that in fact these activities were fairly widespread. Several men spoke about the prostitutes who used to visit particular multi-occupation houses. One man recalled how he asked a prostitute who had come to his lodgings how much money she wanted, gave it to her and told her to go away. Others were not so scrupulous, but while their activities were not openly approved, occasionally spending time

[p.43]

with a woman or even drinking was tolerated and by some men considered necessary to satisfy the needs of men here without their wives. These activities were acceptable, or rather, overlooked, because they involved no commitment and were therefore not seen as conflicting with migrants’ original intentions.

However, regular drinking and extravagant spending of money were disapproved of, because they interfered with a man’s obligation to remit money to kin in Pakistan. A yet dimmer view was taken of a relationship with a girlfriend that appeared to be serious or long-term; kinsmen and villagers would exert pressure to ensure that the man concerned would ‘toe the line’. This might include threatening to withdraw assistance, ostracism, or actually summoning the leader of a Welfare Association or the imam. Amjad was one of the men thus threatened:

After a year or so of living in England, I became one of the lads, although it upset my cousin. I moved out of that crowded house we were all living in, and rented two rooms of my own in a boarding house in Cowley. I wanted to be more private and independent. I had a sports car at that time - one of those with a roof that opens up. The girls loved it; they used to hang around waiting for me. Then one girl got a bit serious - she was a good girl you know and I used to visit her parents, and her grandparents; they were good people and made me welcome. My cousin didn’t like it at all, and my brother warned me, if I got serious, he’d write home. But Younis from my village didn’t bother - in fact, he was like me in those days. Don’t say I told you. Eventually I married the girl, but by that time even my brother, who I’d helped come to England, wasn’t speaking to me.

The arrival of women and children

From about 1964 a major change took place in the Pakistani settlement as wives, children and young brides began to join the men already settled in Oxford. Most Pakistani women came to Oxford between five and fifteen years after their husbands […] and a few men are still waiting for their wives and children to join them.

[p.44]

This pattern is reflected in the city of Oxford electoral registers. There were no Pakistani women recorded on the electoral register of 1961 which showed there were 34 Pakistani (including Bangladeshi) men in five houses. Nor were there any Pakistani women shown on the electoral register for 1963, which records 130 men (one with an English wife) in 26 houses. By 1966, there were 274 people occupying 59 houses. This local pattern is similar to the nationwide picture of the dates of arrival of Pakistani women in Britain.

Several aspects of the arrival of women and children have puzzled observers. If migrants regarded living and working in Britain as a way of earning money to improve their living standards in Pakistan, then why should they bring non-working wives and children to a country where living expenses would leave little money available for saving and sending home? Furthermore, if families are concerned with maintaining their cultural and religious values and improving their social positions in relation to Pakistani society and culture, why should they risk exposing Muslim wives and daughters to what is regarded as the corrupting influence of British culture?

Some have argued that the arrival of women and children in Britain indicates that migrants stopped regarding living in Britain as a means of improving their position in Pakistan and instead became committed to making a permanent life here. One factor is said to be the effect of the immigration controls of 1962 and after. Their implementation made it increasingly difficult for adult men to enter Britain, but men already here were entitled to be joined by their families. In other words, the creation of a permanently settled population from a transient one is considered to have been an unintended consequence of the immigration controls.

However, the fact that migrants have been joined by their wives and children does not necessarily mean that they are committed to life in Britain. Also, it is not necessarily the case that the immigration controls played a causal role in creating an apparently permanently settled immigrant population. The absence of controls, or even the imposition of much tighter controls (as in the case of Turkish migrants to West Germany) is associated in other countries with a similar demographic result.

An alternative explanation is that some migrants, in keeping with their original intentions, were trying ‘to re-create the earlier situation of male-dominated chain migration within the constraints of immigration regulations’ because ‘bringing the whole family to Britain enables the man to ensure that he can be replaced by his son when he wants to return to Pakistan’.

There is some evidence for this view. As it became more difficult for adult men to enter Britain, some families adopted various strategies for bringing boys or young men into the country. In several cases men

[p.45]

brought over ‘sons’ who were in fact brothers’ sons or other relatives’ sons and in some cases boys’ ages were inflated in order that they might qualify for entry unaccompanied by their mothers. This was after the 1965 regulation which continued to permit the entry of wives accompanying children under 16, but removed discretionary rights for children under 16 to join relatives other than parents and for children between 16 and 18 to join their fathers without being accompanied by their mothers. Habib explained why families were brought over as follows:

The 1962 controls were supposed to stop us coming in, but they left loopholes because you could still bring in your son or a brother’s son and say he was yours. The Government soon realized that this was a loophole and stopped it by saying that children had to come with their mothers. That is why we brought our wives over.


However, if Pakistani men viewed calling their wives and children to Britain as a means of getting a second generation of male wage earners into the country, how do we explain the fact that the majority of Pakistani wives have remained in Britain? Although many Oxford Pakistani women have, since they first came to Britain, made one or more return visits to Pakistan of several months duration, often leaving school-age children here and taking younger children with them, they do not expect to stay in Pakistan permanently, at least while their children are at school in Britain. Only two women have returned, apparently permanently: one left a son in Oxford in the care of a daughter-in-law and the other returned taking all her children with her.

A different interpretation of the arrival of women and children is suggested here. The fact that the Pakistani settlement in Oxford had developed on the basis of family links and common village of origin meant that information about a man’s activities in Britain reached his relatives in Pakistan via letters home from fellow migrants or via men returning to Pakistan for holidays. The family in Pakistan would then take action to ensure that a man’s activities in Britain did not permanently hinder him from fulfilling his obligations to his relatives. In most cases, this involved arranging the marriage of a man who was a bachelor or arranging that a married man be joined by his wife and children. Although the head of the household generally took the formal action this required, women themselves had a direct interest in ensuring that a man continued to fulfil his obligations to his kinsmen, for his failure to do so threatened their own position in society.

Amina, Amjad’s wife (for in fact Amjad, who had married his English girlfriend, already had a wife) told me that initially she did not believe the story spread by villagers returned from England and mentioned in letters

[p.46]

from other villagers settled in Oxford that Amjad had married an English girl. Eventually, however, this was confirmed in a letter from Amjad’s brother who was living in London at the time. Amina then resolved to go to England herself. She borrowed money for the fare from relatives (including Amjad’s mother; his father was dead). She brought her children with her to Oxford and lived for almost a year in the same house as the English wife, who by then also had a child. But eventually the English wife left and the child remained with Amina. The English wife made one return visit to see her child, several years later, accompanied by the English man with whom she was living. Recalling the visit drew some scathing comments from Amina about the English woman’s scruffy jeans, her slovenly ways, her loose morality and her lack of interest in her child. Amina is still suspicious of any English woman who visits her home and although Amjad now expresses shame for his ‘misdemeanour’, and has strict attitudes towards the upbringing of his daughters, Amina feels she cannot entirely trust him and is reluctant to go back to Pakistan and leave her husband in England.

Several other married women stated explicitly that they had similar reasons for coming to Britain. Zafar’s wife Zahida said that as Zafar’s remittances became irregular and she was having to depend on kin for financial support for herself and her children, she became worried that her husband had married again, for she had heard that some men had done so. Other married women said that they came to England to ensure that their husbands did not forget that they had duties as husbands. All married women, even those who weren’t as explicit as Saleema or Zahida, said they thought a man and wife should be united after several years of separation. ‘It’s no good for a man to live alone,’ women would say, ‘his wife should be there to cook chapatis for him.’ They also said that children need a father to discipline them. Even some of the single women whose marriages were arranged at this time realized and accepted that one of the motives behind the arrangement of their marriages was to keep a check on their husbands’ activities. Imrana’s recollections of her thoughts and feelings before her marriage to Ijaz were echoed by several other young brides who came to England at this time:

You want to know how I came to be living here? Well, you might not think so now, but when Ijaz was first here, he got into bad company and his uncle was not much better. It is not surprising really, men here on their own. And he was only 19 at the time. But soon his parents got to hear that he had an English girlfriend: at least, that’s what some people from his village were saying. His parents were very worried. They had started to build a new house with the money he had been sending back. Other people got to know too, and his parents thought that because of it they would have trouble finding a girl for him to marry. A man’s family loses respect that way you know. So his parents came from their village in Jhelum to our city and spoke to my parents. Our families are the same caste - Pathans - but we

[p.47]

are not relatives; my father had known his father for some time. They said their son was returning for the marriage. You know what they did? It was his mother’s idea. They sent a telegram saying an uncle had died. It wasn’t true, but it brought him home straight away. Before the marriage, women in our neighbourhood used to talk to me about what England was like. They said there was no control. Men drank alcohol and went with women and no one bothered. They also made remarks, not directly, but I knew, about my husband’s behaviour, hinting at what sort of man he was. I don’t know how they knew. Perhaps they were jealous that I was going to England. Anyway, it made me very frightened about the marriage and I could hardly eat for weeks before it. But I couldn’t refuse this marriage. My parents had decided and were so proud to have a daughter going to England. I couldn’t shatter their hopes. But since I’ve been here, as far as I know, my husband has been a good husband to me.


In most cases, the effect of the arrival of wives was that the relationships with English girls eventually if not immediately ceased. Amjad’s English wife was not prepared to live as a co-wife, and no doubt Amina made her feelings about the situation clear during the year that they lived together. Several men and women said that most marriages or liaisons with English women ended because the women would not conform to the ideals expected of a Muslim wife; they were too independent. In one case, however, in which a Pakistani wife joined a husband married by Islamic law only (thus avoiding bigamy) to an English woman, an effect of the first wife’s presence was that the English wife started to conform to the ideals expected of a Pakistani Muslim wife. She now wears the traditional Panjabi shalwar-qamis, comprising baggy trousers and a long tunic top and covers her head with a dupatta (headscarf), behaves demurely in the presence of her husband’s kin, avoids speaking to unrelated men and only leaves the house to go shopping or to visit the doctor. For this she wins a certain approval from other Pakistani women, including the co-wife. She is considered very respectable as a white woman who has rejected English ways and Christianity.

Even when a man who had an English girlfriend or wife was not joined by a wife from Pakistan, the arrival of Pakistani women and children exerted a moral pressure that often broke the relationship. In some ten or a dozen cases where marriages with English women have lasted, the couples comprise a separate circle of friends which is not entirely independent of the community but is nevertheless regarded as morally on the edge of it. The belief that all western women are promiscuous and unfaithful continues to affect the way in which the English, or in some cases, European, wives are viewed. Pakistani men, speaking about the English wife of one prominent ex-serviceman, have remarked ‘all the men had her in the old days’; as a result, her husband commands little respect, because

[p.48]

perhaps the greatest insult to a man is to imply that his wife has been with other men.

Not surprisingly, men have given differing reasons for the arrival of women and children from the one given by women. It is possible that some men, like Habib, did regard calling their wives and children to Britain as a means of bringing sons into the country, though it seems unlikely that the majority of men, especially the unmarried men, made such conscious long-term plans. Men also spoke of the advantages for their wives and children of the superior health care in Britain compared with Pakistan which has no National Health Service. Others also greatly valued the educational facilities available in Britain and some men explicitly said that they had brought their families to Britain ‘for the education’. From the point of view of the women, however, the fact that they felt they would have an important role to play and on arrival found that this was indeed the case is important in understanding why women have stayed in Britain.

It cannot be assumed that because Pakistanis are now living in Britain permanently, fundamental changes in their values and intentions will necessarily take place. Indeed, given the intentions of migrants’ relatives in Pakistan and of wives joining their husbands in Britain, it is more appropriate to ask whether, and how, over the years, the arrival of women and children has contributed to ensuring that obligations to kin continue to be fulfilled and that the culture is maintained in the new environment.
[p.49]

Saturday, 31 October 2009

Léon Degrelle: The Revolution of the Souls

Léon Degrelle: The Revolution of the Souls

Europe is going mad. Mad with scandals. Mad with egoism. Mad with revolt against Heaven. Mad with blood. […] Corrupt in its morality, debased in its faith, puffed up with individualism, fanaticism, and pride, having lost touch with charity, with the love of God and man, anaemic, modern Europe is waiting for the final blow, the last convulsions, the last corpses. The hour is approaching when all accounts will be settled. The hour is also coming when to save the world it will need a handful of heros and saints who will carry out the Reconquest. […]

A country soon gets back on its feet after financial set-backs. It is not too hard for it to find a new political structure. It just calls for able technicians and a collective will to join forces. […] The real revolution is much more complicated, the one which puts right not the mechanism of the State, but the secret life of each soul. […]

It is only the quality and vibrancy of the soul which matters, the capacity for giving oneself unstintingly, its will to place an ideal above all other considerations in a spirit of total disinterest. Only faith counts, burning confidence, the complete absence of egoism and individualism, the striving of the whole being towards service, however lowly it is, wherever it may be, however it may be fulfilled, for a cause which transcends man, asks everything of man, and promises him nothing.

In a century where people only live for themselves, hundreds, thousands of men must no longer live for themselves, but for a collective ideal, and be prepared in advance to endure for its sake every sacrifice, every humiliation, every heroic act. […] I can hear in the night’s darkest hour crowds of people rising to their feet to protest their will and their faith. I see these thousands of men and women renewing their vow. How can one doubt that this heroism will bear fruit? It is these souls which will change the world.


[From Révolution des âmes [The Revolution of Souls] (Ĕditions de la France: Paris, 1938) 145-62]

Pakistanis in Britain

Alison Shaw is a social anthropologist who turned her Ph.D thesis into a book, A Pakistani Community in Britain (1988). Her four years of research into the Oxford Pakistani community was funded by the Social Science Research Council and included a seven month stay in Pakistan with the relatives of her Oxford subjects. Her book is a sympathetic study of that community but does not avoid revealing some troubling - for us - aspects of Pakistani culture and conduct. I shall be posting some excerpts from the book over the next week or so.

These extracts from the introduction echo a previous post about the biraderi/biradari - extended family networks offering mutual support - that went some way to explaining why Pakistanis turned up here in large numbers buying our land and property so soon after driving us from their country: a social solidarity that is largely absent among the English.

From Alison Shaw, A Pakistani Community in Britain (Blackwell Ltd., Oxford, 1988):

It is commonly assumed that the Pakistani minority will inevitably ‘assimilate’ western values (however these may be defined), and for many English people ‘assimilation’ carries a positive value, while ‘non-assimilation’ carries a negative one. Rather than entering into the debate on whether ‘assimilation’ is a good or bad thing, I am concerned to portray the Pakistani community as far as possible on its own terms rather than from a western perspective and to show how there is much more continuity of tradition than is generally recognized. The reasons for this lie in the migrants’ historical background and in the social organization of their communities.

Pakistanis come from a society with a history of previous migrations within the Indian subcontinent, both within Pakistan and to Pakistan from India. These previous migrations have not made a dramatic impact on cultural values and social organization; rather, the migrants have carried their cultural values with them and have generally regarded their migrations as a means of enhancing their status and bettering their existing position. It is therefore not surprising that their culture and social organization should be capable of adapting to migration to Britain.

The biradari, or extended kinship group, continues to have a major influence over individuals’ activities and over their expectations of life in Britain. […] The biradari perpetuates itself through the institution of arranged marriage, crucial to its persistence and stability. Traditionally marriage is with first cousins, and this has the effect of maintaining the biradari as a kinship group. When a family’s immediate relatives have remained in Pakistan, marriages may be arranged with relatives there or new links may be formed across the boundaries of kinship and even caste with other Pakistani settlers in Britain. For example, two men in Oxford became close friends of a man from a different caste to whom they eventually arranged for their sister to be married. This arrangement, apparently going against the traditional ideal of cousin marriage, was nevertheless accepted by the families concerned, and was justified by reference to Islamic ideology which denies caste differences. It cemented a friendship and forged new links which proved crucial to a joint business venture. The biradari is therefore not static but flexible; it can even, as in one or two cases, accept English women into it through marriage, providing they fulfil the expectations made of them.

One important way in which the biradari ensures this flexibility is through the principle of giving and taking, called lena-dena (taking-giving) which underlies many social relationships within the community. The ties created through lena-dena maintain old relationships and permit new ones with non-kin to develop. These ties, backed up by ideologies of community and

[p.3]

religion, enable the biradari to adapt to a new environment and at the same time have a cohesive and conservative influence.

[p.4]

From a western point of view, an individual who fulfils her or his role within the family, biradari and community, does so at the cost of individual freedom. However, most Pakistanis themselves, including the younger generation, do not see the matter in this way. They do not prize ‘individuality’ as highly as westerners do, and for most of them the sacrifice of ‘individuality’ that the culture requires is more than offset by the advantages of fulfilling one’s role within the family, biradari and community. Occasionally, of course, there is conflict between an individual’s inclinations or convictions and the expectations made of him or her by the family and community; hence the elopements and other incidents that reach the press. But such incidents are not as common as the media’s sensational reporting suggests; the conflicts are usually short-lived and rarely pose a fundamental threat to the community’s social structure. They may involve questioning and challenging and gradual change in particular aspects of the culture, but, as in any culture, such development is in part a result of the culture’s own internal dynamics as well as a response to external environmental changes. As young Pakistanis themselves point out, many of the events and changes occurring within the Pakistani community in Britain, such as questioning the importance of aspects of the arranged marriage, are also taking place within Pakistan. While such changes may be motivated at least in part by western values, the justification for them is generally made in terms of Islamic values. Some of the second generation even claim that such change is taking place more quickly among sections of Pakistan’s society than among Pakistanis in Britain, citing examples from among their own relatives in Pakistan. The fact that the Pakistani population in Britain is a minority has tended to make it more conservative.


***

Shaw identifies something here that was not widely recognised in the eighties but which would become politically significant in the nineties and in this decade: the Pakistani community in Britain is more Pakistani, more conservatively so, than that in Pakistan.

This point stands out, too, and a future post will go into this subject in more detail:

The biradari is therefore not static but flexible; it can even, as in one or two cases, accept English women into it through marriage, providing they fulfil the expectations made of them.


But only English women, of course, Pakistani men do not allow their women to marry Englishmen. According to Pierre L. van den Berghe,

The sociobiological paradigm provides a [simple] explanation. In nearly all species, the female is the scarce reproductive resource for the male rather than vice-versa. […]

[T]he ethny is a corporation of related men seeking to enhance each others’ fitness by retaining a monopoly of sexual access to the women of their own group. This, however, does not preclude men from further enhancing their reproductive success by making the most of every opportunity to inseminate women from other groups. In fact, the whole history of ethnic relations powerfully confirms this interpretation. Men jealously ‘protect’ ‘their’ women from men of other groups, deeply resenting ethnic exogamy on the part of women, while at the same time seeking access to women from other groups. […]

Between ethnies, men use power and violence to secure access to women from other groups, and this reduces the level of inbreeding. When the ethnies in presence are equally matched, male competition for foreign women takes the form of interethnic raids. After an ethnic hierarchy has been established, subordinate-group men loose all or part of their control of ‘their’ women and their reproductive success is curtailed, while upper-group men are polygynous and incorporate subordinate-group women. An ethnic hierarchy, therefore, generally results in a reduced fitness for subordinate-group males. The classical scenario for conquest is to rape the women and kill, castrate or enslave the men. [p.26]


He elaborates on that point later in his book:

Even when conquest is relatively mild and not openly genocidal, the subordinate group in an ethnic hierarchy almost invariably ‘loses’ more women to males of the dominant group than vice versa. Hypergamy (mating upward for women) is a fitness-enhancing strategy for women, and, therefore, subordinate-group women do not always resist being ‘taken over’ by dominant-group men. But subordinate-group men lose fitness by losing potential mates from their group without any hope of access to dominant-group females. It is not accidental that the most explosive aspect of interethnic relations is sexual contact across ethnic (or racial) lines; nor is the asymmetry of the resentment surprising. No group is concerned about gaining women; every group resents losing women.

Conquest and domination mean, in the first instance, a fitness loss. The loss is felt both at the individual and at the collective level. Collectively, since the offspring of subordinate-group women who mate with dominant. group men are generally ‘lost’ to their maternal group, the subordinate group suffers a decrement of reproductive power. Over several generations, this loss can be reflected in serious demographic changes in ethnic group ratios. Dominant groups tend to grow disproportionately. Individually, there is only a fitness reduction if the circulation of women between groups is asymmetrical, as it almost invariably is. Through the suction of women into the upper group (without getting women in return), the pool of mates for lower-group males is correspondingly reduced and, therefore, so is their fitness. Females of the subordinate group also indirectly lose fitness through the lowered fitness of their male relatives. Individual females who choose the hypergamous strategy, however, can gain fitness if their children become assimilated to the ruling group and gain access to upper-group privileges (including polygyny). This sex asymmetry in fitness strategies in ethnically stratified societies often creates tension between the sexes, within subordinate groups. The female option of fitness maximization through hypergamy is deeply resented by subordinate-group males. [p.75-76]

Rolão Preto: ‘Oiro’

Rolão Preto was the leader of the Portuguese National Syndicalists of the 1930s, these quotes are from the movement’s weekly newspaper, União Nacional, the issue of February 25th, 1934:

‘Oiro’ (Gold)

A terrible wave of utilitarianism and baseness is sweeping through the world, and is threatening to subvert and vulgarize everything, plunging it into a quagmire of tragic moral degradation. [ ... ] Where are we going? Day by day more is being chopped away. The clear and holy light of ideas is covered up and lost sight of under a cheap blanket of unfettered commercialism which darkens the soul. Justice, independence, nobility of feeling or thought: empty words. Contemporary man feels increasingly a pawn in a game of material interest, more a slave of gold than ever.

Every so often these acts of extraordinary moral decadence sweep over the world. Man abandons his supreme position in the scale of what is valuable on this earth to surrender to the lure of material objects and the state of supreme wretchedness which goes with them. Only his vanity, his comforts, his material possessions seem to him a worthwhile goal, a path to follow. To achieve this goal, to follow this path, any contradiction of his spirit, any abdication of responsibility, any amount of baseness or shame are justified. Now more than ever all means serve to fulfil this end.

This is the way of the world.

But there are independent spirits, free spirits, those who are prepared to embark on a hard road of sacrifice to preserve their pride and the glory which their independence and freedom give them. They should not despair. Already the signs of reaction are becoming manifest in the noisy protest on every side from those able to resist the temptation to trade their own dignity for material comforts, to swap strength of character for the possibility of making money.

This reaction against the materialist and corrupting utilitarianism of a whole age is the beginning of the great Revolution whose spirit is going to burn and purify the earth. It is a singular aspect of the human condition that the onset of man’s decadence and death always create the conditions of his salvation and deliverance. [ ... ]

The Revolution is under way. It will redeem man, raising him to the height of all the divine greatness that is his. Friends, the glitter of gold, however intense and brilliant, will never obscure the light of the ideal which we carry inside our breast and which is like the pure, redeeming brightness of the dawn in the tragic night of human distress.

The Human Right to Home and Identity

The Human Right to Home and Identity
by Hartwig Huber

These quotes are taken from an article published in the German ‘Nation Europa’ journal in July 1989:

When two hundred years ago the rights of man were solemnly declared, anthropology as a natural science was still in its infancy. Human rights are the creation of jurists and philosophers. The premiss of their thinking was an isolating and speculative one: Man was abstractly conceived as an individual; not as a man, or a woman, or a child, or as someone with ties to a family, an ethnic group [Stamm], a people [Volk]. The heterogeneous world which had grown up over centuries, and which even in the age of absolutism had started to become rationally organized, was now radically simplified.

An abstractly conceived being, Man, was recognized to have fundamental freedoms in 1789, but not to be a communal being. In those days nothing was known of genetics and the like. They were building on speculations about a noble savage, who was contrasted with the European who had been corrupted by his society. [ ... ]

Charles Darwin discovered the natural history of man. The history of his development was uncovered step by step. [ ... ] Modern man emerged in the Ice Age, the quaternary. [ ... ] Research into human behaviour, which made leaps and bounds with the work of the Nobel prize-winner Konrad Lorenz, who died recently, has done a lot to establish a realistic and scientific picture of man. However, the resistance of older, better established sciences such as sociology is still strong. The conflict between empirical natural science and speculative human sciences has not yet been fought out to a conclusion. The picture of man founded on the natural sciences should be taken into account in a redrafting of human rights. […]

Man is a territorial being. That was not yet known in 1789. Every man strives to possess space to dispose of as he alone sees fit. These are the roots of the right to a home [Heimat]. But the right to a home can be found in no constitution which incorporates human rights. If human rights are to mean anything, however, then the right to a home should be included in the list!

Man is as much an individual as a collective being. In every human group a hierarchy establishes itself very quickly and instinctively: men are unequal. Every scientist knows that to establish differences he must experimentally create the same conditions. (Before the law all men are equal.)

The development of man is a combination of natural and cultural factors. This has given rise to an abundance of ethnic groups. American ethnographers have counted at least 4,000 cultures on the earth. The wealth of the human species is in its abundance of cultures.

Let us sum up: the human rights of 1789 were incomplete. The right to a home and an identity must now be added to them. The human rights of the Enlightenment are abstract, individual rights. If they are to be complete and to be implemented, they must include collective human rights, namely the human rights to home and identity! In other words, the human rights of the individual and those of the community should complement each other harmoniously. Every people has a right to its own identity. Whoever violates this right is playing with fire.

[‘Menschenrecht auf Heimat und Identität’ [The human right to home and identity], Nation Europa, 39/7 (July 1989), 5-6.]

The English Nationalist School of Music

From Humphrey Searle and Robert Layton, Twentieth Century Composers: Britain, Scandinavia and the Netherland (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1972)

Nationalism in music was a product of the nineteenth century. Its origins were partly political; in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, for instance, native composers revolted against the Germanic culture imported by the occupying Austrians. They wished to create a national music of their own, based on their folk-songs and using their own language. The melodies and rhythms of native folk-songs influenced even the symphonic works of Smetana and Dvorak in Czechoslovakia, and even a cosmopolitan composer like Liszt was very much affected by the music of his native Hungary. In other countries, too, music began to grow more nationalistic in revolt against the cosmopolitan culture which usually flourished at the courts; thus in Russia the nationalist school under Balakirev wrote Russian music based on Russian and even Caucasian folk-songs in order to replace the French and Italian influences in music favoured by the Imperial Court. Similarly, in Norway a nationalist school grew up with Grieg at its head which spoke in a different voice from the German music which was then prevalent. In England where … German influences were dominant throughout the nineteenth century, the nationalist tide did not begin to flow until the beginning of the twentieth century, and the leading figures in this movement were

[p.22]

two very dissimilar composers, Ralph Vaughan Williams and Gustav Holst, who nevertheless shared common aims.

Both Vaughan Williams and Holst were certain that it was English folk-song which had liberated music in England from the German tradition and given it a voice of its own. Vaughan Williams once wrote: ‘My intercourse with Cecil Sharp (the pioneer collector of British folk-songs) crystallised and confirmed what I already vaguely felt about folksong and its relationship to the composer’s art. With him you had to be either pro-folk-song or anti-folk-song, and I came down heavily on the folk-song side’. This was the basis of his famous article, published in 1912; ‘Who wants the British composer?’ And Imogen Holst declared of her father: ‘The other important event (of 1905) was the revival of folk-song. Folk-songs finally brushed all trace of Wagner from his work. He had the deepest admiration for Cecil Sharp and felt that when the time came for the English musical history of the twentieth century to be written, Cecil Sharp’s name would stand out above all others’. Frank Howes, in his book The English Musical Renaissance, points out that ‘other influences besides folk-song operated in the formation of both men’s respective styles. In the case of Vaughan Williams, one was the hymn tunes he examined for his edition of the English hymnal. In that of Holst it was Weelkes and Purcell, which he made his various choirs sing. Both were touched by the new interest in plainsong, and both found in Bach an antidote to too much Beethoven and Wagner’. Both were interested in writing for amateurs, including choral societies and brass bands, and in musical education - they possessed a social as well as an artistic conscience.

Ralph Vaughan Williams came of mixed Welsh and English blood. His father was born into a legal family from Wales; his grandfather was a judge who settled with his family at Leith Hill, near Dorking. The house next door belonged to the Wedgwood family, descendants of the famous potter, who had also intermarried with the Darwins

[p.23]

(Charles Darwin was Vaughan Williams’s great uncle). The two households soon developed a close friendship, and in 1868 Arthur Vaughan Williams married Margaret Wedgwood. Arthur was a clergyman, and had the living of Down Ampney in Gloucestershire. He had three children; Ralph, the third, was born at Down Ampney on 12 October 1872. Arthur died only two and a half years later and Margaret brought her family back to her parents’ house in Leith Hill. Here Vaughan Williams was brought up and was given music lessons by his aunt. He learnt first the piano and then the violin. He went to Charterhouse in 1887 where he played the viola in the school orchestra and sang in the school choir. In the summer of 1890 he was able to go to Munich to hear Wagner’s operas for the first time. In the same year he entered the Royal College of Music, where he remained for two years, and in 1892 went up to Trinity College, Cambridge.

At Cambridge his official subject was history, but he continued his lessons at the Royal College of Music. During this period he met a number of men with whom he formed lifelong friendships: the philosopher G. E. Moore, the historian G. M. Trevelyan and H. P. Allen, later Sir Hugh Allen, director of the Royal College of Music.

Although an allowance from his family made it unnecessary for him to earn his living, he took an organist’s post at Lambeth in London. He had become engaged to Adeline Fisher; they were married in October 1897 and went to Berlin. Here Vaughan Williams studied with Max Bruch, returning in April of the following year to London and his organist’s position in Lambeth, which left him time to write music of his own, including a setting of Matthew Arnold’s Dover Beach. Some of his song settings, among them Linden Lea, which was to become well-known, stem from this period. Though he had not yet achieved a really mature style in these, it was clear that he was reacting against German influences, which he found actually repugnant; apart from folk song, the chief influence on his music was

[p.24]

that of the Elizabethan composers, Purcell and even mediaeval music at times. He also admired Parry for his mastery of choral technique. It was at this period that he began to think about composing a large choral work with the sea as its subject. This was eventually to become the Sea Symphony.

It was a period when great interest was shown in collecting folk music, and Bartók and Kodály were beginning their collections of Hungarian folk-songs. 1903 saw the beginning of Vaughan Williams’s collection of English folksongs, in which he collaborated with Cecil Sharp.

In 1905 he began the first of his mature works, a setting of Walt Whitman’s poem Toward the Unknown Region. He still felt that he was not sufficiently equipped as a composer, and he travelled to Paris to study with Ravel. Ravel helped him to refine his style, concentrating on lessons in orchestration. Vaughan Williams wrote of this experience: ‘As far as I know my own faults he hit them all exactly and is telling me to do exactly what I half felt in my mind I ought to do’. Ravel took a keen interest in the English composer, and the two remained friends for many years.

The time spent with Ravel must have given Vaughan Williams the confidence he needed to complete larger, orchestral works. The Sea Symphony was first performed at the Leeds Festival in October 1910, and made a tremendous impression. It is a setting for soloists, chorus and orchestra of several poems about the sea by Walt Whitman, in four movements resembling those of the classical symphony, though the form of each movement is often dictated by the structure of the words. It is a powerful work which also contains many beautiful lyrical moments, though the finale is perhaps too extended to balance the rest. It was then that Vaughan Williams met Isadora Duncan and began work on a choral ballet based on The Bacchae for her. And always much concerned with the richness of English folk culture, he gave a lecture early in 1912 in which he set forward his ideas on English folk music: ‘The evolution of the English

[p.25]

folk-song by itself has ceased but its spirit can continue to grow and flourish at the hand of our native composers ... we have made the mistake in England of trying to take over “ready-made” a foreign culture, a culture which is the result of generations of patient development, and of attempting to fit on to it our own incompatible conditions. This is merely to reap where we have not sown and the result must be failure’.

His London Symphony was first performed on 27 March 1914 in a concert of modem orchestral music conducted by Geoffrey Toye at the Queen’s Hall. ‘A better title’, wrote Vaughan Williams, ‘would perhaps be Symphony by a Londoner, that is to say, the life of London (including possibly its various sights and sounds) has suggested to the composer an attempt at musical expression, but it would be no help to the hearer to describe these in words’. And in fact the music does contain various London sounds such as the Westminster chimes, a theme derived from the street-cry ‘sweet lavender’, the sound of a mouth-organ and the jingle of hansom bells; but these are all worked into a true symphonic structure in four movements, and only appear incidentally. Although the piece enjoyed great success, the composer was unable to find an English publisher, so he sent his only score to Breitkopf and Härtel in Leipzig.

As soon as war broke out, Vaughan Williams enlisted in the Royal Army Medical Corps, although he was over forty. In June 1916 his unit left for France, where they were stationed at Ĕcoives. It was here that the ideas for A Pastoral Symphony had their origin; the long trumpet cadenza in the second movement owed its inspiration to a bugler who used to practise in the evening. In the autumn the unit embarked for Salonika; Vaughan Williams remained with it till early 1917, when someone in authority arranged for him to be sent back to England to train for a commission. He said: ‘My only regret at leaving is that I shall cease to be a man and become an officer’.

Peace brought with it a new period of success. On re-

[p.26]

turning to London, he was invited to teach at the Royal College of Music. He was made an honorary Doctor of Music at Oxford, and his Sea Symphony was performed on that occasion in celebration of the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the opening of the Sheldonian Theatre. The unaccompanied Mass in G Minor belongs to that period. Of the latter he said: ‘There is no reason why an atheist could not write a good mass’.

During the next six years he completed many works and was working on his opera based on Falstaff, Sir John in Love. In 1929 he wrote a Fantasia for cello and orchestra for Pablo Casals, as well as a concerto for two violins. By now Vaughan Williams’s mature style had been fully developed. One could describe it as a mixture of modal harmonies and melodies derived from folk song with poly tonal counterpoint and a fondness for moving in block chords. This style was characteristic of him for the rest of his life, though certain of his later works show a rather more austere character.

As early as 1927 he had begun work on the ballet Job. The scenario had been provided by Geoffrey Keynes, and the work had originally been intended for Diaghilev who, however, thought the idea ‘too English’, as it was based on Blake’s illustrations to the Book of Job. With no immediate prospects of a stage production Vaughan Williams designed the work as an orchestral suite, in somewhat expanded form, for the Norwich Festival. Meanwhile, however, the Camargo Society had become interested in it after Ninette de Valois and Lilian Baylis had seen the model sets and designs, and the ballet was first performed by the Camargo Society in July 1931 at the Cambridge Theatre.

In the winter of 1931-2 Vaughan Williams began a new symphony, his fourth. It was first performed on 10 April 1935 by Adrian Boult and the BBC Orchestra; it was a more powerful and violent work than anything he had written before, and remains one of his most original pieces. It is very much more chromatic and dissonant than his usual pastoral style and has a mood of bitterness which is

[p.27]

absent from most of his other works. […]

Shortly after the first performance he was offered the Order of Merit; although he had previously refused all honours, he was prepared to accept this. During the summer he was engaged on three major works, the Five Tudor Portraits for chorus and orchestra to texts by John Skelton, the fifteenth-century poet, a comic opera The Poisoned Kiss, and another choral work, Dona Nobis Pacem. The text of this last work was a setting of three poems by Walt Whitman, and this certainly was a clear presentiment of the coming world war. […]

About this time he received some suggestions for ballet scenarios, one based on Spenser’s Epithalamion from Ursula Wood. After a long correspondence they met for the first time in early 1938. They soon became friends, and she was in fact later to become his second wife.

[p.28]

[…] In 1940 Vaughan Williams undertook composing for a new medium, films. At the suggestion of his former pupil, Muir Mathieson, Director of Music at London Films, he wrote the music for his first film, The Forty-Ninth Parallel. This was shown with great success in 1941, and as a result he was asked to write music for two further films, Coastal Command and The People’s Land.

From this time dates a long and interesting letter to a friend who had sought advice on a possible musical career for his son. This letter, contained in Ursula Vaughan Williams’s biography of her husband, gave the advice that a young composer should take part in as much practical music-making as possible, study the great masters, and work at home, going abroad only when mature. Vaughan Williams, always reacting against any form of pomposity, calmly answered Walford Davies, who said that he had written his Solemn Melody on his knees, ‘I write my music on my bottom’.

The fifth symphony, more pastoral in style than its predecessor, had been completed and Vaughan Williams con-

[p.29]

ducted its first performance at a Promenade Concert on 24 June 1943.

Advanced age did not diminish the composer’s energies. In 1944 he provided incidental music for Richard II for the BBC, and wrote an oboe concerto for Leon Goossens. After the war ended, he began his sixth symphony. Early in 1948 its first performance was given at a Royal Philharmonic concert; like the fourth symphony, it is a powerful and dramatic work, and many people felt that it was not only inspired by the war, but also that the quiet and sinister last movement represented earth after total destruction by atomic bombs. Vaughan Williams, however, said that the last movement was based on Prospero’s speech from The Tempest: ‘The cloud-capp’d towers, the gorgeous palaces, the solemn temples, the great globe itself ... shall dissolve and ... leave not a wrack behind’.

In May 1951 Adeline died. After her death, Vaughan Williams asked Ursula Wood to help him with his domestic affairs. In the summer of 1952 they spent a holiday in France together. Early the next year they married.

Though Vaughan Williams was close to eighty, his creative energies did not flag; he wrote a Romance for harmonica and orchestra for Larry Adler, and a seventh symphony, the Sinfonia Antartica, partly based on his music for the film Scott of the Antarctic. In the summer of 1955, after a holiday in Greece, he gave a lecture in Cork, in which he attempted to prove that almost all the good Irish (not Gaelic) folk-songs were really derived from England; his audience was naturally somewhat outraged. The eighth symphony, on which Vaughan Williams had been working for some time, had its first performance at Manchester under Barbirolli in May 1956; the score is notable for its inclusion of a number of tuned gongs. He had already started on a ninth symphony, and continued to work on it while on a summer holiday in Majorca. In 1957, while on holiday in Austria, he heard a Hugel horn for the first time and decided to incorporate it in his new ninth symphony. He lived

[p.30]

through a major operation, and his eighty-fifth birthday, in October, was celebrated with a concert of his works at the Festival Hall.

After a short holiday in Dorset in 1958 Vaughan Williams returned to London, and here, on 26 August 1958, he died suddenly of a coronary thrombosis.

By basing his melodic and harmonic style on English folksong, Vaughan Williams was able to free English music from German influences; certain traces of a French style appeared instead, however, especially in his more lyrical works such as the Pastoral and fifth symphonies. […]

Vaughan Williams’s principal collaborator in the English folk-song school was Gustav Holst, born at Cheltenham on 21 September 1874. His great-grandfather was a Swedish musician who taught the harp to the Imperial Family at St Petersburg and left Russia with his wife and his small son early in the nineteenth century because of his political views. Later the son settled in Cheltenham. Both Holst’s grandfather and father were musicians. His mother was English, and died when Holst was only eight. He was looked after by his father’s sister, Nina, who was a keen musician.

Holst started early to play both violin and piano, and at the age of thirteen he had set the poem Horatius for chorus and orchestra. Later, when he was seventeen, he was given some counterpoint training at Oxford. Having tried unsuccessfully to win scholarships at various London colleges of music, he returned to Cheltenham, where he obtained an organist’s job at a village in the Cotswolds. He was given the conductorship of a local choral society, and wrote an operetta, Lansdowne Castle, which was produced in 1893 in Cheltenham with great success. As a result, his father borrowed a hundred pounds from one of his relations and sent Holst to the Royal College of Music.

[p.31]

[…] In the autumn of 1895, just after his twenty-first birthday, he met Vaughan Williams for the first time; they soon became friends and got into the habit of playing each other their works. Holst was writing an opera called The Revoke. He became interested in socialism and ran the Hammersmith Socialist Club, attending Bernard Shaw’s lectures at Kelmscott House.

In 1897 he was asked to conduct the Socialist Choir, and there he met his future wife, Isobel Harrison, who sang in the choir as a soprano. He earned a living as organist in several churches in London, and continued to play the trombone in various theatre orchestras. In the autumn of 1898, however, the Carl Rosa Opera company offered him an appointment as first trombone and repetiteur. […]

[p.32]

Holst married Isobel Harrison in the summer of 1902, and coming into a small legacy on the death of his father, he and his wife were at last able to afford a honeymoon: in the spring of 1903 they went to Berlin.

On returning to England, Holst decided to give up trombone playing and to devote his life to composition. His first efforts were a good many songs, invariably rejected by publishers. But he was soon able to begin his career as a teacher and in 1905 was appointed Director of Music at St Paul’s Girls’ School in Hammersmith, a post which he held until his death. He began to be interested in English folk-song and wrote his Country Song and Marching Song for orchestra, as well as sketching his Somerset Rhapsody. The influence of folk-song in these early works is fairly slight though they do contain some modal elements. […]

[p.33]

[…] In the summer of 1913 the new music wing at St Paul’s was opened, and Holst was given a large sound-proof room to work in. Working mostly on Sundays, he wrote the St Paul’s Suite for the school orchestra as a token of his gratitude. His earlier interest in Hinduism gradually gave way to one in astrology, and this became the point of departure for his new work, The Planets. He had just finished the sketch of Mars, the bringer of war, when war in fact broke out, in 1914; Holst at once tried to enlist, but was turned down because of his neuritis and weak sight.

The Planets is a large-scale suite for full orchestra which contains a great variety of styles, ranging from the savagery of Mars, the delicacy of Venus, the scherzo-like character of Mercury and the mysticism of Uranus to the remoteness of Neptune. This variety however does not mean that the composer’s personality is lost: there is always an astringency and power in his handling of his material. The Planets has remained Holst’s best-known work.

In the summer of 1917 he set the Hymn of Jesus, from the Apocrypha, and for this purpose he taught himself Greek so as to be able to understand the original. Long wanting to take a more active part in war work, he was at last offered the job of musical organizer to the YMCA among the troops in the Near East.

Returning from the Near East and back at St Paul’s, he began setting Walt Whitman’s Ode to Death for chorus and orchestra, struggling at the same time to write the libretto of his opera The Perfect Fool. Meanwhile The Hymn of Jesus had been published in the Carnegie Collection of British Music, and Holst conducted its first public performance at the Queen’s Hall in March 1920. This had an overwhelming reception - Holst was becoming successful at last. But Holst was never very good at public relations and simply did not know how to deal with press photographers or

[p.34]

journalists, as well as consistently refusing to accept any honours, degrees or titles.

[...]. Now living alone at Thaxted, looked after by a manservant, he wrote his Choral Symphony, settings of poems by Keats. Admittedly it is difficult to make a setting of the Ode on a Grecian Urn which can add much to the poetry of the words, and the last movement, Bards of passion and of

[p.35]

mirths is rather on the long side, but the first movement’s Bacchanal in 7/8 time and the Scherzo, Fancy and Folly’s Song are both delightful and exciting, and it seems a pity that this work is performed so rarely nowadays.

About the same time he began a new short opera At the Boar’s Head, an interlude based on the Falstaff scenes from Henry V; it was built to a great extent on Morris and country dance tunes which happened to fit Shakespeare’s words.

[…] Holst was a close friend of Robert Bridges and Thomas Hardy, and was now inspired by the latter’s Return of the Native to write an orchestral piece, Egdon Heath, one of his most interesting and remarkable works. The music catches the austere and remote quality of Hardy’s description of the scene, and a good deal of it is more experimental harmonically than anything Holst had written before - so much so that listeners to its first performance failed to understand it, and its true stature has only been appreciated in recent years.

During the summer he was unwell and at the end of the year he decided to stop work and have three months’ holiday in Italy. On returning to England he was as active as ever. In 1930 he finished a Concerto for Two Violins for the sisters Jelly d’Aranyi and Adila Fachiri. The concerto was played at a Philharmonic concert at the Queen’s Hall in April, and on the same occasion Holst was presented with the Gold Medal of the Royal Philharmonic Society. He was working on his Choral Fantasia, in homage to Robert Bridges, as well as on Hammersmith, a Prelude and Scherzo originally commissioned by the BBC Military Band, and afterwards rewritten for orchestra. His sixth and last opera, The Tale of the Wandering Scholar, with a libretto by

[p.36]

Clifford Bax, was written in 1930.

[…] In May 1934 he was operated on; the operation was successful but his heart could not stand the strain, and he died on 25 May.

Holst was a composer of a remarkably original turn of mind, and he absorbed many influences. English folk-song was by no means the only one, and to some extent he was an eclectic. He made a notable contribution to English music although this is only just beginning to be appreciated today. In many ways he was in advance of his time, and the austerity of many of his works is more in keeping with modern music than with the somewhat lusher and more romantic style of his contemporaries.

Three other English composers of this generation deserve to be mentioned; although they were not so directly affected by English folk-song as Vaughan Williams and Holst, they definitely represent a nationalist school in that they wished to eradicate German influences from English music, however much they admired the German classics themselves.

[p.37]

The eldest of these was Frank Bridge (1879-1941), whose contribution was mainly in the field of chamber music, although he also wrote a small number of orchestral works. Beginning as a romantic, his style became increasingly ‘modern’ during the 1930s, especially in such works as his Divertimenti for wind quartet and his later chamber music, which show an experimental use of harmony. He is also remembered for his teaching of Benjamin Britten.

John Ireland (1879-1962) is also chiefly remembered for his chamber music and songs, though he wrote an important piano concerto which still remains in the repertoire. His other works show a genuinely individual gift, and his settings of the poems of Hardy and Housman are extremely subtle. He had an extraordinary ability to reproduce the atmosphere of a poem in music by apparently simple means: he did not aim at bold effects, but his settings show a far more real understanding of his chosen poets than the more superficial ones of his contemporaries like Arthur Somervell, for instance. His music shows some influence of his French contemporaries, particularly Debussy, but he worked out an individual style which combines both English and French elements.

Arnold Bax (1883-1953) was very much a romantic: apart from his music he also attached himself to the ‘Celtic twilight’ school of literature, whose protagonists were Synge and Yeats, and he wrote prose under the name of Dermot O’Byrne. He is chiefly remembered for his seven symphonies, highly romantic and passionate and based partly on folk elements, but characterized by a certain turgid texture which has prevented them from becoming popular. He was a brilliant musician who could read any score at sight, and this possibly tempted him into over-writing. As a person, he was extremely quick-witted and astringent, in complete contrast to the romanticism of his music.

An interesting survivor from this period is Havergal Brian; he was born in 1877 and is still alive at the time of writing. Between the ages of seventy-eight and ninety-

[p.38]

three he wrote no less than twenty-two symphonies, in addition to the ten which he composed earlier. Though stemming from the romantic style, his music is very much more austere and ‘modern’ than that of his contemporaries; many of his symphonies are one-movement works of fairly short duration, and he has added an entirely original element to English music. His principal virtue in his later works is compression and reduction of the music to its bare essentials; in achieving this he got away both from his romantic background and the folk-song school of his youth. His music is often harsh and violent in a manner which is well attuned to the present day.

[p.39]

Friday, 30 October 2009

L’Œuvre Française: racist-anti-racism

L’Œuvre Française is a French nationalist movement active from the late sixties ’til the present. These quotes are from a leaflet they produced in 1993. I like the argument used here, and the aggressive style -- Griffin received his loudest applause from the ‘Question Time’ audience for making a related point in a similar fashion about Straw and Greer’s assault on English ethnicity:

International Anti-Racism is the Negation of National Patriotism

In government, in the Church, in parliament, in political parties, in the media and art, in the judicial system, in the street, the insolence and maliciousness of those who claim to be ‘anti-racist’ seem no longer to have any limit.

Their aim is to ensure the victory of cosmopolitanism through the use of all intellectual and material forms of subversion.

Their plan involves the negation of the Christian essence of our national existence and the denial of the European source of our French identity.

Their tactic consists in systematically accusing French people of good stock, and who are prepared to defend themselves, of ‘fascism’ and ‘nazism’. It is what they call ‘the struggle against racism’, ‘anti-racism’.

Anti-racism is the negation of French France

Self-styled anti-racism is an internationalist ideology which abusively exploits phoney humanitarian sentiments to encourage the invasion of the nation’s inner world, to the detriment of the physical and moral health of France. It is the negation of natural rights - never called into question till now - of the French to live peacefully as masters in their own homes in accordance with the genius of their blood, the nature of their soil, the faith of their heaven.

The pretext invoked is the pseudo-philosophy of the ‘rights of man’, the ideology of the so-called liberation, the frenzy of what was supposed to be the ‘resistance’ … This has culminated in the anomaly of a new state doctrine: anti-racism, which leads to the hatred of every normal society, i.e. one which is hierarchical, traditional, and national.

The result which anti-racism banks on achieving is a France which is under occupation, disfigured, changed beyond recognition: a cosmopolitan ‘Hexagon’ which would no longer be historical France, the France of the French.

Anti-racism is the enemy of our freedoms, our jobs, the future of our children, the enemy of civil peace at home and a fruitful co-operation between states abroad.

L’Œuvre Française wants to safeguard national identity

A strictly nationalist movement, L’Œuvre Française, was founded and directed by Pierre Sidos. Its symbol is the Celtic cross, its slogan ‘France for the French’, and its action is based on a political creed which affirms the existence of a single France, historically constituted as a sovereign state, whose unity and continuity is assured by a principle of authority allied to personal responsibility. It is composed of a people of European extraction, generally of French language, of a Christian tradition, of a classical education, and of a millennial nationality, living in Western Europe within fixed boundaries. The power of integral nationalist thought on all acts of public life must form the basis of the preservation of its spiritual and intellectual identity, its physical and moral integrity, its political and cultural independence, for the common good of the French and the healthy balance of the international community.

This profession of nationalist faith rejects the division of France into ‘left’ and ‘right’ by asserting a national sentiment which transcends the various cleavages within society, and exists over and above elections and parties. It obviously rejects anti-social theories, anti-national machinations, anti-natural practices, all engendered by cosmopolitanism and its modern successor, anti-racism.

The precondition for safeguarding French national identity is first and foremost not to confuse but to differentiate, to make selections between people, to make choices between ideas, by opting for definite preferences and establishing hierarchies. In this respect, L’Œuvre Française … is superbly well placed to make a valuable contribution to the re-establishment of France in every sphere.

Indoctrinabilty, Ideology, and Warfare II

From Indoctrinability, Ideology, and Warfare, the chapters by Richerson & Boyd and Kevin Macdonald can be found at the following links:

‘The Evolution of Human Ultra-sociality’ by Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd
‘Indoctrination and Group Evolutionary Strategies: The Case of Judaism’ by Kevin Macdonald

I only post stuff to the blog that can’t be found online anywhere else, so shan’t post anything here from these chapters.

Inspirational Ibsen

One day generations may come after us
Who form the mainstay of popular unity
At this point the old greatness will arise once more
And wise words will become gloriously true

~ Henrik Ibsen, 1872

Rushton: Race and Racism in History

A useful corrective to the oft-heard ‘racism originated during the enlightenment to justify oppression by Europeans of other races’ canard. From J. Philippe Rushton, Race, Evolution, and Behavior: A Life History Perspective (Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1997), chapter five, ‘Race and Racism in History’:

For millennia, racism was not a word, it was a way of life. Ethnic nepotism and prohibitions against hybridization are a matter of historical record. Downgrading the importance of race not only conflicts with people’s evolved tendency to classify and build histories according to putative descent, but ignores the work of biologists studying other species. In his 1758 work, Linnaeus classified four subspecies of Homo sapiens: europaeus, afer, asiatic, and americanus. Most subsequent classifications recognize at least the three major subdivisions considered in this book: Negroid, Caucasoid, and Mongoloid.

Racism

The most fundamental relationship recognized by tribal man is that of blood, or descent; in many cases anyone not made a relative becomes an enemy. Primitive society often seems to be organized on two major principles: that the only effective bond is a bond of blood, and that the purpose of society is to unite for wars of offense and defense. Sometimes tribes take the name ‘men,’ meaning we alone are men, whereas outsiders are something else, often not defined at all. […]

Identification of racial variation in man based on differences in morphology and pigmentation is as old as recorded history. As referenced by Loehlin et al. (1975), in 1200 RC. the Egyptians of the Nineteenth Dynasty painted polychromatic human figures on the walls of their royal tombs depicting peoples of different skin color and hair form: red (Egyptians), yellow (Asiatic and Semitic), black (sub-Saharan African), and white (western and northern European, also shown with blue eyes and blond beards).

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In the Bible, from a single ancestor, the three sons of Noah are mythically divided into the descendents of Shem (Semites), Ham (non-Semitic Mediterraneans, sometimes said to include Negroids), and Japheth (northern peoples, sometimes said to mean Indo-Europeans, or Aryans). The Jews were descended from Shem and were warned by Jehovah to preserve themselves as ‘a special people unto himself, above all the people that are upon the face of the earth’ (Deut. 7: 6). The patriarch Noah condemned Canaan, one of Ham’s sons and his descendents to be ‘a servant of servants ... unto his brethren’ (Gen. 9: 25-27). This verse was used by the Israelites to sanction their subjugation of the Canaanites when they conquered the Promised Land and later by both Christians and Muslims to justify their slavery of blacks.

In the Bible, from a single ancestor, the three sons of Noah are mythically divided into the descendents of Shem (Semites), Ham (non-Semitic Mediterraneans, sometimes said to include Negroids), and Japheth (northern peoples, sometimes said to mean Indo-Europeans, or Aryans). The Jews were descended from Shem and were warned by Jehovah to preserve themselves as ‘a special people unto himself, above all the people that are upon the face of the earth’ (Deut. 7: 6). The patriarch Noah condemned Canaan, one of Ham’s sons and his descendents to be ‘a servant of servants ... unto his brethren’ (Gen. 9: 25-27). This verse was used by the Israelites to sanction their subjugation of the Canaanites when they conquered the Promised Land and later by both Christians and Muslims to justify their slavery of blacks.

Other groups generated their own religious justifications for separateness. The Aryan or Indo-European people who invaded India 2,500 years ago built up a complex caste system to preserve their original physical type. They began to compose the Rig-Veda, a distillation of their religious beliefs. Eventually these were combined in the Upanishads (composed c. 800 RC., first written c. 1300 A.D.) which, among other things, placed strong social barriers against free hybridization. The caste system may have been the most elaborate and effective barrier against the mixing of contiguous ethnic groups that the world has ever known. It continues to this day despite the attempts of governments to dismantle it. Nonetheless, the once fair complexions of the Brahmans have darkened considerably.

At the Battle of Blood River in Zululand, South Africa, on Sunday, December 16, 1838, the White Boer Voortrekkers entered into a covenant with God. If he would deliver them from the overwhelming numbers of Zulu warriors that surrounded them, they would observe the day as an anniversary every year and conduct their lives in accord with the spirit of the covenant. In the battle, 4,000 Zulu soldiers armed with assegai and shields were killed while one member of the small force of Boer soldiers, armed with rifles and a cannon, suffered a cut hand. The Boer nation had become a theocracy.

Caucasoids, of course, are not the only ethnocentrics. It is impossible to understand modem Africa without comprehending the nature of tribal rivalry. For example, The Times Higher Education Supplement (August 30, 1985: 8) reported that the Kenyan government had warned lecturers and administrators at the University of Nairobi to stop awarding higher marks to students of their own tribe.

The character yi, ‘barbarian,’ has been the normal Chinese word applied to all non-Chinese peoples for over 2,000 years. The Chinese had always felt superior to the rest of the world, long before women of the Roman Empire craved the alluring effects of Chinese silk to the point of alarming the Roman Senate about the drain on its treasury. The European traders, priests, and soldiers who came later gave the Chinese no reason to

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doubt their judgment about themselves. The very name that the Chinese called their country, Chung Kuo, the centrally located ‘Middle Kingdom,’ from whence culture radiated outward, was ethnocentric. Today China is convinced that her communism is the only right and true communism, and that her way out of communism is the only right and true way forward.

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Islamic Ethnology

Hostility and hybridization both characterized ethnic relations among those ancient Middle Eastern groups who affected history -- the Egyptians, the Sumerians, the Akkadians, the Israelites, the Hittites, the Persians, and later, the Greeks and the Romans. The nobility and leadership of the varying factions often urged against hybridization. The Bible provides many examples of the Hebrews being enjoined to avoid it. Tribes and nations thought it natural and legitimate to despise, conquer, enslave, and displace each other. Slavery is attested from the very earliest written records among the Sumerians, the Babylonians, and the Egyptians, as well as the Greeks and the Romans. The wall paintings of ancient Egypt, for example, typically depict the gods and pharaohs as larger than life while Negroes and other outlanders were posed as servants and slaves.

In the seventh century A.D. Islam arose among the Arabs. Under them, and later under the Ottoman Turks, a universal civilization was created from the Atlantic Ocean to China, and from Europe to West Africa. The creation through conquest of far-flung empires into which different races and ethnic groups were pulled, especially through the institution of slavery, led to a considerable body of writing, extending over almost a thousand years, about the characteristics of the various groups. Written in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, discussion focused on the suitability of various races for different tasks and occupations.

Among Arabs, where intense tribal loyalties spilled over into feuding and warfare, there existed the usual ethnocentrism. In his book Race and Slavery in the Middle East, Lewis (1990) examined the common stereotypes that emerged for various national groups. In early Arabic poetry, many nuances of human coloration are described. The Arabs saw their own olive coloring as generally preferable to either the redder color of the Persians, Greeks, and Europeans or to the black and brown peoples of the Horn of Africa and beyond. As Ibn al-Fagih al-Hamadani, an Iraqi Arab author put it around A.D. 902: ‘The Iraqis are neither half-baked dough nor burned crust but between the two’ (cited in Lewis, 1990: 46). One exception was the preference for blondes as concubines; these typically brought the highest prices.

Sa’id al-Andalusi (d. 1070), writing from the then Muslim city of Toledo in Spain, classified ten nations as having achieved distinction in cultivating civilization: the Indians, Persians, Chaldees, Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, Arabs, Jews, Chinese, and Turks. But the northern as well as the southern barbarians were seen as more like beasts than men. It was thought that the Slavs and Bulgars, because of their distance from the sun, had a frigid temperament and dull intelligence. In the South Sa’id thought that the blacks, because of the hot thin air, lacked ‘self control and steadiness of mind and are overcome by fickleness, foolishness, and ignorance’ (cited in Lewis, 1990: 47-48).

Lewis (1990) examined Arabic relations with blacks with whom the Muslims had dealt as slave traders for over 1,000 years. Although the Koran stated there were no superior and inferior races and therefore no bar to racial intermarriage, in practice this pious doctrine was disregarded. Arabs did not want their daughters to marry even hybridized blacks. The Ethiopians were the most

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respected, the ‘Zanj’ (Bantu and other Negroid tribes from East and West Africa south of the Sahara) the least respected, with the Nubians occupying an intermediate position.

The negative views of black people are traced by Lewis (p. 52) to Mas’udi (d. 956) who quoted the Greek physician Galen (A.D. c. 130-c. 200) attributing to the black man ‘a long penis and great merriment. Galen says that merriment dominates the Black man because of his defective brain, whence also the weakness of his intelligence.’ This description is later repeated, with variations.

Most Arab geographers speak of the nudity, paganism, cannibalism, and primitive life of the Africans, particularly of the Bantu-speakers of East Africa alongside Zanzibar, which the Arabs had colonized in 925 A.D. Maqdisi depicted blacks as having the nature ‘of wild animals ... most of them go naked ... the child does not know his father, and they eat people’ (cited in Lewis, 1990: 52). A thirteenth-century Persian writer, Nasir al-Din Tusi, remarks that Negroes differ from animals only in that ‘their two hands are lifted above the ground ... the ape is more teachable and more intelligent’ (cited in Lewis, 1990: 53). In the fourteenth century, Ibn Butlan held a musical rhythm stereotype, suggesting that if an African ‘were to fall from heaven to earth he would beat time as he goes down’ (cited in Lewis, p. 94); another stereotype held that black people may be particularly pious because of their simplicity.

Throughout Islamic literature there is also the image of unbridled, sexual potency in blacks, as related, for example, in stories and illustrations from The Thousand and One Nights. Black females, as well as males, are portrayed with greatly endowed genitalia. One Persian manuscript from 1530 A.D. (Lewis, 1990: 97, and color plate no. 23) contains a pictorial illustration accompanying a poem in which a white woman watches while her black maidservant is able to accommodate to copulation with an ass; when the white woman tries do so, there are disastrous consequences.

In the main, black people are considered destined for menial occupations. Whereas slaves and their offspring from other parts of the empire were able to, and did, rise to the highest levels of office, black slaves did so rarely. Black slaves were seen as unintelligent, a view not held of non-African slaves, nor of those on the empires’ borders, including the European Christians, the Indian Hindus, and the Chinese.

Racial characteristics were often attributed to the environment. Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) whom Lewis describes as the greatest historian and social thinker of the Middle Ages, devoted a chapter to climatic effects. Even the merriment attributed to black people was considered climatic rather than genetic in origin (Lewis, p. 47). One writer, Jahiz of Basra (ca. 776-869) attributed the widely perceived low intelligence of black people to their existing socioeconomic position and asked his readers whether they would have anticipated the existence of the achievements in Indian science, philosophy, and art from their

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experience of Indian slaves. Since the reply was likely to be no, then the same argument might apply to black lands (cited in Lewis, p. 31).


Reference: Bernard Lewis, Race and Slavery in the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990)

Thursday, 29 October 2009

Rushton: Genetic Similarity Theory, Ethnocentrism, and Group Selection

From Indoctrinability, Ideology, and Warfare.

Genetic Similarity Theory, Ethnocentrism, and Group Selection
by J. Philippe Rushton

Introduction

Genetic similarity theory, an extension of the kin-selection theory of altruism, postulates that people detect genetic similarity in others ("nonkin" as well as "kin") in order to provide mutually supportive environments, such as marriage, friendship, and social groups. In line with prediction, studies using blood antigens and heritabilities reveal that sexually interacting couples and samesex friendships are based partly on genetic similarity. As such, a new theory of attraction and friendship is constituted, and the conditions for the evolution of human altruism are enhanced. Genetically biased preferences are not limited to social partners but extend to adopting other cultural practices maximally compatible with genotypes. Ethnocentrism and patriotism may be fitness-enhancing mechanisms that enable group selection to occur.

Choosing social partners is among the most important decisions individuals make affecting their social environment. The tendency is to choose similarity. For example, spouses tend to resemble each other in such characteristics as age, ethnic back-

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ground, socioeconomic status, physical attractiveness, religion, social attitudes, level of education, family size and structure, intelligence, and personality. The median assortative mating coefficient for standardized intelligence tests averages about 0.35. Correlations tend to be higher for opinions, attitudes, and values (0.40 to 0.70) and lower for personality traits, personal habits, and physical features (0.02 to 0.30).

Most explanations of the role of similarity in human relationships focus on immediate, environmental effects, for example, their reinforcement value. Recent analyses, however, suggest that genetic influences may also be involved. According to "genetic similarity theory," genetic likeness exerts subtle effects on a variety of relationships and has implications for the study of social behavior in small groups and even in large ones, both national and international. The main purpose of genetic similarity-seeking is to enhance altruism.

The Paradox of Altruism

As recognized by Darwin (1871), altruism represents a paradox for theories of evolution: How could altruism evolve through "survival of the fittest" when, on the face of it, altruistic behavior diminishes personal fitness? If the most altruistic members of a group sacrifice themselves for others, they run the risk of leaving fewer offspring to pass on the very genes that govern the altruistic behavior. Hence, altruism would be selected against, and selfishness would be selected for.

The resolution of the paradox of altruism is one of the triumphs that led to the new synthesis called sociobiology. By a process known as kin selection, individuals can optimize their inclusive fitness rather than only their individual fitness by increasing the production of successful offspring by both themselves and their genetic relatives (Hamilton 1964). According to this view, the unit of analysis for evolutionary selection is not the individual organism but its genes. Genes are what survive and are passed on, and some of the same genes will be found not only in direct offspring but in siblings, cousins, and nephews and nieces, as well as more distant kin. If an animal sacrifices its life for its siblings' offspring, it ensures the survival of common genes because, by common descent, it shares 50 percent of its distinct genes with each sibling and 25 percent with each sibling's offspring.

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From an evolutionary perspective, altruism is a means of helping genes to propagate. By being most altruistic to those with whom we share genes, we help copies of our own genes to replicate. This makes "altruism" ultimately "selfish" in purpose. Promulgated in the context of animal behavior, this idea became known as "kin selection" and provided a conceptual breakthrough by redefining the unit of analysis away from the individual organism to his or her genes, for it is these that survive and are passed on. Another way sociobiologists have suggested that altruism could evolve is through reciprocity. Here there is no need for genetic relatedness; performing an altruistic act need only lead to an altruistic act in return.

Detecting Genetic Similarity

In order to pursue a strategy of directing altruism toward kin, the organism must be able to recognize degrees of relatedness. There is clearly no such thing as "genetic extrasensory perception." For individuals to direct altruism selectively to genetically similar individuals, they must respond to phenotypic cues. This is typically accomplished by detecting similarities between self and others in physical and behavioral cues. Four processes have been suggested by which animals recognize relatives: (1) innate feature detectors, (2) matching on appearance, (3) familiarity, and (4) location. They are not mutually exclusive. If there are evolutionary advantages to be gained from the ability to detect genetic similarity, all the mechanisms may be operative.

Innate feature detectors. Individuals may have "recognition alleles" that control the development of innate mechanisms allowing them to detect genetic similarity in strangers. Dawkins ( 1976) suggested a thought experiment to illustrate how this could come about, known as the "green beard effect." In this, a gene has two effects: it causes individuals who have it (1) to grow a green beard and (2) to behave altruistically toward green-bearded individuals. The green beard serves as a recognition cue for the altruism gene. Altruism could therefore occur without the need for individuals to be directly related.

Matching on appearance. The individual may be genetically guided to learn its own phenotype, or those of its close kin, and then to match new, unfamiliar individuals to the template it has

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learned -- for example, Dawkins' ( 1982) "armpit effect." Individuals that smell (or look or behave) like oneself or one's close kin could be distinguished from those that smell (or look or behave) differently. This mechanism would depend on the existence of a strong correlation between genotype and phenotype.

Familiarity or association. Preferences may also depend on learning through social interaction. This may be the most common means of kin recognition in nature. Individuals that are reared together are more likely to be kin than nonkin.

Location. The fourth kin recognition mechanism depends on a high correlation between an individual's location and kinship. The rule states: "If it's in your nest, it's yours." Where an individual is and whom the individual encounters can also be based on similar genes, for example, if parents exert discriminatory influence on where and with whom their offspring interact.

Kin Recognition in Animals

There is dramatic experimental evidence that many animal species recognize genetic similarity. For example, bees block the nest to prevent intruders from entering. In one study, bees bred for 14 different degrees of genealogical relationship were introduced near nests. There was a strong linear relationship (r=0.93) between the ability to pass the guard bee and the degree of genetic relatedness.

Mammals are also able to detect degrees of genetic relatedness. For example, squirrels produce litters that contain both sisters and half-sisters. Despite the fact that they shared the same womb and inhabit the same nest, full sisters fight less often than half-sisters, come to each other's aid more, and are less prone to chase one another out of their home territory. Recent experiments with squirrels demonstrate how rearing (together or apart) and relatedness (littermates or non-littermates) affect juveniles' social interactions. Play-bout frequencies were ordered (high to low): littermates reared together 〉 non-littermates reared together 〉 littermates reared apart 〉 non-littermates reared apart. Statistical analysis revealed that both rearing and relatedness contributed to this ordering.

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Similarity Recognition in Humans

In earlier papers, my colleagues and I extended the kin-selection theory of altruism to the human case by proposing that, if a gene can ensure its own survival by acting so as to bring about the reproduction of family members with whom it shares copies, then it can do so by benefiting any organism in which copies of itself are to be found. Rather than merely protecting kin at the expense of strangers, organisms might identify genetically similar others so as to exhibit altruism toward these "strangers" as well as toward "kin." Kin recognition would be just one form of genetic similarity detection.

Humans are capable of learning to distinguish kin from nonkin at an early age. Infants can distinguish their mothers from other women by voice alone at 24 hours of age, know the smell of their mother's breast before they are 6 days of age, and recognize a photograph of their mother when they are 2 weeks old. Mothers are also able to identify their infants by smell alone after a single exposure at 6 hours of age, and to recognize their infant's cry within 48 hours of birth.

Human kin preferences follow lines of genetic similarity. For example, among the Ye'Kwana Indians of South America, the words "brother" and "sister" cover four different categories ranging from individuals who share 50 percent of their distinctive genes (identical by descent) to individuals who share only 12.5 percent of their genes. Hames has shown that the amount of time the Ye'Kwana spend interacting with their biological relatives increases with their degree of relatedness, even though their kinship terminology does not reflect this correspondence.

Anthropological data also show that in societies where certainty of paternity is relatively low, males direct material resources to their sisters' offspring (to whom their relatedness is certain) rather than to their wives' offspring. Paternity uncertainty exerts other predictable consequences. Grandparents spend 35 to 42 percent more time with their daughters' children than with their sons' children. Following bereavement, grandparents grieve more for their daughters' children than for their sons' children. Family members feel only 87 percent as close to the fathers' side of the family as they do to the mothers' side. Finally, mothers of newborn children and her relatives spend more time commenting on resemblances between the baby and

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the putative father than they do about the resemblance between the baby and the mother.

When the level of genetic similarity within a family is low, the consequences can be serious. Children who are unrelated to a parent are at risk: a disproportionate number of battered babies are stepchildren. Children of preschool age are 40 times more likely to be assaulted if they are stepchildren than if they are biological children. Unrelated people living together are more likely to kill each other than are related people living together. Converging evidence shows that adoptions are more likely to be successful when the parents perceive the child as similar to them.

Mate Choice

A well-known phenomenon that is readily explained by genetic similarity theory is positive assortative mating, that is, the tendency of spouses to be nonrandomly paired in the direction of resembling each other (described in the introduction). This tendency even extends to socially undesirable characteristics, including aggressiveness, criminality, alcoholism, and psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia and the affective disorders. Although alternative reasons can be proposed for this finding, such as unsuccessful competition for the most attractive and healthiest mates, it does suggest that the tendency to seek a similar partner may override considerations such as mate quality and individual fitness.

A study of cross-racial marriages in Hawaii found more similarity in personality test scores among males and females who married across ethnic groups than among those marrying within them. The researchers posit that, given the general tendency toward homogamy, couples marrying heterogamously with respect to ethnicity tend to "make up" for this dissimilarity by choosing spouses more similar to themselves in other respects than do persons marrying within their own ethnic group.

Assortative mating is found in taxa ranging from insects to birds to primates, and it can be observed in the laboratory as well as in nature. Assortative mating also occurs in plants. To have evolved independently in such a wide variety of species, assortative mating

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must confer substantial advantage. Advantages thought to accrue in human mates include (1) increased marital stability, (2) increased relatedness to offspring, (3) increased within-family altruism and (4) greater fecundity.

The upper limit on the fitness-enhancing effect of assortative mating for similarity occurs with incest. Too much genetic similarity between mates increases the chances that harmful recessive genes may combine. The negative effects of "inbreeding depression" have been demonstrated in many species, including humans. As a result, the "incest taboo" has been hypothesized to have an evolutionary basis, possibly mediated through negative imprinting on intimate associates at an early age. Optimal fitness, then, may consist in selecting a mate who is genetically similar but not actually a relative. Van den Berghe speculates that the ideal percentage of relatedness is 12.5 percent identical by descent, or the same as that between first cousins.

Other animal species also avoid inbreeding. For example, several experiments have been carried out with Japanese quail, birds that, although promiscuous, proved particularly sophisticated. They preferred first cousins to third cousins, and both of these relatives to either unrelated birds or siblings, thus avoiding the dangers of too much or too little inbreeding.

I tested the hypothesis that human mating followed lines of genetic similarity by examining blood antigen analyses from nearly 1,000 cases of disputed paternity. Seven polymorphic marker systems (ABO, Rhesus (Rh), MNSs, Kell, Duffy (Fy), Kidd (Jk), and HLA) at 10 loci across six chromosomes were examined in a sample limited to people of North European appearance (judged by photographs kept for legal identifications). These blood groups are sufficient to correctly identify more than 95 percent of cases in paternity disputes. They also reliably distinguish between fraternal twins. My results showed that genetic similarity within pairs related to (1) whether the pair was sexually interacting or randomly generated from the same sample, and (2) whether the pair produced a child. Sexually interacting couples shared about 50 percent of measured genetic markers, part way between mothers and their offspring, who shared 73 percent, and randomly paired individuals from the same sample, who shared 43 percent. Couples who produced a child together were 52 percent similar on this metric, whereas those who did not were only 44 percent similar (p〈0.05).

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In other tests of the genetic similarity theory of assortative mating, studies show that mate choice is greater on the more heritable of a set of homogeneous items. This prediction follows from theory because more heritable items better reflect the underlying genotype. Examples of differing heritabilities used to establish the theory include: for physical characters, 80 percent for mid-finger length versus 50 percent for upper arm circumference; for intelligence, 80 percent for the general factor versus less than 50 percent for specific abilities; for personality, 41 percent for having a preference for reading versus 20 percent for having many different hobbies; and for attitudes, 51 percent for agreement with the death penalty versus 25 percent for agreement with Bible truth. Thus, Russell, Wells, and Rushton (1985) found spouses were more similar on the more heritable of 36 anthropometric variables, 5 perceptual judgment variables, and 11 personality variables. Rushton and Russell (1985) found heritabilities predicted similarity between spouses for 54 personality traits, 15 cognitive tests, and 13 anthropometric variables. Rushton and Nicholson (1988) found that spouses were most similar on the more heritable of 15 IQ subtests from the Hawaii Family Study of Cognition and 11 subtests from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale.

Intrafamilial Relationships

One consequence of genetic similarity between spouses is an increase of within-family altruism. Several studies have shown that not only the occurrence of relationships but also their degree of happiness and stability can be predicted by the degree of matching on personal attributes (reviewed in Rushton 1989a).

A related prediction can be made about parental care of offspring that differ in similarity. Sibling differences within families have often been overlooked as a topic of research. Positive assortative mating makes some children genetically more similar to one parent or sibling than to another. For example, if a father gives his child 50 percent of his genes, 10 percent of which he shares with the mother because of parental similarity, and the mother gives the child 50 percent of her genes, 20 percent of which she shares with the father because of parental similarity, then the child will be 60 percent similar to the mother and 70 percent similar to the father.

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Genetic similarity theory predicts that parents and siblings will tend to favor those who are most similar. Littlefield and Rushton (1986) tested this hypothesis in a study of bereavement following the death of a child. Respondents picked which side of the family the child "took after" more, their own or their spouse's. Spouses agreed with each other 74 percent of the time on this question. Both mothers and fathers grieved more intensely for children perceived as resembling their side of the family.

Other evidence of within-family preferences comes from a review by Segal (1988) of feelings of closeness, cooperation, and altruism in twin pairs. Compared with fraternal twins, identical twins worked harder for their co-twins on tasks, maintained greater physical proximity, expressed more affection, and suffered greater loss following bereavement. Subsequently, Segal, Wilson, Bouchard, and Gitlin (1995) found that degree of genetic relatedness predicted degree of bereavement and that the loss of a cotwin resulted in the same level of grief as the loss of a child or a spouse.

A Genetic Basis for Friendship

Friendships also form on the basis of similarity, whether as perceived by the friends or for a variety of objectively measured characteristics, including activities, attitudes, needs, personality, and anthropometric variables. Moreover, in the experimental literature on who likes whom and why, one of the most influential variables is perceived similarity. Apparent similarity of personality, attitudes, or any of a wide range of beliefs has been found to generate liking in subjects of varying ages and from many different cultures.

The tendency to choose similar others as friends is genetically influenced. In a study of delinquency among 530 adolescent twins by Rowe and Osgood (1984), path analysis revealed not only that antisocial behavior was about 50 percent heritable, but that the correlation of 0.56 between the delinquency of an individual and the delinquency of his friends was mediated genetically. Adolescents genetically disposed to delinquency were genetically inclined to seek each other out for friendship. In a study of 396 adolescent and young adult siblings from both adoptive and nonadoptive homes, Daniels and Plomin (1985) found that genetic influences were implicated in choice of friends: biological siblings

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were more similar to each other in the types of friends they had than were adoptive siblings.

In a study to examine similarity among male friendship pairs, I used the same blood markers and differential heritabilities as in my study of sexual partners. The best friends were 54 percent similar to each other using 10 loci from 7 polymorphic blood systems (ABO, Rhesus (Rh), MNSs, P, Duffy (Fy), Kidd (Jk), and HLA). An equal number of randomly chosen pairs from the same overall sample were significantly less similar. Stratification effects were unlikely because within-pair differences in age, education, and occupation did not correlate with the blood similarity scores. Similarity between friends was strongest on the more heritable of 36 conservatism items and 81 personality items.

Independent corroboration that attitudes with high heritability are stronger than those with low heritability has come from a series of studies by Tesser (1993). Each subject responded "Agree" or "Disagree" to attitudes with known heritabilities. Attitudes higher in heritability were responded to more quickly, were more resistant to change when attempts were made at social influence, and were more predictive of liking of others who shared similar attitudes. For example, similarity on more heritable attitudes correlated higher with attraction to a stranger imagined as a potential friend, a romantic partner, and a spouse than did similarity on less heritable items.

Epigenetic Rules in Social Development

Both the evolutionary and social sciences err in not making more explicit that social learning is dependent upon the innate capacities and biases of the learner. For example, most models of cultural transmission within the family (i.e., vertical, from parent to child, and horizontal, from sibling to sibling) imply that siblings will resemble each other, over and above shared genes, as a result of a common family environment. An epigenetic model, in contrast, in which genes incline individuals to acquire patterns of behavior best fitting their particular genotype, leads to the expectation that siblings will differ from each other. While it may seem intuitively correct to assume that common family environment shapes individual development, consideration of data reveals quite a different set of relationships.

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Social development is guided by epigenetic rules that incline individuals to particular learning experiences. As in the studies of friendship formation among delinquents described in the last section, behavior genetic designs provide powerful tests of alternative hypotheses about the genetic and social influences on family resemblances. Comparing 573 pairs of adult monozygotic and dizygotic twins who had been reared together, Rushton, Fulker, Neale, Nias, and Eysenck (1986) examined the cultural and genetic inheritance of individual differences in altruism and aggression. We found not only a strong association of genetic factors with the characteristics in question but also a negligible influence of the twins' shared environment. Rather, the distinct experiences of the individual accounted for almost all the environmental influence.

The discovery that common family environment plays a very limited role in social development (even for traits that parents are expected to indoctrinate, such as altruism) runs counter to prevailing theories of personality development that assume that the important environmental variance is between families, not within. Yet the observation that the environmental factors that influence development are those that are specific to each sibling, rather than common, is robust, having been replicated using other research designs (like adoption studies) and other social characteristics. Regardless of whether one considers the transmission of socially undesirable traits, such as crime, obesity, and schizophrenia, or more normative personality characteristics, such as vocational interests and value systems, the evidence reveals that whereas genetic influences have an important role to play, the common family environment alone has little apparent effect.

A compelling test of models of transmission has been made in the context of social attitudes. Since attitudes are more flexible than personality, purely cultural models of transmission might be considered especially likely, with at least some vertical transmission occurring from parent to child. Yet in one compilation of results, Eaves, Eysenck, and Martin (1989) showed that social scientists have typically misconceived the role of cultural inheritance in attitude formation. Individuals acquire little from their social environment that is incompatible with their genotype.

So far the discussion has been limited to individual social development. However, the potential of epigenetic rules to bias behavior and affect society goes well beyond ontogeny. Via cognitive phenotypes and group action, altruistic inclinations may be amplified into charities and hospitals, creative and educative dis-

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positions into academies of learning, and martial tempers into institutes of war. Such macrocultural innovations can be expected to influence the genetic composition of future generations.

Ethnocentrism

The implications of the finding that people moderate their behavior as a function of genetic similarity and epigenetic biases are farreaching. They suggest a biological basis for ethnocentrism. Despite enormous variance within populations, it can be expected that two individuals within an ethnic group will, on average, be more similar to each other genetically than two individuals from different ethnic groups. According to genetic similarity theory, people can be expected to favor their own group over others.

Ethnic conflict and rivalry, of course, is one of the great themes of historical and contemporary society. Local ethnic favoritism is also displayed by group members who prefer to congregate in the same area and to associate with each other in clubs and organizations. Understanding modern Africa, for example, is impossible without understanding tribalism there. Many studies have found that people are more likely to help members of their own race or country than they are to help members of other races or foreigners, and that antagonism between classes and nations may be greater when a racial element is involved.

Traditionally, political scientists and historians have seldom considered intergroup conflict from an evolutionary standpoint. That fear and mistrust of strangers may have biological origins, however, is supported by evidence that animals often show fear of and hostility toward strangers, even when no injury has ever been received. Analogies may be drawn between the way monkeys and apes repel intruding strangers of the same species and the way children attack another child who is perceived as being an outsider.

Many of those who have considered nationalist and patriotic sentiment from a sociobiological perspective, however, have emphasized its apparent irrationality. Johnson (1986) formulated a theory of patriotism in which indoctrination through socialization and conditioning engage kin-recognition systems so that people behave altruistically toward in-group members as though they were genetically more similar than they actually are. In Johnson's analysis, for example, patriotism may often be an ideology indoc-

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trinated by the ruling class to induce the ruled to behave contrary to their own genetic interests, while increasing the fitness of the elite. He noted that patriotism is built by referring to the homeland as the "motherland" or "fatherland," and that bonds between people are strengthened by referring to them as "brothers" and "sisters."

According to genetic similarity theory, patriotism is more than just "indoctrinated" altruism working to the individual's genetic detriment. It is a strategy by which genes typically replicate copies of themselves more effectively. The developmental processes that Johnson (1986) and others have outlined undoubtedly occur, as do other forms of manipulated altruism. However, if these were sufficient to explain the human propensity to feel strong moral obligation toward society, patriotism would remain an anomaly for evolutionary biology. From the standpoint of optimization, one might ask whether ethical systems would survive very long if they consistently led to reductions in the inclusive fitness of those believing in them.

If epigenetic rules do incline people toward constructing and learning ideologies which increase their fitness, then patriotic nationalism, religious zealotry, class conflict, and other forms of ideological commitment can be seen as genetically influenced cultural choices that individuals make that, in turn, influence the replication of their genes. Religious, political, and other ideological battles may become as heated as they do partly because of implications for fitness; some genotypes may thrive more in one ideological culture than in another. According to this view, Karl Marx did not take the argument far enough: ideology serves more than economic interest; it also serves genetic fitness.

Two sets of falsifiable propositions follow from this interpretation. First, individual differences in ideological preference are partly heritable. Second, ideological belief increases genetic fitness. There is evidence to support both propositions. With respect to the heritability of differences in ideological preference, it has generally been assumed that political attitudes are mostly determined by the environment; however, as mentioned, both twin and adoption studies reveal significant heritabilities for social and political attitudes as well as for stylistic tendencies (Eaves, Eysenck, and Martin 1989). Of course, no behavioral geneticist believes that genes are 100 percent responsible for complex social behavior. The battle is between those who believe 100 percent in

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environmental determinism and those who think that both genes and environments affect behavior.

Examples of ideologies that increase genetic fitness include religious beliefs that regulate dietary habits, sexual practices, marital customs, infant care, and childrearing (Reynolds and Tanner 1983). Amerindian tribes that believed it important to cook maize with alkali had higher population densities and more complex social organizations than tribes that did not, partly because cooking with alkali releases the most nutritious parts of the cereal, enabling more people to grow to reproductive maturity (Katz, Hodiger, and Valleroy 1974). The Amerindians did not know the biochemical reasons for the benefits of alkali cooking, but their cultural beliefs had evolved for good reason, enabling them to replicate their genes more effectively than would otherwise have been the case.

By the way of objection, it could be argued that although some religious ideologies confer direct benefits on the extended family, ideologies like patriotism decrease fitness (hence, most analyses of patriotism rest on indoctrination and social manipulation). Genetic similarity theory may provide a firmer basis for an evolutionary understanding of patriotism, for benefited genes do not have to be only those residing in kin. Members of ethnic groups, for example, often share the same ideologies, and many political differences are genetic in origin. One possible test of genetic similarity theory in this context is to calculate degrees of genetic similarity among ideologues in order to examine whether ideological "conservatives" are more homogeneous than the same ideology's "liberals." Preserving the "purity" of an ideology might be an attempt to preserve the "purity" of the gene pool.

Because ethnic conflict has defied explanation by the standard social science disciplines, genetic similarity theory may represent an advance in understanding. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1989b) agreed with me that if attraction toward similarity has a genetic component then it provides a basis for xenophobia as an innate trait in human beings. He reiterated that ethnocentrism is a phenomenon manifested in all cultures so far studied and presented his view that generalized altruism began with maternal caretaking, a turning point in the evolution of vertebrate social behavior, which up to that time had been based on dominance and submission. The mother-child bond established the possibility of gradients in familiarity-trust/strangeness-suspicion.

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Van den Berghe (1989) also endorsed the genetic similarity perspective, stating that ethnicity had a "primordial dimension." In his 1981 book, The Ethnic Phenomenon, he had suggested that ethnocentrism was a case of extended nepotism, with even relatively open and assimilative ethnic groups policing their ethnic boundaries against invasion by strangers by using badges as markers of group membership. These were likely to be cultural rather than physical, he argued, such as linguistic accent or clothing style. Now, it seemed to him (van den Berghe 1989), identifying fellow ethnics using shared traits of high heritability provided a more reliable method than cultural, flexible ones, although these other membership badges could also be used.

Adopting a gene-based evolutionary perspective for ethnic conflict may prove illuminating, especially in the light of the conspicuous failures of environmentalist theories. With the breakup of the Soviet bloc, many Western analysts have been surprised at the outbreak of the fierce ethnic antagonisms long thought over. Lynn (1989, 534) put it directly:

Racial and ethnic conflict is occurring throughout the world -- between Blacks and Whites in the United States, South Africa, and Britain; Basques and Spaniards in Spain; and Irish and British in Northern Ireland. These conflicts have defied explanations by the disciplines of sociology, psychology, and economics...genetic similarity theory represents a major advance in the understanding of these conflicts.


Lynn (1989) raised the question of why people remain as irrationally attached as they do to languages, even almost dead ones such as Gaelic and Welsh. One function of language barriers, he suggested, was to promote inbreeding among fellow ethnics. The close mapping recently found to occur between linguistic and genetic trees is compatible with Lynn's hypothesis. Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza (1994) combined 120 allele frequencies from 42 populations into a phylogenetic tree based on genetic distances and related it to a taxonomy of 17 linguistic phyla. Despite the apparent volatility of language and its capacity to be imposed by conquerors at will, considerable parallelism between genetic and linguistic evolution was found.

The theoretical stance taken so far predicts that the ease of producing patriotic sentiment and internal harmony varies with the genetic homogeneity of the national group. As van den Berghe (1981, 27) put it: "Ethnicity can be manipulated but not manufactured." Since ethnic aspirations are rarely justified in terms of

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naked genetic self-interest, any analysis will necessarily have to be conducted at a deeper level than surface ideology. Political interests are typically couched in the highest of ethical terms, no matter how utilitarian, transparent, or heinous these appear to opponents.

Genetic similarity is only one of many possible influences operating on political alliances. Obviously, causation is complex, and it is not intended to reduce relationships between ethnic groups to a single cause. Fellow ethnics will not always stick together, nor is conflict inevitable between groups any more than it is between genetically distinct individuals. As indicated, people can be manipulated into working for "other groups." People also work for other motives, such as economic success as well as reproductive success. However, as van den Berghe (1981) pointed out, from an evolutionary perspective, the ultimate measure of human success is not production, but reproduction.

While cultural evolution and organic evolution are undoubtedly different, they are linked reciprocally in complicated ways and seem to share certain properties. Both appear to "strive" to replicate their units, if necessary at the expense of the other system's units (alleles in the case of organic evolution; "memes" or "culturgens" in the case of cultural evolution). Their seat of battle is the individual human mind, which only dimly perceives the consequences of its choices, based as they are on many competing elements. Thus, ideologies can arise which have the paradoxical effect of dramatically decreasing fitness. A classic example of such a lethal culturgen is found among the Shakers, a religious sect which considers sex to be so sinful that it imposes celibacy upon even its married members. This ideology has nonetheless been quite successful in replicating itself through several generation, new adherents being recruited, largely via adoptions. The members' genes, of course, fail to replicate.

Selection of Groups

Humans have obviously been selected to live in groups. Typically, they hold a territory in common that they fill with symbols of their group and that they are willing to defend (Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1989a). The line of argument presented so far may have implications for determining whether group selection occurs among humans. Although the idea of group selection, defined as "selection that

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operates on two or more members of a lineage group as a unit" (E. O. Wilson 1975, 585) was popular with Darwin, Spencer, and others, in recent decades it has often been thought not to play a major role in evolution. Hamilton's (1964) theory of inclusive fitness, for example, has been typically regarded as an extension of individual selection, not group selection (Dawkins 1976; 1982).

Group selection was brought to center stage by WynneEdwards (1962) in the context of altruism. He suggested that whole groups of animals collectively refrained from overbreeding when the density of population became too great, even to the point of killing their offspring. Such self-restraint, he argued, protected the animals' resource base and gave them an advantage over groups that did not practice restraint and became extinct as a result of their profligacy. This extreme form of the group selection claim was immediately disputed, and a great deal of argument and data was marshaled against the idea (Williams 1966). There did not seem to exist a mechanism (other than favoring kin) by which altruistic individuals could leave more genes than selfish individuals who cheated.

A compromise was offered by E. O. Wilson (1975), who suggested that although genes are the units of replication, their selection could take place through competition at both the individual and the group levels; for some purposes these can be viewed as opposite ends of a continuum of nested, ever enlarging sets of socially interacting individuals. Kin selection is thus seen as intermediate between individual and group selection. Group selection may have been prematurely rejected due to a failure to see that with genes as "replicators," it is irrelevant whether it is individuals, social groups, or still higher-level entities that are the "vehicles" of selection (for an extended discussion see D. S. Wilson and Sober 1994).

Among humans, genetic similarity theory makes group selection especially likely because altruism is conferred beyond immediate kin. Through language, law, religious imagery, and patriotic nationalism, all replete with kin terminology, ideological commitment extends altruistic behavior enormously. Groups made up of people genetically disposed toward honesty, trust, temperance, willingness to share, loyalty, and self-sacrifice will have a distinct genetic advantage over groups that do not have this makeup. In addition, if strong socialization pressures, including "mutual monitoring" and "moralistic aggression," are used to shape values

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within the group, a mechanism is provided for controlling, and even removing, the genes of cheaters.As indicated, social learning is genetically biased. Social psychological studies of cultural transmission show that people pick up trends more readily from role models who are similar. It is likely that different ethnic groups learn from different trendsetters and that the variance among groups is increased, thereby increasing the efficacy of group selection. Those groups adopting an optimum degree of ethnocentric ideology may have replicated their genes more successfully than those that did not. Evolution under bioculturally driven group selection, including migration, war, and genocide, may account for a substantial amount of change in human gene frequencies. E. O. Wilson (1975, 573-74) put it forcefully:

If any social predatory mammal attains a certain level of intelligence, as the early hominids, being large primates, were especially predisposed to do, one band would have the capacity to consciously ponder the significance of adjacent social groups and to deal with them in an intelligent organized fashion. A band might then dispose of a neighboring band, appropriate its territory, and increase its own genetic representation in the metapopulation, retaining the tribal memory of this successful episode, repeating it, increasing the geographic range of its occurrence, and quickly spreading its influence still further in the metapopulation. Such primitive cultural capacity would be permitted by the possession of certain genes.... The only combination of genes able to confer superior fitness in contention with genocidal aggressors would be those that produce either a more effective technique of aggression or else the capacity to preempt genocide by some form of pacific maneuvering. Either probably entails mental and cultural advance. In addition to being autocatalytic, such evolution has the interesting property of requiring a selection episode only very occasionally in order to proceed as swiftly as individual-level selection. By current theory, genocide or genosorption strongly favoring the aggressor need take place only once every few generations to direct evolution. This alone could push truly altruistic genes to a high frequency within the bands.

Monday, 26 October 2009

Morale and Morale-busting

I suppose we’d always find something topical in these extracts from Ian McLaine, Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1979). But the recently published claim that that the current government had a policy of promoting immigration expressly as a means of transforming the ethnic and cultural make-up of the country gives this post added interest.

Looking back we find that many of the persuasion strategies used in the era of mass immigration were given their first run out during the Second World War to manage the reaction to US soldiers’ presence in WWII. As part of this ‘gigantic social experiment’ we see many of the practices that are now familiar being used for perhaps the first time, at least on so large a scale: such practices as historically constructed apologias for Black behaviour; intervention in schools to control politically sensitive language; the police being instructed to discourage ‘discrimination’; the large scale funding and social deployment as government proxies of voluntary organisations known to be committed to race-liberalism; acculturation to social problems imposed by government diktat leading to a growing acceptance that the artificial situation is ‘normal’; propaganda publications specially designed for both host and incomer to smooth both groups' rough edges and facilitate mixing; the government sponsoring of ‘spontaneous’ goodwill and hospitality as model for private emulation; these and more are here.

We can also imagine that this social experiment had interest for integrationists in America. Eisenhower’s agreement not to segregate White and Black troops stationed in Britain, and the Americans’ exposure to British puzzlement and anger at negative attitudes to Blacks born of long experience can only have aided the integrationist cause.

These extracts are also interesting for the light they throw on the growth of government involvement in the minutiae of everyday life and the inexorable growth of rules and regulations; WWII ushered in the nanny state, then as now war was used as pretext for social control.

***

One of the primary tasks of the Ministry of Information was to compile a weekly report for government on the state of public opinion and on the results of various surveys into lifestyle and consumption habits, the Wartime Social Surveys:

[all emphases in bold are mine]

Not only were the reports comprehensive and detailed, delving into many apparently trivial aspects of wartime life, they were - which was more important - unbiased and accurate when tested against the quantitative findings of the British Institute of Public Opinion and the Wartime Social Survey. Their uniqueness lay in the fact that for the first time a government had at its disposal a reliable machine for testing public responses to administrative and policy decisions

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… and for gauging the needs of the people. […]

The cynically-minded observer might be disposed to comment that it took a total war for the British governing classes to show real and practical concern for the condition of the people. But while it may be true to say that the main thrust of Home Intelligence’s work was directed towards ameliorating wartime discomforts and grievances in order to buttress support for the government, it is also true that the staff of the Ministry came to regard their labours as socially useful, war or no war. […]

Once it had settled down, the Wartime Social Survey became an extremely useful adjunct to government. In June 1941 Louis Moss, late of the BBC Listener Research unit and the British Institute of Public Opinion, was appointed as Superintendent and together with Stephen Taylor he readied the Survey for the great demands that were to be made upon it by governments. At the end of the following month all but two of the existing staff resigned when the Ministry refused to approach the National Institute of Economic and Social Research again, the Institute having earlier withdrawn its support because it objected to the Survey’s study of morale as well as of public opinion. However, new staff were immediately engaged and put to work.

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Although the major concern was with the immediate physical and psychological well-being of the populace in time of war, the nature and breadth of the Survey’s work had obvious implications for peacetime. Never before had government involved itself so intimately with the minutiae of British, largely working-class, life. Appalled at the prospect of the loss of such a unique organisation, Taylor from as early as September 1942 urged the retention of the Survey after victory in the form of a National Institute of Opinion Studies. He correctly anticipated that after the war economic and social restrictions would continue in being for some time, necessitating appropriate social research so that the government of the day might reach sound and just decisions. […] Taylor was supported by the Ministry. The unit survived and is today a valuable part of the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys.

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For our purposes it is important to note that, as with the reports of Home Intelligence, the Wartime Social Survey was more than an expedient tool for the maintenance of morale. It represented a considerable widening of the ambit of government concern for the condition of the people and may be considered part of the wartime acceleration towards social reform.

The presence in Britain after January 1942 of American troops, several million of whom had passed through the country by D-Day, threw on the Ministry of Information yet another responsibility that of smoothing and enhancing relations between this most numerous body of foreign soldiers and their civilian hosts.

Certain worrying questions presented themselves. How would the populace respond to the presence of soldiers whose country of origin was by no means popular in Britain? A country, moreover, which was inevitably to become the senior partner in the alliance. If resentment arose, would it affect the nature and quality of the British war effort? What of the large numbers - amounting to tens of thousands - of black American troops? The potential for friction between a strained, tired population and the well-paid, ebullient young Americans, freed of the many restraints governing their behaviour at home, was considerable.

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Upon the arrival of US servicemen, the Ministry of Information set up an American Forces Liaison Division which was made responsible for co-ordinating what was essentially a locally based programme of smoothing relations between the public and the American forces. Only at the level of town and village could the Ministry, through the agency of RIOs, (Regional Information Officers) recruit the co-operation of numerous bodies and authorities. Local improvisation rather than central direction was necessary if success was to be achieved. Employing much the same tactics as were applied to stealing the thunder from the left, the Ministry remained in the background, ‘fomenting spontaneous hospitality’* and encouraging manifestations of good will. […]

* Southern Region Report, INF 1/327B

There were two initial difficulties. The Americans came ‘self-sufficing, fully equipped, and prepared to regard Britain in much the same light as they regarded North Africa, namely, as the base from which they happened to be fighting at the moment’; and it was only through the efforts of General Eisenhower and the creation of a top-level British-American Liaison Board, on which the Ministry was represented, that this variant of isolationism was broken down. A number of publications prepared for distribution to American troops undoubtedly helped. […]

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The second difficulty had to do with money. The Ministry’s programme languished for want of it. When the government was persuaded to allocate finance for disbursement by the department, the hospitable impulses of the areas in which US soldiers were stationed or spent their leave were given tangible form.

What was done once money became available? The Local Information Committees, which had been a cause of distress to the Ministry in the past now came into their own, for on them were represented the many interests whose co-operation was required. Hospitality Committees were set up. These comprised local authorities, the Regional Commissioner, voluntary societies and the churches, their ‘ideal being to allow no American to go home again without having at least been under one British roof and made one British friend’. The American Red Cross, which lodged and fed troops on leave in facilities provided by the British, was assisted by a total of 40,000 women volunteers who helped organise Red Cross Clubs. Two hundred and fifty social clubs were established by voluntary agencies such as the YMCA, Rotary, the Salvation Army and the Jewish Hospitality Committee, while the WVS ran some 200 Welcome Clubs where British civilians were able to meet American servicemen ‘away from the atmosphere of the street or the pub’. The Ministry encouraged and supported the British Council and the English Speaking Union in sending speakers to American establishments and aided the American Red Cross in forming clubs for the purpose of instructing some of the 60,000 ‘G.I. brides’ about American life and customs.

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Care must he exercised lest the impression is given that most Americans took their ease in church halls and Rotary clubs: it is more likely that the majority preferred the atmosphere of the pub and the company of ‘loose women’ to the amenities so earnestly and anonymously fostered by the Ministry of Information. But insofar as the Ministry facilitated it, the contact of hundreds of thousands of young Americans with the kindness and warmth of ordinary Britons undoubtedly helped to ease much confusion and loneliness. We are, however, principally concerned with the impact of the U.S. troops on their hosts. It did not have the consequences which might have been anticipated from a reading of the intelligence reports prior to Pearl Harbour or from the fears which motivated the Ministry’s campaign to popularise the United States.

The complaints and accusations levelled at the American troops were many. They were said to drink too heavily, to be boastful and contemptuous of the British armed forces (‘the Dunkirk Harriers’), to be too highly paid, to corrupt young women, and to practise discrimination against their black comrades.

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By December 1942 such reports had considerably declined in number and in 1943 they had all but disappeared. This, together with the constant remark that the Americans were ‘settling down well’, may be taken as an indication of the way in which they came to be regarded as part of wartime life, albeit an exotic part. The RIO for the Southern Region described the American ‘occupation’ as a gigantic social experiment and asked whether it had succeeded:

... in spite of fairly frequent incidents ... annoyance and criticism lost significance as time went on. It was smothered by a growing appreciation of the Americans as a whole. Irritating and disquieting incidents continued, but there Was less and less inclination to draw general and damning deductions from them. People began to realise ... that the Americans really belong to a different nation, with different standards, customs, manners of approach’.


If after actual contact the British revised their earlier notion of the Americans as close relations, how did they respond to the black American troops in their midst? Great concern was expressed in the War Cabinet. It was feared in a generally undefined way that the presence of black US soldiers would have untoward consequences for the morale of both civilians and servicemen and for Anglo-American relations. The Ministry of Information did not entertain such fears and adopted a cautious and sensible approach to this contentious matter.

In August 1942 Anthony Eden referred the War Cabinet to ‘the various difficulties’ likely to be encountered, including the health of coloured troops during the English winter, should the United

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States continue to send the existing proportion of black troops to Britain. Cabinet agreed with the Foreign Secretary’s proposal to press the Americans for a reduction in the number being sent over. A month later Sir James Grigg, Secretary of State for War, submitted a memorandum in which he argued that the failure of British civilians to sympathise with the distinction drawn by white against black troops would lead to friction between white Americans and the host populace. The morale of British troops overseas would also be adversely affected should there ‘be any unnecessary association between American coloured troops and British women’. He therefore recommended that the lead of the US authorities should be followed and, as an example of the policy he had in mind, he appended to the memorandum a note written by the Major-General in charge of Administration, Southern Command, for the guidance of British servicemen.

Following a potted history of slavery and of the reasons for the segregation practised in the southern American states, the note spoke of the ‘bond of mutual esteem’ between the races and the white Southerner’s sense of moral duty to the negro ‘as it were to a child’. Of ‘a simple mental outlook’ and lacking ‘the white man’s ability to think and act to a plan’, the negro is nevertheless capable of engaging in civil strife if allowed too much freedom and too close an association with white people. With these facts in mind, British serving men and women were advised to be sympathetic to coloured men but to avoid making intimate friends with them, women being adjured never to ‘walk out, dance or drink’ with coloured soldiers. As a general rule, it was thought best in such matters to emulate the behaviour of white American troops.

Grigg’s recommendations were too much for Lord Cranborne who, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, was aware of the effect the adoption of such a policy might have on black colonials serving with the British forces. He protested that ‘it is going too far to attempt to ask the British Army or the ATS to adopt the attitude of the American Army towards American coloured people’. The Lord Chancellor, Lord Simon, warmly supported Cranborne. Although he stated that the coloured man was entitled to equal treatment only ‘if he behaves himself’, Simon insisted upon the maintenance of equality in service and in civilian life. Herbert Morrison, despite concern for the consequences of the fascination of coloured men for some British women, also came down against Grigg’s proposals: the police had already been instructed not to practise discrimination and to discourage it among others; advice to soldiers on the lines suggested

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would certainly become known to the general public; and in any case assurances had been received from General Eisenhower that the US Army would not segregate coloured from white troops in the United Kingdom.

Bracken’s contribution to the debate was confined to the circulation of a letter he had written to Grigg on 16 September. Though it was desirable, the Minister of Information maintained, to avoid offending white American soldiers, it would be unwise to try to lead the British people to adopt the American social attitude to the negro:

I do not think that the mass of the civilian population ought to be approached with any propaganda on the subject. A wrong step would be disastrous, and there is not sufficient prospect of any real success, however wise one’s attitude. Incidentally, the essential agents of national hospitality are the Voluntary Societies, with whom we are working very closely. Their fundamental principles are involved in the doctrine of no racial discrimination.


The Ministry’s general philosophy on propaganda apart, Bracken could hardly have advised otherwise since on 20 September 1942 the Sunday Express had carried an article under his name, ‘The Colour Bar Must Go’, which, while referring to coloured British subjects, was unlikely to be divorced from the American issue in the minds of most readers.

In the light of reports reaching the Ministry of Information, Bracken’s caution was well advised. The probability of antagonising the public by ‘education’ along the lines suggested by Sir James Grigg was high. Of all factors contributing to tension between the civil population and the Americans by far the most important was the discrimination publicly exercised by white against black, the initial puzzlement leading eventually to ‘strong feeling’ and ‘considerable indignation’. British soldiers shared the civilians’ feelings: one incident said to be typical was that in which a number of soldiers, upbraided by Americans for ‘fraternising with negroes’, commented that as both black and white troops had come 3,000 miles to help win the war they saw no reason to distinguish between one American and another. Civilians took increasingly to interfering verbally and physically in disputes between black troops and white officers and military police, the GOC Southern Command reporting a number of such incidents to Sir James Grigg who in turn anxiously informed the Prime Minister.

Faced with a cascade of memoranda on the subject, the War

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Cabinet was thrown into a lengthy discussion on 13 October 1942. While it was thought that the British people ‘should avoid becoming too friendly with coloured American troops’, it was also agreed that Grigg’s suggestions ‘went too far’ and that no modification be made in respect of free access by coloured persons to canteens, pubs, cinemas and the like. The Lord Privy Seal, Sir Stafford Cripps, was asked to consult with the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for War and to produce a revised set of instructions for the Army and an article for the Army Bureau of Current Affairs.

For the man who had been chosen earlier in the year to go to India in order to conduct extremely delicate negotiations with Congress and who might therefore have been expected to possess an understanding of racial problems and communal sensitivities, Cripps made surprisingly few alterations to the instructions appended to Grigg’s paper of 3 October. The offensive analysis of the negro character and the recommendation that the British should emulate the white American attitude were omitted, but there remained references to black slaves as having taken ‘root and multiplied’, to the capacity of their descendants for inspiring ‘affection and admiration’ like children, and to semi-tropical labour being more fitted to the coloured man. British servicemen and women were to be told to adopt an objective attitude in any discussions they might have with white Americans on the colour question, but the advice remained much the same as before. Just what effect the issuing of these instructions had on ‘other ranks’ it is difficult to say, but it is doubtful whether on a matter so closely involving deeply personal beliefs and attitudes much influence was exerted. Bracken successfully vetoed the distribution of similar advice to the general public. He also expressed opposition to ‘written documents’ and ‘the didactic approach’ being inflicted on the Army, but could not prevent the scheme going ahead.
Some publicity did, in fact, escape from the Ministry of Information. But it was on a small scale, aimed at specific groups in the community and exhibited rather more discretion than was shown in the final product of the War Cabinet’s deliberations. Louis MacNeice, the poet, was commissioned by the Ministry on behalf of the Board of Education to write a booklet, Meet the U.S. Army, for the guidance of school teachers. In it he touched on the colour problem:

The American Negroes require a special comment. There are many Negro soldiers in this country, and those Britons who have met them have been very favourably impressed by their pleasant manners and their readiness to please. These Negro troops are not,

[p.271]

on principle, separately brigaded, the U.S, War Department having rightly declined to differentiate them from other American citizens. It must be remembered, however, that ... they are in the unique position of being descended from slaves; this memory of slavery, being still fresh, retains a psychological hold both on the Negroes themselves and on many of the white fellow-citizens ... from this they will only gradually break free. Any American Negro who comes to Britain must be treated by us on a basis of absolute equality. And remember never to call a Negro a ‘nigger’.


The Ministry steered very cautiously between the shoals of indignant British opinion and the ingrained attitudes of many white American soldiers. The Regions were advised to seek the guidance of the commanding officer of the local American unit before encouraging hospitality for black troops and to obviate ‘embarrassment’ by never inviting ‘negro troops to a dance at which white American troops and English girls’ were present. RIOs were also asked to point out to Americans that the British people, having no colour problem of their own, could afford to take ‘a more detached and seemingly more humanitarian attitude to negroes’: hence their impatience at evidence of discrimination. One Regional officer found this policy irksome. When asked by the American Southern Base Commander whether anything could be done to moderate the public’s ‘effusiveness’ towards black soldiers, he replied unofficially that departmental instructions prevented him from taking such action in much the same way as US Army policy prevented ‘what most American Officers would have liked to do, namely, to exclude Negro troops from this country’.

A year after the thorough Cabinet discussion Sir James Grigg was still pressing for a change of ‘attitude on the colour question’. Failing to analyse the circumstances and the possibility of discriminatory behaviour on the part of the US military police, he cited the crime statistics relating to black troops. These showed that the incidence of sex offences was twice as heavy and of violent crimes five times as heavy as among white American soldiers; and as black troops were less inclined towards drunkenness, Grigg concluded that ‘in both these classes of crime the trouble is due to the natural propensities of the coloured man’. The Duke of Marlborough, who as a lieutenant-colonel was liaising between the American and British forces, also felt constrained to warn Churchill:

There is, I know, a feeling throughout parts of the country in which these negro troops are quartered that it is unwise and

[p.272]

dangerous to go out into the roads and country lanes after dark and ‘there is growing resentment that these conditions should be allowed to exist. I know the difficulties of the situation as they confront you and the American authorities, I do not wish to make a mountain out of a molehill but I do visualize that during the coming winter when the hours of darkness grow longer that the number of these crimes will become greater and also the possibility of their being undetected will also be facilitated.


The Prime Minister considered the situation ‘serious’. But the Ministry of Information, in possession of no evidence to substantiate the Duke’s forebodings, continued to counsel prudence, Both in the policy towards black troops and in the tactic of quietly encouraging the basically friendly and hospitable promptings of the public towards the American visitors, the department acted in accordance with the stance evolved in 1941. In these, as in other matters of morale and public opinion, the British people were trusted to behave sensibly and in a manner consistent with the nation’s best interests.

[p.273]

Saturday, 24 October 2009

Amren upload

I’m increasingly doubtful about future internet access, for reasons of both censorship and infrastructure security. Accordingly, I have downloaded the American Renaissance archives that were an important part of my education and political development and that I know from experience have the power to help others ‘see the light.’

I have uploaded a zip file containing every issue thus far (130MB) to megaupload, here:

http://www.megaupload.com/?d=ZBT1YPF1

Obviously the link will break eventually -- just ask...

Notions of Nature, Culture, and the Sources of Indoctrinability

From Indoctrinability, Ideology, and Warfare

Notions of Nature, Culture, and the Sources of Indoctrinability
by Lionel Tiger


A long-standing heuristic in the social and psychological sciences, as well as in theology and common sense, is that there is a conflict between the inner, turbulent, instinctive life of human beings and the socialized arrangements that discipline and restrict the forces of raw nature. Conventional distinctions such as between nature and culture, or the painfully simple Freudian map of id, ego, and superego, or the endlessly reiterated contest between genetics and environment -- all reveal one of the profound judgments human beings have made about themselves. This is that in some real sense we all suffer -- either actually or potentially -- from some behavioral original sin. And of course when judgments about good and evil must be made about particular behaviors or people engaged in them, it is largely thought that malign behavior or people represent the heart of darkness that is nature. At the instinctive human core is the turbulent reservoir of potential mayhem.

This is not an altogether pure conception. At least two caveats must be entered immediately. One is that when nature refers to other animals or to natural settings, it is often regarded as noble and desirable, a pastoral purity not to be violated by the actions of people. Here nature is the value, and human behavior is its defiler. (It is also interesting that often the same people committed to the protection of animal rights and the natural environment most

[p.97]

ardently oppose assertions such as the biosocial about the impact of human evolution on contemporary behavior.) The second caveat is that there is often supposed to be great artistic and psychological value in expressing one’s deep inner nature, for example in the sexual or sensual sense developed by D. H. Lawrence, Freud himself, and the actor and teacher Stanislavsky. These and other protagonists championed liberating colorful inner appetites from the restrictions of lackluster conventional society. In boisterous expressiveness lay true aesthetic honesty. Here is the common somewhat operatic theme, at least in Euro-American society, of the contest between the sharp, ardent artist and the muffled containment of bourgeois society.

Nature Is Grubby, Culture Prestigious

Nevertheless, the effective impact of the broad weight of opinion, both social-scientific and lay, is that ‘culture’ bears the prestige and function of circumscribing ‘nature.’ In one sense this is no more than to acknowledge that children must be socialized by communities. Apart from the feral children of legend and rare fact, there is no alternative model than that the potentially intractable child by inducement and well-meaning force majeure is rendered fit for capable conduct of the life cycle.

[p.98]

How Many Exceptions Prove the Rule?

I want to make a contrary assertion about the relationship between culture and independence, within a broad biological context. This begins by adapting to social science the zoological law known as Romer’s rule. Romer was one of E. O. Wilson’s predecessors at the Harvard Zoological Museum, and his rule in effect claimed that the prevailing adaptive strategy of animals in response to changing conditions was to make small changes in order to avoid making large ones. So if the climate changed and a green habitat became brown, a bird could make the relatively minor adjustment of the coloration of its plumage rather than the far more demanding one of becoming terrestrial and perhaps a burrowing creature to avoid attracting the attention of predators. Similarly, humans may have adjusted with shifts in skin color that affected heat transfer at the external level rather than adjusting to climatic variations with alterations in basal body temperature, metabolic rates, and the like, which obviously involves very substantial and costly changes.

Can we not adapt Romer to social behavior? Is cultural variation the societal equivalent of the feather or skin-color response? Human groups adapt to changing conditions, either environmental or social, by altering the way they behave. The immense number of different cultural groups in the human species may reflect more the skill of the species in conforming to Romer’s rule than that there are behaviorally effective genetic differences between these different groups. Given the array of habitats, climates, densities, ambient fauna, and other societies in which people are immersed, it is hardly surprising that human beings found ways to confront such diverse challenges with a variety of strategies -- a variety that can be called cultural variation.

So as a first result of this story we can dispense with the most extreme environmentalist notion, which in various forms and intensities continues to characterize much thinking concerning the link between behavior and the human genotype. This is that cultural variation illustrates that the human genotype cannot and does not have effect at the level of social behavior. What my colleague Robin Fox has called ‘ethnographic dazzle’ has frequently induced social scientists to conclude that there cannot possibly be any major genotypically linked consistency in the social behavior of our species. Surely, it is argued, ‘culture’ is an autonomous realm, uncontaminated by primordial restrictions. Alexander

[p.99]

Argyros of the University of Texas has described such a view of culture as a creationist position, but one without God. Derek Freeman has described amusingly, if despairingly, his experience with American anthropologists who bitterly resented his challenge to the assertions of the paradigmatic figure Margaret Mead about the autonomy of human culture. These were in part based on her Samoan ethnography, which Freeman saw fit to revisit and fundamentally query. Carl Degler has provided a sober account of the intellectual history at the root of this surprisingly fervent dialogue that Roger Masters has positioned specifically in political science and the variegated description of which is a discrete academic industry all on its own.

Destructive Deconstruction

The ‘culturalist’ point of view, though seemingly extreme to anyone even minimally aware of the complex lessons of modern biology, has now surprisingly found a generous homestead in American social and cultural science. There, the deconstructionist perception continues to claim primacy, or at least confident respectability. It boasts the conclusion that both reality and the perception of it by those who call themselves scientists are highly conditional because science is itself a fatally flawed cultural form. At base, it is just one of the ongoing intellectual fashions. Thus self-critical linear science is a baroque folkway largely of mainly white males who sustain self-reinforcing and mutually rewarding norms of conduct, to say nothing of often guaranteed salaries. Partial explanation and even partisanship is inevitable, goes the invulnerable claim, because all persons reflect only their own biographical particularities -- national, class, sexual, political, disciplinary, etc. Even the lens of the microscope shows different things to different people. Individuality is a perceptual and conceptual prison. The envelope of the self is also a fortress of inevitable prejudice in which each person’s cognitive apparatus is as distinctive as his or her fingerprints -- an intellectual version of fundamental Protestant individuality and responsibility. A genuine community of openly self-critical perception on which science claims it must depend is remarkably unlikely in this account. In effect, this means that even the unusually rigorous socialization (or indoctrination) of the scientist cannot overcome

[p.100]

the radical impact of individual differences. And, perhaps most peculiarly, even the enormous power of the skills in communication of Homo sapiens is insufficient to overcome this central perceptual loneliness.

As if that were not defeatist enough, reality is also clouded, the earnest claim continues, by the inevitable impact of the observer on the situation observed. This is a corruption of the Heisenberg principle from which it appears to derive its intellectual ancestry. Heisenbergian effects are important to the behavior of subatomic particles, but they do not influence the behavior of larger entities, such as organisms. Apples continued to fall down while Newton was watching, but his watching did not precipitate their fall.

Such are some elements of the frail intellectual foundation of the common notion that cultural variation illustrates the absence of genotypical regulation of human behavior. Now let's turn this around in the service of our overall intellectual project. The very ubiquity of the pattern surely compels this proposition: there is something naturally human in the ability to generate variable cultural patterns. A quarter of a century ago, following Chomsky’s proposal of an inherent cortical capacity to acquire human language, the universal grammar, Robin Fox and I proposed there was a ‘culture acquisition device’ that was the basis for the readiness with which people acquired and sought to maintain the special character of their particular group. If there could be a genotypically available mechanism for learning language -- a relatively recent phylogenetic capacity -- surely it was parsimonious to predicate the possibility of a similar kind of readiness for learning the more ancient forms of social interaction such as mate choice, political order, cooperative food-gathering, and socialization of the young.

Natural Culture

But why would we need such a device? The next step of my claim, which bears on indoctrinability, is that it is precisely this great intrinsic biological variability among people that necessitates some unifying capacity in order to coordinate socioeconomic, political, and military behavior. There has to be some way to link the different bits of the normal curve of variation.
In essence, a central function of cultural patterning is to reduce the inherent biological diversity among people.

[p.101]

For example, in appearance, choice of clothing, size, body movement, and the like, even members of very coherent cultures vary considerably. The intrinsic function of culture as a phenomenon is to limit the range of operation of a set of individuals who have inherited an extremely broad range of aptitudes, enthusiasms, and resistances. Without some restriction of these variations, coordinated social activity could become relatively problematical. For example, in what is perhaps the most sharply sculpted of cultures -- military groups -- a stringent dominance hierarchy, constant repetitive drill, and a set of narrowly defined procedures are necessary to ensure some coordinated and circumscribed behavior among individuals who may be otherwise able and adventurous in their privately chosen behavior. The historian William O’Neill has even argued that the capacity for marching and rhythmic dancing has been central to the evolution of human organizational competence. What is military training if not the reduction of phenotypical variety in the demanding name of cultural focus? Also, there is another form of behavior - religion - in which otherwise precarious survival is regarded as an outcome of successful coordinated action. Incoming practitioners may be subjected to a mandatory regimen involving emotional and cognitive control comparable to the physical emphasis of military training. Perhaps because of the ubiquity and political influence of claims about the sacred, there has in fact been something of a resurgence of interest in the biological elements of religious observance […].

But military and religious organizations are only extreme forms of more general patterns of social coherence that emerge in human groups.

My simple point is that the culture acquisition device has evolved as a mechanism for relatively quick and reliable inculcation of social values. […]

[p.102]

And here we are at the core of our issue: while political and other leaders may find it attractive to indoctrinate their subordinates to accept convenient pictures of the world, these subordinates are also available for the process.

Ease of learning is easily ease of indoctrinability. When the Leader speaks, the ears have it. While indoctrination may be imposed with ruthless cynicism, it is met halfway by human beings prepared by the natural evolution of cultural skill to accept and join the glistening ambient social scheme in which they find themselves. This may after all be the only world they know or can share or envisage. And while indoctrination may deprive a person of an ample portion of human and political rights, membership in a community with beliefs, rights, and obligations may also be a human right to enjoy. Presumably, this is why solitary confinement is usually a punishment, not a reward.

Biological Radicals

I want to turn now to examples of the evasion of the central tendencies of culture, in the form of radicalism, free speech, academic freedom, and the like.

My colleague Irving Louis Horowitz, in an anguished review of the sharp limits on free thought in the world, notes that in no more than twenty communities are there genuine principles of academic freedom which reliably operate to protect individuals who challenge existing notions of reality and human possibility (Horowitz 1995). Perhaps they challenge the comforting certainties of the world as Galileo did; or perhaps they envisage utopian communities that threaten the stability of society, such as the Shakers, or messiah-ridden cults like the one at Waco, Texas, or countless others in recorded knowledge. One of my first senior colleagues, the sociologist Kaspar Naegele of the University of British Columbia, said, ‘The clearing is very small.’ He meant that the room for maneuver of genuinely free thinkers was very restricted. These souls must confront a potent combination of the

[p.103]

culture acquisition device alloyed with the earnest enthusiasm of those in power to use it. And this can and does make working life difficult for those who question the foundations of the community or even specific features of its operation.

This becomes extreme in wartime when those who question the leadership can be viewed as traitors. But it is obvious at other times, too, especially when insecure political or military leaders concoct or exaggerate outside threats the better to restrict opportunities for internal challenge to their world-view and maintenance of power. The flag becomes a blanket on free speech and contemplation. The use of the in-group/out-group distinction to cement internal systems of control is universal and a relatively obvious and reliable mechanism. It is as common as it is because it mobilizes and depends on a biosubstrate that is itself at the heart of the process of social organization and the conduct of politics. Perhaps also pertinent here is Colin Irwin’s observation that it is characteristically difficult for people to learn foreign languages without an accent after puberty -- a biogenic disability that he has suggested is related to the need of persons choosing mates and their kinfolk to be able to identify legitimate members of their community, not interlopers and impostors.

So even at the level of language acquisition, it is possible there are some ongoing controls over the distinction between in-group and out-group. This reflects the power of indoctrination to maintain existing structures and threaten outsiders. It is also useful in parsing the power and nature of indoctrination to consider the links between politics and exogamy; ‘sleeping with the enemy’ is obviously a reproductive version of the political traitor. A striking biomilitary innovation was unveiled in the Balkan struggle of the mid-1990s when captive women were raped and then held prisoner beyond the availability of abortion so that they would be compelled to bear the offspring of enemy males. This graphically parsimonious strategy is presumably cousin to less dramatic techniques of group assertion.

The Effects of Pseudospeciation

It is thirty years now since Erik Erikson reflected on his concept of ‘pseudospeciation’ at that pivotal meeting on ritualization which Julian Huxley organized at the Zoological Society of London in 1965. In effect, Erikson suggested that humans were capable of defining members of hostile or foreign groups as other species.

[p.104]

Hence, they could be subject to predation rather than aggression -- a distinction commonly observed, for example, in the detailed neurophysiological studies of feline behavior. Through symbolic management, people can redirect emotional energies of intrahuman conflict into those available for prey animals. This is important for a hunter-gatherer for whom human enemies are much more easily and efficiently damaged or liquidated if they are defined as impersonal, nonhuman prey. New and improved tutorial methods to accomplish this translation have been recently described by the American army officer David Grossman. An informal study of death cries in wartime children’s comic books that I conducted sometime after the ritualization conference reveals that characteristic death calls and other vocalizations differed between opposing sides, more or less as if they were different species. These mechanisms are, broadly speaking, the work of the higher cortical and symbolic faculties, those most proudly reflected in the diagnostic sapiens humans have applied to themselves. They are not mainly or even partly the result of endocrinological or other similarly primordial secretions, though as Kemper among others has shown, secretions such as testosterone may affect thought and behavior as literally as alcohol or other substances. Rather, the organic system responsible for the sapiens element of our self-description is the enabling facility. It is the capacity for cultural denotation and symbolic sorting of people into groups that underlies hostilities. The contrast between the complexity and subtlety of notions of free speech and academic freedom with the behavior in the Balkans or the sudden murderousness of the Rwandans suggests which behavioral system is the easiest to learn, particularly when social and economic pressures escalate. An Irish ambassador to the UN once too whimsically noted: ‘The most dangerous place in the world is under men’s hats.’ Here is a serious proposal that requires inspection from natural scientists.

[p.105]

Wednesday, 21 October 2009

Us and Others: The Familial Roots of Ethnonationalism

From Indoctrinability, Ideology, and Warfare

Excerpts from ‘Us and Others: The Familial Roots of Ethnonationalism’
by Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt

Us and Others: The Familial Roots of Ethnonationalism
by Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt

Ever since the transition of face-to-face communities into larger anonymous societies, human beings have been confronted with the problem of developing loyalties towards people unknown to them. Since then human beings have experimented with ways to deal with this situation, which in evolutionary terms is new to our species. For most of their existence, humans have lived in small, individualized communities, an arrangement to which they seem fairly well adapted.

I will argue that familial dispositions are the basis of humankind’s prosociality. Furthermore, I will discuss the phylogenetic origin of our nurturant motivations and behaviors, including the propensity to become fixated on symbols and values with a permanence that resembles imprinting. And I shall argue that this propensity is the basis of our indoctrinability. In summary, familial adaptations constitute preadaptations for living in certain larger anonymous communities, such as ethnicities, nation-states, and multinational federations. But these preadaptations had to be welded by cultural experiments -- deliberate attempts at adaptation. The ultimate goal of these attempts was the formation of larger communities capable of self-defence and relatively free of internal strife, the members identifying with or at least obeying their rulers and communicating among themselves in a cooperative way not limited to the family and kinship ties.

[p.21]

The variety of social techniques employed in these cultural experiments ranges from repressive and nurturant dominance to nurturant leadership and the various combinations of the three. These techniques tap into existing social dispositions, which in part derive from our species’ vertebrate heritage. However, not all of our predispositions serve as preadaptations for large group formation. Some, at least in certain contexts, also act as obstacles.

Us and the Others

All over the world a resurgence of tribalism and ethnic conflict is evident. We are confronted with worldwide manifestations of ethnocentrism and xenophobia. One might define ethnicity as a mere construct to be deconstructed, but that in practice will not do away with the problem. Kurds will nonetheless define themselves as Kurds. Armenians as Armenians, Bosniaks as Bosniaks, and Serbs as Serbs. And many indeed are ready to sacrifice their lives to preserve their identity. They are misled, one might argue. But this invites at least the question: Why are people all over the world so easily misled?

Us against them -- this certainly constitutes one of our major problems. How did this distinction come into the world? There are turning points in evolution: Sternstunden, to borrow a term coined by Stephan Zweig. They are events that switch the rails in new directions. The evolution of nurturant maternal care constitutes such a turning point in the evolution of the land vertebrates.

In January 1954 I had a ‘key experience’ on the remote Galapagoan island of Narborough. Stepping ashore I found the surfbeaten rocks literally covered with hundreds of marine iguanas. They were tightly packed side by side and evidently seemed gregarious, but in contrast to the mammals and birds, which I had studied so far, they did not interact in any prosocial way. There was no mutual grooming to be seen, no mutual feeding, nor the bonding rituals derived from those nurturant activities. The social interactions of these large iguanas consisted in patterns of ritualized fighting with dominance displays, headbutting, and submissive postures of the loser. Even their courtship behavior consisted of dominance displays by the males. Females ready for copulation accepted these overtures by assuming a submissive posture, lying flat on their bellies. I realized that there was a basic

[p.22]

difference in the social behavior of reptiles on the one hand and birds and mammals on the other. Reptilian social behavior is based upon dominance and submission. Furthermore, reptiles do not form groups bonded by individual acquaintance. They aggregate but do not discriminate between individuals on the basis of ‘us’ and ‘others.’

In contrast mammals and birds often live in pairs or even in larger groups of bonded individuals that clearly distinguish group members from others. Furthermore, in addition to patterns of dominance and submission, a rich repertory of affiliative nurturant behaviors can be observed.

[p.23]

We may thus say that the evolution of nurturant individualized broodcare constitutes a turning point in the evolution of vertebrate social behavior, since it paved the way for long-lasting, truly affiliative friendly interaction and love between individuals.
In humans, the capacity for individualized bonding is also familial in origin. Patterns expressing affection, such as caressing,

[p.25]

are clearly derived from maternal behaviors, as are embracing, kissing and baby talk in a voice raised by one octave.

[p.26]

It also holds true for humans that individual acquaintance creates a relationship of trust, whereas a stranger is met with distrust. The first manifestation of distrust of strangers appears early in life and is well known as the phenomenon of ‘stranger awareness’ or ‘fear of strangers.’ Every healthy baby demonstrates during its first months of life basic trust: any approaching human

[p.27]

being will be greeted with a smile. From approximately the age of six months onwards, the baby then distinguishes between persons it knows and strangers, the latter releasing now ambivalent responses. The baby may smile at a stranger, but usually after a few seconds it will turn toward its mother and hide its face. It will fluctuate between approach and withdrawal responses or show superpositions of these two behaviors. Should the stranger be insensitive to the baby’s fear and continue to approach, the baby usually shows strong fear and clings to its mother in clear avoidance. This is a universal pattern and does not depend on prior bad experiences with strangers. It persists throughout life as stranger awareness, and it finds its clear expression in ambivalent behaviors. It can be regarded as the first manifestation of an ‘us two’ versus perceived ‘others.’ It evolved to secure the mother-child bond in a species dependent on particularly long child care, but it also provided new potential

[p.28]

for larger group formation. By ‘familiarization’ with others, behavior shifts along a continuum from mistrust to trust.

Extended families and small individualized groups, in which everybody knows each other, were then formed. They demarcated themselves from other similarly organized ‘in-groups.’ Behavior patterns of bonding thus spread by kin selection and proved so effective that members of the individualized groups not directly belonging to a family were able to bond by means of additional cultural institutions in such a way that the group could, in certain situations, such as war, act as a unity. Arguably, this allowed hunter-gatherer groups to become a unit of selection. Bonding at all levels in humans is reinforced by relationships of mutual sharing and reciprocity, often called reciprocal altruism. The literature on the evolution of reciprocal altruism in ethology and its current expressions in anthropology is vast and beyond the scope of this chapter. Social networks based on delayed reciprocal altruism, which serve the function of social security, certainly constitute one of the most important cultural inventions in the social evolution of our species. […] When larger societies emerged, the networks became elaborated in order to integrate expanded populations into solidarity groups.

[p.31]

The ability to form such networks is based upon a number of universal predispositions, such as the motivation and affiliative behavior patterns evolved in the service of bonding, the ability to symbolize, and in the special case of giving, the norm of possession, the ability for delayed reciprocity, and the ability to extend familial behaviors to distant relatives and nonrelatives -- in particular, to establish fictive-kinship relationships by marriage.

One striking characteristic of human social organization concerns male group solidarity, a phenomenon discussed by Tiger. An interesting precondition for the evolution of this male group solidarity might have been virilocality. In the majority of kin-based societies males usually stay within their local group and territory, while females migrate. A similar pattern is found with chimpanzees, where males stay within the territory in which they were born. Only females migrate during their first rut to other groups, and in doing so change their affiliation group. Males of one local chimpanzee group are therefore closely related by blood, and male solidarity thus enhances inclusive fitness. In early man the situation might have been similar. Even today human males tend to stick to their natal group, while females more often than not change location on marrying. However, the solidarity that persists in humans between females and their natal groups allows for the instrumental use of female kinship ties to establish reciprocal relations with members of other groups. Such alliances, which frequently serve to reduce a wide variety of risks in the natural and social environment, are an important precondition for the establishment of intragroup alliances.

With the distinction of ‘us’ versus ‘others,’ a new quality of social behavior came into the world as well as a potential for further evolution. Members of the same species became distinguished according to their relatedness as friend or foe. Agonistic behavior is certainly old. In reptiles, rivals fight each other, the latter being mainly members of the same sex. But reptiles know only ‘others,’ such as potential mates or rivals. The capacity to distinguish ‘us’ from ‘others’ developed in the societies of birds and mammals. This new ability found a variety of expressions in the pair-bond, the family, in human individualized groups, and even in anonymous mass societies such as nations. The nurturant affiliative behaviors of bonding and the exclusivity coupled with it established a new evolutionary potential.

[p.32]

In humans, ties of friendship and belonging bind members of the individualized group together in an atmosphere of basic trust. By contrast, strangers are met with suspicion. It is well known that xenophobia is a universal phenomenon, but I want to emphasize that fear of strangers is not to be confused with hatred of strangers, which is a result of indoctrination. We should be aware, however, that due to the basic mistrust of strangers our perception is biased in such a way that one negative experience usually has greater impact than a multitude of positive experiences. Another characteristic of the relationship with members of other groups is that the human inclination to establish a dominance-submission relationship is accentuated. Ethics toward strangers is certainly different from ethics toward own-group members.

Human social behavior is thus characterized by a fundamental ambivalence toward conspecifics. Agonistic and affiliative behaviors are simultaneously aroused. The former are the older vertebrate heritage, which control dominance and submissive sociality. The reptilian brain still forms a structure in the human brain as large as a fist. The old dominance-submission mechanism continues to operate in humans, and the achievement of repressive dominance in fight and competition is rewarded, as in other mammals, by a hormonal reflex. Tennis and chess players experience an increase in the blood testosterone level after victory and a drop after defeat. The winner thus experiences an ego boost. This disposition is not without problems, since success rewarded at every step is positive feedback and can lead to escalation of competitiveness.

Tendencies toward repressive dominance are ever present. Within bonded face-to-face communities they are, however, tabooed, and group pressure among others acts against them. Affiliative behaviors predominate, and leaders are chosen according to their ability to act in a socially integrative way. Individuals who are able to protect the weak, who comfort the distressed, who share -- in short, who have nurturant dispositions and who in addition demonstrate special skills, such as spokesmen, war leaders, horticulturists, healers -- individuals with these characteristics become leaders. The others approach them for help, seeking protection and advice. If people lose their social and special skills competence, they lose their status. Interestingly enough, children choose their playgroup leaders according to the same criteria.

[p.33]

Repressive dominance, however, is a pattern often observed in use by individuals or groups toward strangers, which in traditional societies means nongroup members. Members of other groups not bonded by alliance contracts or other reciprocal ties may be exploited, robbed, driven away, and even killed, if this can be done without endangering the security of one’s own group members. The ruthless rivalry between groups over scarce resources, such as land, constituted one of the factors that drove the evolution of modern humans. For a while it was thought that war came into the world with horticulture and animal husbandry, but there is substantial evidence of warfare in the Paleolithic and among contemporary hunter-gatherers prior to European contact. Warfare, unfortunately, is a long-standing cultural achievement.

[p.34]

With humans we can observe competing groups in trade and war and gauge the results of winning and losing on populations large and small. We can examine how populations are spaced or even driven to dispersion or extinction. Losing certainly does not enhance fitness. Through individual and kin selection, characteristics evolved that allowed groups to bond so effectively that further cultural evolution could tap into these adaptations to bond very large anonymous groups, such as ethnic nations, which in turn acted as units in situations of group competition such as war.
Perhaps it is politically undesirable to face such facts. But blinding ourselves to reality will not contribute to solving the problem of maintaining the peace in an ever more crowded and rapidly changing world. In human phylogeny, warfare has worked in a group-selective way. We owe a part of what we are -- patterns of affiliation as much as of aggression -- to this activity. But we are not bound to follow primordial dictates. War is a culturally elaborated form of destructive group aggression open to cultural con-

[p.35]

trol, provided we find alternate means for fulfilling functions so far performed by warring -- competition and the protection of one's land, identity, and other resources.


Indoctrinability and Anonymous Societies

With the cultural evolution of animal husbandry and agriculture, higher population densities became possible and competition over land, property, and other resources became better organized and thus more destructive, as history teaches us. Groups able to recruit more manpower for attack and defence had an advantage over smaller groups. Of course, there were other factors involved, such as technological advantage, but from this stage onward there was a definite tendency for the formation of larger anonymous societies.

Among the cultural mechanisms that enhance the biologically given predispositions for kinship affiliation and reciprocity, ideology is of paramount importance. Our indoctrinability, in this context, plays an important role. Through indoctrination a fixation to culture-specific standards of behavior, ethical concepts, values, symbols, and other characteristics takes place, seemingly similar to the learning processes called ‘imprinting’ by ethologists. Like imprinting, indoctrination proves to be quite resistant to therapy. Again, a predisposition for the evolution of this capacity first appeared in the mother-child relation where it served to strengthen the bond by mutual fixation of both mother and child on individual characteristics of the other. This trait proved to be preadapted to bonding kin and then distant kin and finally other group members.

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The indoctrinability of our species seems to be a special learning disposition to form an affective attachment to symbols and

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values characterizing the quasi-familial we-group. Again, this learning is characterized by affective attachment and resistance to therapy. Once acquired, individuals seem substantially fixated to their religious, political, and other values and to the symbols typical for the we-group. The readiness to attach and adhere to such values takes place during the juvenile period, and I hypothesize that the physiological mechanisms (brain chemistry) involved with symbol identification are derived from those that secure familial attachment of the child. Humans follow a flag like an experimentally imprinted duckling, a ball.

It seems, however, that humans’ indoctrinability is nursed from several roots and that the process of cultural indoctrination taps into several genetic predispositions. Besides those securing family solidarity, those underlying sex identification seem of paramount importance since they enhance male bonding. Boys identify themselves with their fathers and other males, and girls with female models -- in many cultures apparently without cultural pressure. A bias in perception enhances this preference. Given the choice between schematized drawings of male and female frontal view body contours (which do not show any other sex characteristics), prepuberal boys and girls alike show a clear preference for the same-sex body schema. With puberty, a dramatic reversal of preference takes place. Now the shape of the other sex is preferred. The prepuberal preference guides attention to the appropriate model. Boys gang up in same-sex groups, and there is little doubt that male bonding, which becomes culturally reinforced by symbols of identification and by shared ideologies, is of paramount importance for group identity and group defense. At political rallies when people are identifying with the ‘sacred’ symbols and hymns of their religious or political community, altered states of mind are induced. People experience these as trance-like states that come upon them somehow beyond their control, as described by the terms ‘zeal’ and the German Begeisterung. It is as if God or the spirits have taken possession of them. At the same time people often experience the shudder of being deeply touched. This feeling is caused by the contraction of the muscles that raise the hair on the back, shoulders, and arms, an archaic response of social defense, which in our primate ancestors caused the fur to stand on end. It would be worthwhile to investigate the ethophysiology of this response.

Humans’ indoctrinability as a specific learning disposition was enhanced by the advantage it brought about in cementing existing

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bonds and cultural institutions, thus supporting the social, economic, and political institutions necessary for preserving harmony within the group (conflict management, rules for sharing, and the like). This was accomplished by strengthening a sense of togetherness, building up loyalties, and emphasizing contrasts to others often by creating images of enemies. Such bonding was to the advantage of both the individual and the group, for in the face of fierce intergroup competition an individual had few chances outside of a strong group. Indoctrinability is a special learning disposition that allows acceptance and identification with group characteristics and thus serves we-group demarcation. Once learned, these aspects of group identity seem to be resistant to eradication.

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Characteristics of group tradition are acquired early. Dialect stands out in this context, since the intonation and melody of voice remains for a lifetime and allows insiders to distinguish us- and other-group membership. It is very difficult to acquire such characteristics later in life. Identification with one’s own family during childhood lies at the roots of human indoctrinability -- small local groups acting as quasi-family units. But this is certainly not the whole story.

The bond to a native land is another affective disposition contributing to humans’ indoctrinability. This bonding to our home country is a type of ‘imprinting’ that may well be rooted in territoriality. Whether the affective bonding to home and country are of different origin and quality than the affective bonding to family and group, however, needs further investigation. In Western culture, people who grow up in a certain stable environment get ‘homesick’ when moving for longer periods, which is a highly peculiar state of affection. We found evidence for homesickness also in traditional societies, such as in the Trobrianders. People who change their home repeatedly in childhood seem not to form this attachment, thus achieving a certain ability to be mobile. The matter of a critical period for territorial attachment needs investigation. Cultural indoctrination imprints group identity and love of one’s native land in principle by the same means in tribal societies as in our Western culture.

Human beings are in particular open for value imprinting around puberty when adolescents seek group values with which to identify. Accordingly, it is at this time that initiation combined with indoctrination of group values occurs in most societies.
Since values supporting group interest were advantageous when groups were competing in war, selection favored the disposition for indoctrination. Young males, indeed, often willingly fight and risk death in combat for their group. Nonetheless, the bond to the family usually remains stronger. In our modern nation-states family also comes first, and nepotism is still a problem in society. Attempts to dissolve the family in modern times have failed. It is possible, however, to indoctrinate individuals to such an extent that their loyalty to the extended family is overruled by loyalty to the larger group, as represented by the head of the tribe, the monarch, or by the symbols of a nation. Indoctrination intends to counteract nepotism by putting tribe or state ethos above family ethos in the scale of val-

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ues. Loyalty to the symbolic head of state is supposed to come first, particularly in times of emergency.

With the formation of the early state, ideologies as promoted by political and religious leaders took on the additional function as pacemaker of evolution by setting new goals and thus initiating new ways of acting and thinking. Ultimately, though, ideologies are measured against the yardstick of fitness.

Cultural Pseudospeciation

As previously noted, the pressures that selected for large group formation derived from intergroup competition. (Here, amongst other things, sheer manpower counted.) Depending upon the subsistence strategy and the carrying capacity of the land, groups in pre-state societies ranged from a few dozen to a few hundred. In these societies, most groups split when they reach the size of 300 to 600. They usually split along kinship lines, assuming that it is their closest kin whom they would help. Humans show a strong inclination to form such subgroups, which eventually distinguish themselves from others by dialect and other subgroup characteristics and go on to form new cultures. Erikson (1966) aptly spoke of this process as ‘cultural pseudospeciation.’ As a result, the two tendencies are in conflict with each other, fissioning most likely to occur where kin ties are weakest, and fusion where individuals or groups need one another, whether for spreading economic risk or for joint security.

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The tendency for cultural pseudospeciation, whereby larger groups tend to split or smaller groups parcel themselves off through custom and dialect, initiates ethnocultural diversification, which in turn can serve as pacemaker for further biological evolution. Large group formation sometimes allows for rapid cultural change but inhibits cultural diversification, as the increasing uniformization of our world civilization shows. It also endangers existing ethnic groupings, which may be one source of increasing unrest on our globe. […]

If we look at the mechanisms employed to bond members or groups who are not close kin, we find that they tap into the existing phylogenetic adaptations already mentioned. In kin-based

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societies one common means of bonding is by extending kinship principles (terminology and accompanying behavior) beyond the circle of close kin to more distant kin and in some cases nonkin. This is done by the creation of segmentary lineage systems and other systems of descent: groups can thus trace themselves to a common ancestor. These groups are held together on the basis of both kinship and reciprocity.

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Repressive and Nurturant Strategies of Governing Populations

Human sociality is characterized by the conflicting behaviors of dominance and nurturance. The patterns of the former realm are the various forms of aggression (physical violence and the many forms of threat display), as well as the behaviors that serve flight or submission. All these are usually contrasted as agonistic behaviors as opposed to the prosocial behaviors that in mammals and birds are derived from parental nurturance.

Dominance can be achieved in a variety of ways. Repressive dominance is usually achieved by agonistic behaviors such as physical attack or threat, the dominated being subjugated, displaced into lower status or out of a previously held territory, or even killed (see Salter 1995 for a review and observational study of dominance techniques deployed by governments and other organizations).

Interestingly enough, nurturant behaviors can also serve the function of dominating. Giving can be used as a weapon, since reciprocity is felt as an obligation.

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Repressive dominance is usually suppressed in individualized, face-to-face communities, where high-ranking individuals are those with prosocial competence. Thus, by means of prosocial behavior individuals can also achieve high-ranking positions, such as community leader. And all gradients from nurturant leadership to nurturant dominance can be found. Children normally submit to the nurturant behaviors of their mothers or caretakers. It is, after all, comforting to be cared for.

The motivation to nurture can be so strong that efforts to that effect are continued against the resistance of the nurtured. Such overcaring can hamper emancipation of the individual and keep it in infantile dependence. Nurturant leadership is primarily a behavior characteristic of small, individualized communities.

Societies numbering in the many thousands or even millions, such as (ethnic) nations, share history, descent, language, and a set of cultural beliefs and practices. These signs of relatedness, if entrained, help create feelings of solidarity. Nonetheless, the prob-

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lem exists that in anonymous societies people are not bonded with equal strength, but rather demonstrate clear preferences along family and kinship lines. In the other direction, the inclination to establish repressive exploitative dominance relations toward persons not known and therefore not bonded in a personal way is less inhibited (Ellbogengesellschaft). It was probably this fact that caused Thomas Hobbes to assume that human beings, due to their egoistic nature, could be induced to live in harmony only by the coercive rule of a supreme sovereign. And in fact, repressive dominance by a king or a ruling caste was and still is a widely employed technique of government. Human beings are prepared to submit to repressive dominance if they cannot resist. However, they remain ready to revolt, vigilant for signs of weakness in the ruling elite, awaiting the chance to rid themselves of their oppressors or even to turn the tables on them.

The readiness to submit to command is strong, as demonstrated by the now classical experiments of Stanley Milgram, but repressive dominance, for reasons just explained, does not secure stability of government. History, however, shows that sometimes it works for generations, in particular if those who rule by intimidation also present themselves as protectors, since fear arouses protection-seeking in the vicinity of the strong, even if fear and protection derive from the same source. Closer examination reveals that infantile behaviors of flight to the parent are activated. It seems that in particular early civilizations, such as those of ancient Europe and Central America (Aztec, Maya), the rulers used repressive dominance to induce fear while at the same time offering protection.

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In anonymous societies, internal peace and harmony are constantly threatened by conflicting interest groups. This is particularly the case in multiethnic states where in times of emergency the different ethnic groups tend to compete in their efforts to dominate each other in order to secure access to scarce resources. More attention should be given to this cause of internal conflict. Some well-meaning philanthropists believe they are serving peace and opposing racism by encouraging the development of multicultural societies in formerly fairly homogenous nation-states. ‘Bold experiments’ like this could easily prove disastrous, the results being contrary to expectations, the more so since some proponents even of Caucasian stock seem to act in clear hostility to their own group.

Peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups within one state is certainly possible if none of the groups need fear the domina-

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tion of others, more generally if none finds itself in a situation of interethnic competition. This is best achieved when each group owns its own land and enjoys sovereignty over its own affairs as is the case in Switzerland.

At the basis of the liberal laissez faire is often the evolutionary concept of selection. Among others, Friedrich von Hayek expressed the opinion that we should rely on the regulating power of selection. But selection is a crude and certainly not human regulatory device. The prey-predator relationship is a classic example of the corrective principle of nature: if prey is abundant, the predator population increases. Finally, the prey population, suffering from overexploitation, diminishes, and starvation of the predators ensues, leading to an abrupt die-off. This gives the surviving prey population the chance to recover, and, with a delay, predators can start to thrive again and so forth. Certainly, we cannot want selection to shape our fate this way. We can set ourselves goals and plan ahead, and, provided we are ready to correct mistakes in time, this gives our species unique opportunities for rational and human planning. Laissez faire is not enough. At a certain point disorder and chaos may cause the pendulum to swing in an authoritarian direction and endanger liberal democracy. Open society was Karl Popper’s demand. By this he meant open to new ideas regardless from where they come. The Open Society should not be interpreted to mean the complete dismantling of barriers and acceptance of everything and everyone without regard to numbers, with consequent social unrest and environmental degradation.

Conclusion

Ethnocentrism and tribalism are universal phenomena rooted in primordial familial dispositions. The first manifestation of ‘us’ versus ‘others’ is the individualized mother-child dyad. With the evolution of individualized nurturant maternal care, caring motivations, behaviors and mother-child signals evolved and became available for adult bonding. They proved so effective that members of individualized face-to-face groups not directly belonging to a family were able to bond in such a way that the group could, in certain situations, such as war, act as a unit. Intergroup competition selected for large-group formation. If we look at the mechanisms employed to bond members of groups who are not close kin, we

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find that they tap into existing phylogenetic adaptations of familial sociality. Culturally developed symbols of identification enhance similarity, and entrained shared values make the behavior of group members predictable for each other. Thus, mistrust of the unfamiliar is counteracted. Indoctrinability is a special learning disposition allowing acceptance and identification with group characteristics, which thus serves bonding and we-group demarcation.

Monday, 19 October 2009

Indoctrinabilty, Ideology, and Warfare

After experiencing the mind-bomb of Global Meltdown, an experience I referred to here, one of the first and most personally influential books I read in the immediate aftermath was Indoctrinabilty, Ideology, and Warfare: Evolutionary Perspectives, edited by Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Frank Kemp Salter.

[Salter was later to rock my world again with On Genetic Interests - so good I bought several copies (if anyone reading this would like to make a small donation to the BNP, Steadfast Trust, or something similar in return for an untouched, still sealed copy of the second edition send me an email and we’ll work it out). And incidentally, although it is 11 years old I would still recommend Global Meltdown to readers interested in an honest analysis of the problems caused by globalism, mass migration, the culture wars, and subsequent social breakdown. As I mentioned before it’s an academic work that quotes writers like Taylor, Brimelow and Abernethy respectfully, but it has another virtue: unlike the similarly themed Clash of Civilisations, Coming Anarchy, or New White Nationalism it is not written to persuade Euros and ‘their’ governments to act in ways beneficial to other groups (Jews in Huntington’s and Kaplan’s works, Blacks in Swain’s) but harmful to us.]

Now, back to Indoctrinabilty. Over the next few days I’ll post some of the parts most relevant to a pro-nationalist position. I think most readers of this blog that haven’t yet read Indoctrinability will perceive its quality if I name some of its contributors: Salter, obviously, but also Kevin Macdonald, Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson, J. Philippe Rushton, Lionel Tiger, and Johan M. G. van der Dennen among others. For now, here’s an extract from the introductory chapter in which the editors set out their stall.

From Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Salter (eds), Indoctrinabilty, Ideology, and Warfare: Evolutionary Perspectives (New York, Berghahn Books, 1998) pp.1-3:

Ar